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“一带一路”倡议中需注意的五大问题

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一、“一带一路”倡议起源于对美国奥巴马政府重返亚太战略的回应

现在大家热议的“一带一路”倡议，在 2013 年提出来的，最初就是对奥巴马重返亚太战略的回应。这要进行一个简要的历史回顾，在 9.11 以前，中国是美国霸权主要的、潜在的敌人，非常凑巧的是 9.11 事件，让真的敌人打到美国了，在美国本土发生了战争，所以 2001 年到 2003 年美国主要精力是忙于中东战事。但是 2004-2006 年，美国相当多的智库说美国敌人不在中东，还是在中国，因为中国加入 WTO 以后，几年的情况发展非常好，GDP、财政、就业情况，都出乎意料的好。所以到 2008 年小布什下台以后，奥巴马政府就开始布局，尽早的收中东的烂摊子，重返亚太。

在美国“重返亚太”的变化中，中国最担忧的问题，就是能源问题。能源是中国工业化最主要的一个动脉。我们从 2000 年之后也在布局考虑这个问题，先提的“一带”，后提的“一路”，如果这“一路”被卡住了，我们怎么办？能源怎么办？如果马六甲海峡被卡住，那是不是有两个海上通道？这个起点上，我们提出“一带一路”的倡议，国际反应很快很好，这也和我们中国的一些人才相关。亚洲基础设施投资银行的金立群发挥了积极作用，原来我们讲亚投行，最多的时候 30 几个，后来到现在的 70 多个，受欢迎程度远远出乎意料。

二、“一带一路”倡议核心是对欧美主导的国际关系叙事的修正，学界要对其赋予的各种含义进行解读。

最近这一两年，附加在“一带一路”的意义，学界的、政界的、商界的，不断的加重。最早的加，就是和国内产业结构调整有关，和能源安全有关。主要是几十年来中国造桥、造路、打洞以及整个机械设施已经全球第一了，我们有信心走出去，正好发展中国家也需要基础设施建设，一些发达国家也需要。所以我们利用优质的产能出去，带动我们的钢铁、中车出去。然后附加的文化意义，这个意义加上去，就非常宏大了。我们要改变 500 年来，尤其是威斯特伐利亚体系以来欧美主导的国际关系体系，这个体系中，主权国家平等的形式，内含一些明确的或不明确的要求。这些我们不是打破，而是要修正，原则就是“共商、共建、共享”，“平等、尊重、合作、共赢”；还有结邦不结盟，对抗和平衡，中国带来了新的全球关系的秩序叙事，包括人类命运共同体的重新叙事。

这个叙事，是因为要摆脱二战以来的西方的话语，以人权、民主为主导的话语体系，建立“共商、共建、共享”的话语体系。因此，“一带一路”要照顾到各个地区的多样性的差异，中国和东道国个别谈，所以最近一年

半我们讲对接讲得多了，就是防止单向输出。对“一带一路”赋予的含义，哪些含义是可行的，哪些是理念的，哪些是原初的，哪些含义是逐步附加的？这是第一个大的问题，学界要进行思考。

三、有必要认真分析“一带一路”倡议对东道国工业化推进的利弊

我们要考虑“一带一路”倡议，对东道国工业化推进可能带来的不利影响。这是一个很复杂的问题，没有工业化，就没有城市化。中国30年的发展，正好是机缘巧合，1978年邓小平执政与英国撒切尔夫人、美国里根同时进行全球化，中国的改革开放无意中就对接了。二战以后，西方发达国家原来低端的产能，也到了向外转移的时候，我们正好对接。中国搞了开发区，把沉淀在农村的几亿完全剩余的劳动力，转移到工厂中，移出去以后，他就有了工资收入，这样快的伟大的转型、复杂的转型，保证了相对的稳定和增长。这是我们没有想到的。到之后的国内顶住压力，加入WTO，极大促进了经济的发展，2002年到2008年，一下子把我们原来积累的就业问题都解决了。而且2003到2005年劳动力供不应求。

现在，中国整个工业，要从中低端向中高端转，同时很长时间要保留中低端，以解决农民工就业问题，这就动了欧美的奶酪。西方国家的发达，是因为他价值链的上游，这个上游如果给中国占了，对西方是一个巨大的威胁，因为中国人口巨大，民族认同感强，而且我们有完备的工业体系。中国如果什么都能造，理论上讲，就堵塞了印度重复走中国工业化道路的可能性。如果低端产业一下子流到印度了，虽然解决了印度2亿多的剩余劳动力，但是商品的市场在哪里呢？中国已经占据了绝大部分的国际市场。还需要印度卖给我们什么工业品呢？这其中的确有零和博弈的味道，共赢、双赢可能很难实现。我们要了解，中国对外最大的需要，其实就是能源、矿产资源，这是一个不争的事实。

所以“一带一路”，到底给沿线国家带来工业化、城市化多少真正的好处？我们要冷静分析。另外这些沿线国家，生态很脆弱，有污染风险的企业去，肯定要出问题。中亚国家的生态，比我们国家还脆弱。所以我们讲“一带一路”产业发展的时候，要冷静分析其对东道国的影响。

四、要注意“一带一路”沿线国家的宗教和文化问题，对沟通的难度要有理性的认识

“一带一路”沿线国家很多是伊斯兰教国家，这些国家面临着西方的压迫，面临着市场化、工业化、城市化多重问题，转型的艰难程度比中国不知道多几倍。一个重要的原因就是：伊斯兰教的教义、圣训，对日常生活都有很多宗教化的规定，任何行为方式的变动，都触及了宗教的基本教义，这就给他们带来问题。反过来，中国没有宗教，什么都可以，所以给中国的现代化带来无穷无尽的便利，当然没有宗教也有没有宗教的问题。对伊斯兰教国家，文化的相通没有那么容易，也不是说不能沟通，沟通的

时候，要求我们对伊斯兰教要有所分析，可以试图把可兰经，还有大规模的圣训，作为沟通的依据。这其中，我们要积极培养人才，在文化沟通中发挥作用，但是也要考虑到它的困难性。

要注意的是：中国的历史上，儒家、道家从来都没有向外输出，都是别人来学习，说明对自己极端自信，没有兴趣进行输出。西方的文化输出主要是宗教输出，可以叫社会组织输出，几百年的传统就是如此。所以欧美现在建立了人权 NGO，慈善机构，也服从整个社会、经济的需要。西方的输出是有宗教的动力和情怀在其中的，中国比较缺乏这个原生动力，文化和社会组织的输出还是要政府给钱和配套，我们缺乏传教士般的激情。但是，中国的优点也在这个地方，不进行强行输出，西方文化是强行输出，近代是输出宗教、当代就是输出人权民主。

五、“一带一路”倡议中要对“中印关系”给予足够的重视

印度政府和主流社会对“一带一路”的态度是多元化的，是趋向于保守和负面的，这也属于一个常态。因为中印之间的关系是非常微妙的，原因在于：

第一，我们与印度存在着边界问题，2200 公里中我们和印度的边界有一段是唯一没有划定的。

第二，1962 年中印藏南之战，中国的胜利让印度心存芥蒂。

第三，是印巴关系，让印度有所担心。克什米尔是印巴问题的核心。我们在巴基斯坦、克什米尔地区修路、建设中巴经济走廊 (CPEC)，触痛了印度的神经，印度希望我们能够满足他们在克什米尔的要求，这也是不可能的。同时克什米尔地区主权复杂、文化复杂，底层人民信仰伊斯兰教，上层人民信任印度教，矛盾难以调和。

第四，印度被西方媒体捧得有点昏昏沉沉，说他是最大的民主国家，但必须问，为什么民主国家经济发展赶不上“专制”的中国（西方学者的话语）？这是印度最难回答的一个问题，这二三十年以来，两国综合国力的差异急剧拉开了。同时美国人发明了针对中国的“珍珠链”战略，要各个攻破。这些都导致了印度的耿耿于怀，因此“一带一路”倡议的推进中，一定要注意中印之间的关系问题。

北约东扩、“特朗普新政”与俄欧安全新格局

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北约问题是横亘在俄罗斯与欧洲之间的一道鸿沟。这道鸿沟并不只是冷战造成的，而是有其深厚复杂的历史渊源。在冷战终结之后的十多年里，俄罗斯与西方一度和解。但是在新世纪初期，双方关系又一步一步地重趋紧张。北约的东扩在其中发挥了事关重大的特殊影响。

从今天来看，北约东扩并不仅仅是某一个国际组织在单一领域的扩展过程，而是包含着北约作为一个军事安全组织在欧洲地区以国家—政治单位为内涵的边界扩展，而且，通过防御性战略武器系统——反导系统的部署，又带动了常规武装力量在乌克兰危机之后再一次直接呈现于东西方对抗的最前沿。

北约东扩不光受到俄罗斯的抵制，在西方阵营内部，也一直存在着对北约东扩的不同看法。在2016年美国大选结果揭晓前后，特朗普对北约、俄罗斯，以及欧洲安全问题，发表了不少关于“北约过时”、关于要与俄罗斯改善关系的言论，与美国以往战略大相径庭，令人颇有大跌眼镜之感。但此后不久的2017年2月慕尼黑峰会，以及在此前后特朗普政府班子的要员接连访问欧洲，包括特朗普在内的美国政要又表态要维持与欧洲的盟友关系。这一前所未见的戏剧性变化将给北约、俄罗斯与欧洲安全关系带来何种影响？俄欧安全关系的未来究竟是会走向和解、趋于新冷战、抑或会出现更糟糕的局面？

一、危机背景下的北约东扩之争

苏联解体以后，作为一个在冷战时期与华约集团对峙的军事组织——北约，将何去何从，自然成了问题。

20世纪90年代后，曾有过一场关于北约将会从军事安全组织转型为政治组织的大讨论，但人们各执一词，讨论有始而无终。对于当时北约在对巴尔干地区前南斯拉夫诸国事务的干预中所起的作用，始终也存在着争议。包括1996-1997年的北约东扩，人们现在才了解到，美国内部的争议甚至发生在最核心的决策层。一直到2001年“9·11”恐怖袭击事件发生后，美国似乎才如梦初醒。特别是在新保守主义势力的催动之下，小布什觉得大有必要借打击恐怖主义的机会，再次凸现北约的安全功能。

此后的十几年里，北约先是在美国的推动下全力投入了阿富汗战争。虽然战事进行得断断续续，时起时伏，但是，毕竟阿富汗战争是北约在新世纪的第一次大规模集体军事行动。更为关键的变化，乃是2007-2008年间，小布什试图推动把格鲁吉亚、乌克兰等国拉入北约。此举虽然在德国等欧洲伙伴的阻挠下未能实现，但深刻地影响了此后北约与俄罗斯的相互关系。

2009年，奥巴马上台之后，一度以推动中东革命为己任。但正当中东革命引发了连绵不断的动荡局势之后，美国却表现出明显的颓势。在金融危机中自身难保、捉襟见肘的尴尬局面下，美国半推半就把法国等盟国推上第一线。2011年通过扩大解释联合国安理会的关于利比亚“禁飞区”的决议，由北约出面进行空中袭击，军事干预利比亚政局，在乱军中残暴处死卡扎菲。直到2013年，正当奥巴马准备从阿富汗战场带头撤出以北约名义的军事力量时，乌克兰危机突然发生。一方面，这场危机使准备不足的北约感到措手不及，但另一方面，乌克兰危机也使得北约获得了切实加强其安全功能的重大机会。此后，北约在欧亚大陆的布局随之发生重大改变：从仅仅停留在巴尔干、阿富汗、包括利比亚等当年冷战时期的边缘地带，转而登堂入室，回到了欧洲正面防线的“新欧洲”地带，直接开始与俄罗斯重新对峙。

实事求是地说，冷战终结之后，北约在欧洲的扩大过程，一开始并没有引起重大争议。北约东扩的发起，也并非美国所为，而是缘起于身处东西方之间的中东欧国家对自身的安全关切。在当时的政治氛围之下，甚至冷战中的老对手俄罗斯也一度表示有加入北约的兴趣。但是，所有这一切并没能抹去北约这一实实在在的军事安全组织在“政治化”的形式和表象下，自20世纪90年代后半期与21世纪初，在中东欧、东南欧、波罗的海国家这些敏感的地缘政治要地，利用每一次危机的发生所进行的有组织、有步骤的战略扩张的事实。

二、反导系统与欧洲安全

反导武器系统，是美国在冷战年代争取战略优势以及维持冷战后世界军事霸权的撒手锏。新世纪以来，一方面，美国执意推进反导系统，把原属美国一家的反导计划，变成了覆盖整个欧洲大地的、北约的反导系统；另一方面，俄罗斯应对反导系统的态度则由合作转向抵制，表现出不可妥协的立场。这一组逆向而动的趋势表明，反导问题乃是新世纪以来大国安全关系中的焦点所在。

美国反导系统经历过几个发展阶段。以反导问题为轴心，可以看出美国、北约与俄罗斯相互之间的安全战略关系，一波又一波地展现出各个阶段的不同态势。

第一阶段，自1983年“战略防御计划”提出，直至2001年底美国退出《反导条约》。虽然在这段时期围绕反导系统的争斗，没有此后那样激烈复杂，但也大体反映出美国与俄罗斯之间在反导问题上的深刻对立：即使在相互关系较好的情况下，也不惜撕破脸皮而一争高下。

第二阶段，从美国正式退出《反导条约》到2008年8月俄罗斯-格鲁吉亚战争的爆发。这是美国反导系统由摆脱规范制约，开始走向实施，并引发与俄罗斯关系骤然恶化的一个关键时期。

第三阶段，自2008年俄罗斯-格鲁吉亚战争结束到2013年乌克兰危

机爆发。这一阶段的前期，美俄关系“重启”确实又一次带来了美俄相互抗争过程中的和缓与接近。但是，美俄双方在反导这一重大战略问题上的深刻分歧，始终是导致美俄关系“重启”又重新向危机态势倒转的核心问题。

第四阶段，从2013年底乌克兰危机发生一直到2016年的反导系统开始进入实际部署状态。

乌克兰危机的爆发，导致俄罗斯与美欧间关系的大倒退。不光美俄关系的“重启”已成过眼烟云，而且，俄欧安全争议因克里米亚事件而急剧升温。在此背景下，欧洲反导系统的部署成为东西方关系中最令人关切的大事之一。

在反导问题上，俄罗斯与美国在欧洲的战略力量失衡已经出现。这就是为什么普京一再强调，反导是新世纪以来美俄关系恶化的根源。总之，反导问题得不到妥善解决，欧洲安全构架就难以真正形成。

三、乌克兰危机后的常规武装力量重新对峙

乌克兰危机爆发以后，从一方面看，克里米亚的回归，俄罗斯的军事志愿人员在乌克兰东部地区的介入，清晰地表现出俄方不顾自己在国内外诸多问题上的困难，坚决抵制西方影响在乌克兰扩展的决心。另一方面，针对乌克兰这样一个非成员国来说，北约当时也并没有做好直接军事回应的准备，甚至，此刻俄罗斯如果进一步干预乌克兰和其他地区事务，北约也没有特别的应急计划。可以说，乌克兰危机实际上激发起了美国与其他北约成员国的政治意愿，要求“重新审视北约对欧洲安全的根本承诺及美国的领导作用”。

（一）北约军队的重新部署

华沙北约峰会所确认的驻军计划，其内容包括：向波罗的海国家派出四支部队——波兰、波罗的海三国每国各一支，共四支多国营；每营一千人，实行轮换（按斯托尔滕伯格的解释，这样做，是为了不与“俄罗斯与北约基本文件”的规定相抵触）；将北约快速反应部队的人数扩大到了原来的三倍，达到4万人；设立规模为一个旅的先锋部队（拟驻扎在罗马尼亚），作为快速反应部队的一部分；在北约东部建立8个小型司令部；在东欧的多国部队，由北约核心大国负责（在波兰的北约驻军将由美国领导，在波罗的海三国的分别由加拿大、德国和英国负责）；大国落实预置装备、补充预警和情报手段；还将在当地防御性地部署更多武器；值得关注的是，本次峰会邀请了两个中立国——北约伙伴国瑞典与芬兰——的领导人参加。近年来，北约越来越积极地对这两个国家进行入盟的游说。

这是北约在冷战结束之后规模最大、力度也最大的一次调整。

（二）欧洲成员国的不同立场

华沙峰会前夕，当时的德国外长施泰因迈尔刚刚警告过，不要“用动静很大的武力威胁和战争叫嚣”来加剧紧张关系。但是在华沙峰会上，还是推出了一连串冷战终结以来最大规模的北约强军计划。德国社会民主党

主席西格马·加布里尔质疑道：“我们必须自问，如果双方在边境上举行军事演习、增加兵力并相互威胁，世界是否真会变得更好”。法国总统奥朗德则明确表示：“北约没有权力对欧洲应与俄罗斯建立怎样的关系指手画脚。对于法国来说，俄罗斯既不是威胁，也不是敌人。”捷克总统泽曼公开对在四国派驻北约军队表示质疑。比利时和卢森堡的代表也认为，北约应当考虑改变对俄立场，与莫斯科展开对话，“华沙峰会不是为了反对谁，这不是论坛的宗旨。”

（三）俄罗斯的反应

俄罗斯常驻北约代表亚历山大·格鲁什卡表示：北约在东部地区的行动“具有对抗性质”，“俄罗斯将被迫对北约的行动做出反应”。在华沙峰会之前，格鲁什卡就通过媒体反驳了斯托尔滕伯格所提出的理由。首先，他明确表示：“北约在东部采取的举措只会令局势恶化。实际上，这是用军事手段（例如官兵轮值和大型演习）来打造新的分界线，妨碍大欧洲项目的落实，并加强欧洲国家对美国的依赖。”

华沙峰会前夕的专家论坛上，北约副秘书长弗什博表示：“如今我们怀着惆怅的心情承认，我们转入了与俄罗斯的长期战略竞争，因为双方对欧洲的看法有原则性的分歧。”他说：这意味着北约“已经开始了冷战后方向相反的新转型。”北约将回归自己的本源——巩固自己的东部边界。

（四）关于“军事存在规模”和“混合战争”问题的争议

乌克兰危机以后，美国与北约成员国到底可以在何种程度上做出军事反应，至少在两个关键问题上俄罗斯与西方存在争议。

第一个问题，是1997年俄罗斯与北约基本文件中关于如何界定“军事存在”的争议。按照1997年5月27日俄罗斯与北约签署的关于《俄罗斯与北约之间相互关系、合作和安全的基本文件》的条款：“北约确认：在现在和未来可预见的安全条件下，北约同盟将会通过协作、一体化和增强潜能的方式，来实施自己的防务和完成相应任务，而不是通过增加部署大规模常规作战力量的方式。”

第二个问题，是如何应对俄罗斯在乌克兰东部地区所发起的所谓“混合战争”。乌克兰危机以后，欧洲安全领域出现了一个令各方专家热议的新词：“混合战争”。有趣的是，对立中的双方都使用“混合战争”的类似概念，用来指责对方故意模糊不清的军事行动。俄罗斯专家认为：“2013年底在乌克兰成功挑起一场‘混合战争’的是美国，其目的是用傀儡政权来取代政府”。

四、“特朗普新政”与北约的前景

总的来说，近年来对于北约的走势，大体可以归纳为两种估量和分析：立场之一，认为美国对俄策略已经失败，应该重新考虑北约的存留。在这一立场之下的第一种意见认为，当前西方对俄战略已经陷于全面困境。这一立场中的第二种观点认为，美国应该退出北约。在这一立场中，还包括

第三种看法，认为俄罗斯横竖没有出路：即使美俄和解，也不会对普京有帮助。这一观点，实际上是主张美国放弃对俄的强硬态度，与特朗普竞选期间主张暗合。

从以上这两种观点可以明显地看出，正在左右为难中希望调整对俄罗斯关系的不仅是特朗普执政集团，而且还包括其他方面的政治精英。

但是，美欧内部争议中还有更为显著的另一种影响广泛的立场，主张北约要以更加强硬的联盟战略来对付俄罗斯。

这一派立场当中，还可以细分出两种意见：前者侧重于“强硬”；后者侧重于“遏制”。持第一种主张“强硬”立场观点的西方人士不在少数。他们认为，面对“俄罗斯的威胁”，欧美必须团结一致，强硬应对。这一种观点的结论是，北约的强硬立场有可能获得胜算。

这一立场中的第二种意见认为，作为北约的战略对策，应该重回凯南式的遏制战略。遏制战略的要点应该是：第一，近半个世纪之久的凯南式遏制的持续耐心；第二，相信西方优势和俄罗斯所面临困境的坚定不移的信念；第三，维护西方的团结。只有这些才是成功的关键。

代结语：北约、欧洲安全与俄罗斯之争的历史比较

从相对较短时段来看，国际学者较为关注的是冷战以来，特别是冷战结束以来，美俄多次缓和与“重启”对于欧洲安全的影响。实事求是地说，尽管东西方之间在欧洲呈现多年高度对抗状态，但是，毕竟还是有过不少次或多或少的和解。当今形势之下，似乎对抗局势又在卷土重来，但是，回顾历史，东西方之间顽强不息地追求和平的努力，始终还是给当前事态的进程留下了重要启示。

第一个问题是有关地缘政治在当今变局中的作用。普京在2016年瓦尔代论坛的大会讲演中提到，“地缘政治因素比之意识形态更重要。”普京的这一论断迄今还并没有太多为国际舆论所议论。但当今国际变局中，意识形态与地缘政治因素孰轻孰重的话题，值得人们深思。虽然，非意识形态化的语境一度主导冷战后的国际发展，但是，一方面，意识形态可能是很难被“胜利者”所主动摒弃的，另一方面，地缘政治利益博弈从来没有为意识形态的去留而消失，相反，是愈演愈烈。所以，普京的这一断语点出了事态的要害。

第二个问题，对于北约东扩背景之下的欧洲安全格局的发展趋势而言，二战以来几十年的国际遗产和经验教训，虽然值得总结，但是多少还是显得时间短暂，因而未能触及更为深刻层面的结构性变化。这意味着，需要根据更长时段的观察进行总结和反思。

居于总体弱势的俄罗斯，在冷战终结和苏联解体后二十六年来磨难中，经受了考验，凸显了自强不息的顽强斗志。但是，在内外诸多挑战之下，还难言前程乐观。以多元共存代替以往一元主导的格局，乃是一个从未经历过的历史大变局。若非经历漫长而曲折的路途，难以设想会有任何斩获。

所需要的可能不仅是力量和勇气，往往还更多地有赖于思想的健全与创意，方能编织出未来的俄罗斯、北约与欧洲安全格局的一幅清晰图景。

尤需强调的是，历史上西方在大欧亚地区的扩张——无论十字军东征，无论法国大革命后的拿破仑扩张战争，也无论是北约东扩——都是由一元化导向下的意识形态（宗教）和政治军事扩张为启端，最后总落得或多或少地趋于更为多样化发展的结局。这样的历史逻辑一再得以重现，理应给后人留下教益。

相比之下，以往的西方扩张与冷战后条件下北约东扩的最大不同点，是在西方依然具有综合优势的背景下，推行伴有深重战略威慑成分的扩张，但是，毕竟还没有发生大规模或全局性的武装冲突和军事战争。所以，尽管北约东扩来势凶猛，也确实已经走向一个面临全面军事冲突的临界点，但是，历史的进步在战争与和平问题上的体现十分清晰。这说明当今条件之下，依然还留存维护和平的机会，有待于各方有志者对此尽其一切可能的努力。

两国元首对表 夯实中美“大厦”

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国家主席习近平同美国总统特朗普的海湖庄园会 7 日落幕。正如习近平主席在会见时提到的，中美关系的大厦要一层一层建设好。此次元首会的成功举行，使得中美关系实现了从奥巴马政府到特朗普政府的平稳过渡，为中美关系这栋大厦夯实了基础。

此次元首会的成果，我们可以从四个方面来理解。

首先，两国元首以及两国工作团队之间建立关系。特朗普在会谈时表示，他同习主席第一次见面谈得很好，建立起了良好的友谊。以特朗普的性格来看，这并不是客套话。与前任相比，特朗普个性比较“接地气”，因此一直有“大嘴”之称。由此判断，双方元首在首次会面中的确建立了良好的友谊。更值得关注的是，两国工作团队之间也顺利地建立了关系。元首会只有短短的一天，不可能对很多具体的事项进行细致交流。而在两国元首会晤前，国务院副总理汪洋同美国财政部长姆努钦、商务部长罗斯，国务委员杨洁篪同美国国务卿蒂勒森、国防部长马蒂斯已经启动对话机制，就相关问题深入交流，并商定了两个机制下一步工作的议程。特朗普在内阁很多重要岗位继任者还未就职之际，将核心团队悉数带到海湖庄园，与中方进行对接，显示出“以成果为导向”的务实态度。

格外值得注意的是，特朗普本人以及经过内部“斗争”后确立的核心团队，基本都属于务实型。正如特朗普本人在会谈时所说，希望重要问题保持沟通和协调，和中国共同办成一些大事。这就给中美关系的未来提供了更大空间。

其次，此次元首会为下一步的两国关系发展定下了积极的基调。中美元首的会面，历来都会为中美关系发展定调。那么，这次两国元首如何为新时期中美关系进行“顶层设计”？“相互尊重、互利互惠”这 8 个字为中美关系未来定下了积极的基调。如果要进一步理解这 8 个字，那么前 4 个字是针对如何处理两国的分歧，而后 4 个字则指的是中美在各个领域、特别是经贸领域的合作。例如，在朝核问题上，两国元首各自阐述了立场，确立了继续在联合国框架内进行合作，强调执行安理会的决议，并以和平的方式解决问题。这就是互相尊重。如果特朗普总统能积极回应习主席提出的欢迎美方参与“一带一路”框架内合作的倡议，那将是对两国“互利互惠”和“共同办一些大事”最好的诠释。

第三，此次元首会重新确立、开拓发展了处理双方关系的机制性保障。自 2006 年中美战略与经济对话创建以来，它已经成为两国之间卓有成效的对话机制。此次元首会在原有的基础上加以开拓，形成了外交安全对话、全面经济对话、执法及网络安全对话、社会和人文对话 4 个高级别对话合

作机制,进一步细化两国的合作,使之更具有可操作性,符合特朗普政府“成果导向”的预期。

最后,良性互动努力管控潜在危机。正如习近平在与特朗普会面时所说,两军关系是中美关系的重要组成部分,军事安全互信是中美战略互信基础。此次由美方提出、中方响应的两国联合参谋部对话机制新平台,将修补奥巴马执政后期因为南海危机而陷入停顿的两军关系,进一步完善重大军事行动相互通报信任措施机制和海空相遇安全行为准则两大互信机制。

虽然此次元首会为新时期中美关系成功地开了局,但是中美关系正常化 45 年来,两国关系从来不是一帆风顺,不到 24 小时的“习特会”还有很多没有解决的问题:比如朝核问题两国将以何种形式合作,在经贸领域提出的“百日计划”如何解决贸易不平衡,4 个高级对话机制如何产生令双方满意的成果,能源领域进一步合作的方向,等等。

美国国内政治的复杂性以及特朗普政策的不确定性仍是接下来两国发展关系的最大障碍,正如习近平主席所说,我们有一千条理由把中美关系搞好。在中美元首对表之后,相信也有一千条方法把中美关系这栋大厦建得更牢、更高、更美。

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略经修改与翻译

如何理解今日中国之基督教

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关于如何理解今日中国之基督教，中外和教会内外有种种不同的视角和看法。而我对中国基督教的想法和角度，自然不同于中国政府和基督教会，与中国其他学者也有所不同。我主要从以下几个视角或分析框架来讨论当前中国的基督教：一、后传教时代的中西宗教互动；二、当前中国基督教在中国社会的处境；三、“信仰中国”：关于中国的新叙事。

一、“后传教时代”的中外（中美）宗教互动

西方在华传教运动是中外关系史上十分重要的一页。西方尤其是美国的基督教差会通过在中国举办大量教育、医疗和慈善等机构，产生了巨大的社会影响，为中美关系奠定了文化和社会基础，传教士也因此成为中美两国之间的精神纽带。然而，随着具有世界意义的中国革命的胜利，西方教会和传教士在 20 世纪 40 年代末和 50 年代初全面撤离中国大陆，这在中美关系上投下了长长的阴影。

在西方基督教会全面撤离中国的 60 多年后的今天，宗教再度成为中西尤其是中美关系中的重要因素。就中美关系而言，传教士在两国之间的“精神中介”和“文化桥梁”的作用已大为下降。而且此种互动和交流的主要目的也不是传播基督教福音。在 20 世纪上半叶中国大陆一度是世界上接受基督教传教士最多的国家，而在过去 60 多年来中国已由西方尤其是美国基督教传教运动的“福地”变为“禁区”，中西或中美宗教交流和互动显然已进入“后传教时代”，然而其内容却比以往任何时候都更加丰富和多样化。

后传教时代中美宗教互动呈现出如下特点：

首先，后传教时代意味着传教士不再是中美两国之间的主要精神纽带，派遣传教士也不再是西方差会的主要传教方式，因为中国政府明令禁止外国差会来华传教。美国基督教会并未放弃对中国大陆的传教活动，只是由于受中国国情限制其传教方式由直接转为间接。因此早期作为中美两国之间主要精神中介的传教运动已被现在多样化的宗教接触和交流所取代。

其次，与传教时代不同，后传教时代的中美宗教互动不仅限于民间接触和交流，而且涉及政府层面，包括宗教反恐、政府间宗教对话、以信仰为基础的公共外交以及关于“宗教自由”问题的立法等。美国政府涉足宗教或推行“福音化外交政策”主要出于以下原因：冷战结束以来宗教、民族等问题的非疆域化、美国内外政策的界限模糊、外交政策的社会关怀倾向以及美国国内宗教因素的外溢（包括宗教议题外溢和宗教势力外溢）等等。与民间宗教交流一样，中美政府间或半官方的宗教互动有时会推动中

美关系的发展，有时又会起到阻碍作用。

第三，中国是宗教大国而非强国，但美国在宗教上的超级大国地位则极为突出。尽管在后传教时代中国在宗教领域已成为积极的输出者，比如由联合圣经协会资助的南京爱德基金会为世界上 70 多个国家印刷了 70 多种语言的 2600 多万册圣经，使中国成为世界上最大的《圣经》生产国和输出国。中国还是世界上包括圣诞礼品在内的宗教商品的最大的生产国和出口国。但这基本上还是精神产品的“物化”或“商品化”，所提供的还主要是宗教商品而非宗教公共产品，这与拥有世界上最大“宗教出口业”的美国相比仍有很大差距。中美宗教交流相当不平衡，在非物质性的宗教领域中国对美交流则存在较大入超。

第四，后传教时代中美宗教交流的不平衡还表现为美国的“宗教知华派”为数寥寥。直到目前美国有关中国基督教的“公共话语”或讨论水准仍十分粗浅，更多在发泄情绪而不是发布事实信息，而且趋于两极化。美国对中国基督教的此种可被称为“高情绪化的低水准认知”在对中国各大宗教以及宗教政策的总体认识上也普遍存在。美国有关团体和个人对中国宗教政策和状况的过于政治化和意识形态化的解读、基于神学传统的先入之见、出于筹款目的和政治操控等权宜之计的做法均构成中美宗教交流的障碍。基督教宣教学上有“福音未及之地”和“福音未得之民”的说法。美国还有许多“中国宗教真实信息未及之地和未得之民”。

第五，反观中国，对美国宗教以及宗教因素在中美关系中的作用无论在社会层面还是在政（府）教（会）学（术）三界都未得到足够的重视，关于这些议题的“公共话语”和民间议论通常也比较简单化，并且同样存在着误解、分歧乃至对立。就学界而言，尽管近 10 多年来一些论著陆续问世，包括本人主编的《宗教与美国社会》系列丛书，但与美国研究的其他领域相比，仍存在着较大的差距。学界的美国宗教研究除少数例外实际上还处在偏重历史（主要是美国在华传教史）、文献综述和译介的阶段。就基督教而言，实际上中国教牧领袖对美国基督教的实际情况，比如对水晶大教堂、柳溪教会、马鞍山教会、葛培理福音布道会等著名教堂和教会组织的了解，要远胜于许多学者。推动国内学界对美国宗教尤其是美国对外关系中的宗教因素的研究，减少各种猜疑和误判，尤其是减少过于政治化的解读，对于中美关系的稳定和持续发展具有深远的意义。

第六，后传教时代的中美宗教互动不限于基督宗教。此前其他宗教交流与基督宗教相比影响甚微，但在后传教时代尤其是中国改革开放以来如佛教、道教、犹太教、摩门教等宗教均在较大程度上参与互动，这不仅体现了中国社会开放的广度，也反映了美国宗教格局多元化的深度。具有摩门教背景并曾在中国台湾地区担任该教会传教士的洪博培 (Jon Huntsman) 出任奥巴马政府的驻华大使，就是此种宗教互动多元化的生动写照。事实上中国对外开放以后逐渐落户于中国各地的摩门教、东正教、巴哈伊教、犹太教以及中国民间信仰的复兴，对中国目前的五大合法宗教（即基督教、

天主教、佛教、道教和伊斯兰教)的宗教管理模式,构成了挑战。

第七,对中国来说,美国对华宗教输入最大的影响之一就是形成了中国人看待宗教问题如政教关系等的外在参照系。这对中国未来的宗教政策和实践将产生重要的影响。事实上随着中国海外利益的全球化和以孔子学院为代表的文化走出去战略的全面实施,中国政府不少部门和社会各界对过去基督教传教运动的看法也有所改变。

二、基督教在今日中国社会之处境

统计数据的缺乏或不准确是理解当代中国基督教的最大难题。关于当前中国基督教权威统计数据的缺乏以及对之解读的分歧之大,足以引出截然不同的结论。然而,正因为后传教时代的中美宗教互动,尤其是在宗教民调领域的合作,中美或中外之间的“方法论差距”和“信徒人数差距”正在明显缩小。据目前中外学界都比较认可的数据,中国各种宗教信徒的人数在3亿以上,相当于或超过了美国总人口;而中国基督教信徒人数,也在2300万至4000万的区间,或约占我国总人口的1.7%至2.9%。另据国务院国家宗教事务局2012年6月发表的数据,我国现有经批准开放的宗教活动场所近13.9万处,其中基督教教堂、聚会点约5.6万处。如加上其他所有的宗教崇拜场所,我国各类宗教场所的总数至少接近或甚至超过美国。因此单就数量而言,中国宗教尤其是中国基督教在1979年改革开放以来,确实有了较迅速甚至是超常规的增长。

然而,除了绝对数量外,宗教尤其是基督教在中国的社会地位,与过去相比还是有较大差别。基督教在中国发展的基本轨迹,大致上是从社会边缘到中心再回到边缘,或从政治体制外的客观上具有革命性的势力转变为体制内具有改良和保守性的势力,再转变为游离于体制内外的只具有象征性政治作用的社会力量。在1949年之前,从整体上讲基督教在中国享有较高的社会地位,具有“三高”的特点:

“一高”指教育与神学训练程度高:基督教会是中国现代高等教育的先驱,也是中国高等院校的模板。基督教教会大学以及神学院校不仅为基督教在华生根落户提供了重要的“基础设施”,也成为中国基督教会的“思想库”和“人才库”。在基督教在华传教运动的传教策略中,教会教育始终占据着头等重要的地位。

“二高”指社会参与程度高:1949年前基督教与中国社会的接触面极广,教会通过各种福音事工以及教育、医疗和慈善机构不仅下达社会底层,而且上至社会高层和两党政治,在中国近代史上的各个重要时期和事件中均扮演过重要角色,并且最后成为国家权力建制的一部分。基督教内部有高端或精英路线与低端或普罗路线之争,这实际上都增加了基督教的社会参与度、接触面和影响力。

“三高”指国际化程度高:基督教在华传教运动是国际基督教运动的组成部分,在思想、经济和组织机构上均深受西方基督教会的影响和实际

掌控,自20世纪初以来,中国基督教会的自主性提高,并渐次登上国际舞台,对普世基督教运动也做出了重要贡献。笔者若干年前曾把赵紫宸出任世界基督教协会主席和韦卓民获得美国纽约协和神学院路思义世界基督教教席的殊荣称为标志性事件,表明中国基督教会在当时全世界的所谓后进教会中,或至少在东亚地区,在基督教组织和思想建设的整体水准上处于领先的地位。

与此同时,上述“三高”现象所反映的,是长期以来中国基督教会对西方差会的“高度依赖”。这一“高”实质上是中国基督教内所谓中西新教权力建制(Sino-Western Protestant Establishment)和“中西共管模式”的致命伤之一,造成了阻碍中国基督教本地化的种种严重后果,如:教会直接宣教事业与辅教事业(如教育、医疗和慈善等事业)“头轻脚重”,后者“喧宾夺主”;教会机构过于庞大,难以实现自养,也难以摆脱“洋教”色彩;经济、机构和神学上对西方差会的依赖也导致中国基督教会就整体而言在政治上成为体制内的势力,并成为中国革命的对象等等,这些都使基督教在中国所取得的种种成绩大打折扣。

1949年以来,中国基督教会的社会处境发生了根本性的变化,目前的这种处境可以用“三个边缘化”来加以归纳:

“第一个边缘化”指在神学和宗教学术研究上的边缘化。中国基督教神学和宗教研究发端于基督教会及其所属的教会和神学院校。然而,由于20世纪50年代初教会教育机构的国有化以及包括文革在内的政治动乱,使中国基督教会完全退出教育领域,正式神学教育也奄奄一息并一度完全中断,直到文革结束后才逐步恢复。因此,1949年后中国基督教神学和宗教研究的重心发生位移,先转移至台、港教会和学术界,改革开放以来又重回大陆学术界而非教会界,使向来对神学和宗教研究难能置喙的世俗学界对教会界取得了较大的甚至压倒性的优势。

“第二个边缘化”指在社会生活中的边缘化。基督教会曾经是中国社会公共产品的主要提供者之一。然而1949年后中国基督教会也全面退出医疗、慈善、媒体等公共领域,教会和宗教活动则完全被限制在私人领域。近10多年来基督教会虽获准举办了一些小规模医疗、慈善、养老和幼儿教育机构,开展如防治艾滋病等项目,参与扶贫赈灾救援等活动,但教会的社会影响力仍相当有限,这与基督教会在1949年前的情形以及与当前较大的信众数量相比是不匹配的。

“第三个边缘化”指在国际基督教界被边缘化。20世纪50年代初切断与西方教会的联系被视为是中国基督教“三自运动”的一项主要使命,中国基督教会也因此与世隔绝。改革开放后尽管中国基督教与普世教会重新建立了关系,比如1991年重新加入世界基督教协进会,并且与世界福音派联盟等也建立了关系,但其国际地位却明显下降,并且不充分具备国际学术对话的能力,这是与中国作为拥有众多基督教人口的正在崛起的世界性大国的地位也是不相称的。

不过近年来中国基督教会出现了若干新趋势，这些趋势在一定程度上改变中国基督教会上述边缘化的处境，并且有可能较大地提升基督教在中国社会中的地位 and 正面作用：

“第一个趋势”可称为多元化趋势。这种趋势有多种表现：一是教会存在形式的多样化。目前中国的基督教大致上可分为“三自教会”（即全国基督教两会系统的教会）、“非三自教会”（即未经政府相关部门登记的教会）、“准三自教会”（即名义上服从“三自教会”但实际上并不具体接受“三自教会”指导的教会）。人们一般所称的“家庭教会”，大多属于后两类。对“家庭教会”的重新认识问题已提上政学两界的议事日程；二是“三自教会”内部的非集权化和宗派化：由于属地化管理的政策，“三自教会”出现分权化或地方化趋势，部分权力开始流向基层教会尤其是大教堂（megachurches）。与此同时，宗派化的倾向也在潜滋暗长，成为“后宗派时代教会体制”外的选项。三是基督教徒成分的多样化。原来的信徒是所谓“五多”，即文盲多、老人多、妇女多、农村居民多、病人多；现在信徒中知识分子、高收入者、城市居民和中青年的比例有较大提高，涵盖老板基督徒、农民工基督徒、职场基督徒、学生基督教团契的城市教会正在迅速发展。四是基督教分布状况的多样化。随着经济发展和人口空前规模的流动，宗教信徒也随之大量迁徙。改革开放 30 多年来国内基督教的主要流向有两个：一是从乡村到城市；二是从东部（沿海）到西部（内地），使基督教越来越成为城市和全国性现象。所有这些都提高了基督教的社会覆盖面和能见度，当然也在某种程度上加大了教会内部、教会与社会以及教会与政府之间的各种张力。

“第二个趋势”可称为学术化趋势。这可从两方面来理解。一方面中国基督教内部的知识化趋势，表现于基督教会自身文化程度的提高，出现“文化基督徒”、大学生团契等群体现象，选派基督教领袖、牧师和神学院教师到国内著名高校以及到国外著名神学院校进修和攻读学位已成为获得政府批准和支持的制度性安排。不过包括基督教神学院在内的宗教院校未被纳入国民教育体系，它们提供的教育和颁授的学位得不到社会认可，是目前制约中国基督教神学教育发展的最大瓶颈。中国基督教会在“神学思想建设”或“自我神学”（self-theologizing）方面还有很长的路要走；另一方面，世俗大学和研究机构无论在神学还是在宗教研究和教学上都扮演着主角。有学者把中国基督教神学研究分为教会神学、汉语神学和学术神学三个板块，其中教会神学基本立足于教会和神学院，而汉语神学和学术神学则主要寄身于世俗高校和研究机构。基于世俗机构的汉语神学和学术神学远较教会神学发达，为中国基督教研究和教学扩大了生存空间，构成具有中国特色的基督教神学及宗教研究，不过也招致“有学而无神”或“有神学而无教会”的批评。目前，中国高校包括基督教研究在内的宗教研究渐成学术热点，提升了宗教研究在整个学术研究中的地位，并且为中国基督教会的健康发展提供了必不可少的思想和教育资源。

“第三个趋势”可称为社会化趋势。目前，中国基督教的社会服务事工已逐步从传统的“灾难救助式慈善”或“政府指令式慈善”朝专业化、制度化、规模化的方向发展，并较大提升了其公共形象。对宗教公益慈善事业的重视，也已经开始在政府部门的发展战略中有所体现。2012年2月26日，国家宗教事务局联合中央统战部、国家发改委、财政部、民政部和税务总局等部门印发《关于鼓励和规范宗教界从事公益慈善活动的意见》（国宗发[2012]6号），为宗教界开展公益慈善活动提供政策指导和框架性“准入”规定，而拟议中的“宗教慈善法”则将为包括基督教会在内的宗教团体进入公共慈善领域提供更大空间和制度保障。由于现实处境的限制，当前主流基督教会对社会的参与，主要还是通过较少争议的社会服务和关怀、文化建设和伦理示范等途径，正如中国著名宗教学者卓新平所言，在其社会功能方面，中国基督教会需要“先做仆人后作先知”。

中国学界一般认为，中国基督教在经过20世纪80和90年代的迅速增长后，由于各种原因，尤其是来自传统宗教如佛道教和民间信仰的竞争，在上世纪末已经进入缓慢增长期，或者说已经到了“增长的极限”。今后中国基督教的绝对信徒人数还会有所增加，但在总人口中的占比可能不会大幅提高，显然中国基督教的发展已需要从目前的“数量阶段”向“质量阶段”过渡。在下一阶段，中国基督教更加需要强身固本，在教会牧养、神学教育、学术研究、社会服务、构建和谐社会以及后来要讲到的对外交流等领域全面提高其事工的质量。

三、信仰中国：关于中国的新叙事

“信仰中国”不仅是看待中国基督教、也是看待整个中国的新视角，或者说是关于中国宗教以及宗教与中国对外关系的某种愿景。

与西方世界长期以来对于“无神论中国”的刻板印象截然相反，各种权威数据均表明，中国不仅是传统而且是新兴“宗教大国”，主流宗教的增长、新兴宗教的崛起以及民间信仰的复兴相互交织，成为全球宗教复兴的一个重要组成部分。

然而，与在政治、经济、军事领域的“准超级大国”地位相比，中国在文化、和观念领域却仍属“发展中国家”序列，在实际国际影响力上呈现出明显的“软硬失衡”态势。中国国内宗教信仰的复兴与国际上根深蒂固的“无神论中国”印象之间的认知差距，恰恰反衬出了中国宗教在海外投射力上的限度，以及中国在建构与展示较“无神论中国”更为真实的“信仰中国”以及宗教政策方面的能力不足。与此种“内外有别”一体两面的情况是，佛教、道教以及各种中国传统民间信仰在港台、东南亚以及欧美国家所拥有的较广泛的信众和影响，却并未实质性地增进作为发源地和根据地的中国之国家利益，两者之间存在着断裂与脱节。

部分国家尤其是海外华人社会及其广大宗教信众仍然对中国的宗教生态与政教格局存在疑虑，这也严重削弱了这些地区和社区对中国的好感度

与向心力。在中国和平发展的宏观背景下，与其他国家及其普通民众在宗教信仰上的隔阂，已然成为制约中国树立文化大国形象的现实瓶颈。

与此同时，目前中国为世界所提供的主要还是宗教商品，虽有宗教经济的繁荣景况，却尚不具备文化和神学附加值。可以说，中国在国际宗教经济市场中的弱势地位，与中国博大精深的宗教传统也形成鲜明对照。结果是中国在为全球宗教复兴提供充足物质条件的同时，却并未得到与此种贡献相称的国际认可。而国际社会在广泛消费中国制造的信仰商品的同时，也并未真正意识到信仰商品背后一个正在逐渐显现的“信仰中国”。

在国际政治领域，自冷战结束以来，宗教越来越成为中外关系中的要素，西方国家尤其是美国对中国宗教问题的“政治化”手法（如所谓“中国宗教自由问题”）以及政治（主权）问题的“宗教化”和“国际化”运作（如西藏问题），不仅形成对中国的国家主权与安全的挑战，也强化了国际社会对我国的“制度偏见”。面对此种局面，我们与其在宗教问题上不断面临中国外交的被动卷入，不如正视和顺应全球宗教复兴与国际关系“宗教回归”的大趋势，积极寻回我国外交中的宗教因素。如何把宗教从中国国际战略中的“负资产”转变为“软权力”，在国际宗教舞台上化被动为主动，目前已日益成为我国需面对的一项迫切的战略选择。

中国和平崛起的历史进程，亦是全面“走出去”以及国家利益全球化的展开过程。就前者而言，我们很难设想没有传统文化支撑的可持续的经济走出去战略，同样也很难设想缺乏宗教背景和价值观基础的传统文化。同时，现代政治的大众参与特性决定了中国“走出去”战略与全方位外交的顺利开展，在需要注重目标国家和地区政治上层和社会精英的同时，亦无法忽视基层群众或草根的巨大力量。宗教作为超越阶层、种族、性别、文化的精神力量，历来是中外文化交流的主要载体和重要组成部分，无疑能为中国开展公共以及民间外交提供有力的依托，从而克服中国外交工作中在某种程度上存在的“上下脱节”（重精英轻草根，重官方轻民间）状况。宗教交流是中国与外部世界在思想文化、价值观和情感层面的互动，当然要比经贸等交往更为深刻、更具基础性和长期性。

以上这些都表明，如何实现宗教与外交之间的良性互动，将国内宗教发展、跨国宗教交流与国家总体外交三者相协调，正在逐渐成为中国和平发展以及民族复兴进程中具有全局性意义且亟需面对的战略问题。中国若要在宗教信仰领域更加有所作为，弥合前述的“软硬失衡”、“内外有别”、“上下脱节”等多重差距，其关键即在于正视一个长期不为人注意、但已逐渐显现的“信仰中国”。而中国国力和民族自信力的迅速提升则为在新形势下中国得以主动叙述、建构以及展示一个真实的“信仰中国”提供了必要的条件。

在从传统帝国向现代民族国家的转型过程中，领土的快速“内收”与人口的大量“外移”是两股相逆而并行的趋势。由此造成的结果是，尽管现代中国的国土面积已今非昔比，但海外华人的分布之广却远超过历史上

的任何时期。中国的国境线在地理意义上的收缩过程，恰恰是其在人口意义上的扩张过程。伴随着海外华人的足迹遍布东南亚、欧美及世界各地，中国的各种传统宗教信仰亦得以在全球范围内传播。从这个角度看，由华人的跨国迁移所推动的中国人的国际化，也带动了中国传统宗教信仰的国际化。在这一双重的国际化进程中，逐渐在中国本土以外形成了至少三类信仰群体，包括中国传统宗教信仰的海外华人信众、东西方各种宗教信仰的海外华人信众，以及中国传统宗教信仰的外国信众。可以说，他们构成了“信仰中国”的海外版图。

在中国崛起的宏观背景下，杜维明先生的“文化中国”论，恰恰为我们理解和叙述一个正在逐渐显现的、与“中华经济圈”和“文化中国”并存的“信仰中国”提供了极佳的参照。

在杜维明先生所建构的中国叙事中，“文化中国”由三个意义世界（symbolic universes）构成：1、中国大陆、港澳台地区及新加坡；2、世界各地的海外华人社群；3、各国关心中国文化的知识群体（学者、媒体人、企业家、政府官员等）。与这种超越民族国家地理边界的定义方式类似，“信仰中国”亦呈现为差序包容式的同心圆结构，而此一结构恰恰又是分辨“中国、诸夏和夷狄”的传统中华世界政治秩序的真实写照。可以说，对“信仰中国”的反现代国家式的叙述，反而是对传统中国政治文明的回归。

具体而言，“信仰中国”包含了三个紧密相连的“信仰板块”：1、中国大陆与港、澳、台；2、中国传统宗教信仰与各种东西方宗教的海外华人信众群体；3、中国传统宗教信仰的外国信众群体。第一个“信仰板块”正好涵盖了当代中国的政治版图，而第二、三个“信仰板块”则反映了“信仰中国”的海外版图，是中国“信仰国境线”的海外延伸。

就第一个“信仰板块”而言，中国大陆与港、澳、台拥有着“信仰中国”大部分的人口，是“信仰中国”的主体部分。与杜维明的“文化中国”以港台为潜在中心的论述相反，中国大陆不仅是第一个“信仰板块”的中心，亦是整个“信仰中国”的中心。这种中心地位，不仅表现为庞大的信众人口、繁荣的宗教经济和全面的宗教复兴，还体现在中国大陆是各种传统宗教与民间信仰的发源地和中心。无论是经过本土化后的佛教，还是直接发源于中国的道教以及妈祖等信仰，几乎所有最重要的朝觐圣地都位于中国大陆。这不仅成为维系港澳台民众对大陆向心力的重要依托，也成为中国海外文化辐射力的潜在资源。如果说传统中国是东亚各国政治上“朝贡”的中心，那么，现在中国大陆完全有可能成为海内外信众宗教上“朝觐”的中心。同时，中国大陆对于各种外来宗教的接纳，亦使这些宗教及其信众成为联系中国与其他国家的中介。在中国全面“走出去”以及全方位外交的背景下，这种联系的意义正在逐渐凸显。相较于经历革命“洗礼”的中国大陆而言，中国传统宗教与民间信仰在港澳台地区的存在更为普遍，影响更为深远，几乎涵盖了政治、经济和社会生活的方方面面。两岸民间宗教同源同宗。台湾各界均认可台湾的民间宗教信仰缘自大陆，根植民间社会，与台湾移

民史、开发史同步发展，直至今天仍然拥有占台湾人口三分之二左右的信众。

就第二个“信仰板块”的两个信仰群体而言，出于历史、民族、血缘、语言等原因，海外华人与中国有着天然的特殊联系。中国国内的宗教状况、中国的宗教政策，以及他们与中国的宗教互动经验，往往影响到他们对中国的向心力与归属感。同时，宗教信仰与宗教建制又往往能超越地缘、血缘、阶层、性别等界限，赋予海外华人信仰群体以很强的凝聚力，从而使有信仰的少数人常常具有远较无信仰的多数人更高效的社会组织、动员与参与能力。这就为他们对所在国民众的中国认识与所在国政府的中国政策施加某种程度的影响（无论是正面的或负面的），提供了必要的条件。在广大的海外华人社会尤其是东南亚国家中，各种历史悠久的中国传统宗教与民间信仰在普通民众的日常生活中扮演着重要的角色。在谈到中国基督教的增长时，著名宣教学者安德鲁·沃尔斯（Andrew F. Walls）便提醒人们不能忘记“中国基督教并不限于中国；遍布亚洲及亚洲以外的海外中国人口中的基督徒目前已为数庞大”。事实上，各种西方宗教的海外华人信众，往往能较西方民众更加真实地把握中国国内的宗教状况。同时，相较于中国自身而言，他们更加懂得亦更有能力将中国国内的真实情况告诉西方社会。这种双向的优势，使海外华人中的西方宗教信众完全有可能充当在宗教领域中互相理解的传译者。

就第三个“信仰板块”的信仰群体而言，由于宗教信仰并不以一定的知识水平为前提，“信仰中国”第三个“信仰板块”无疑更加贴近于国外民众与草根（尽管精英的作用亦十分重要）。对于绝大多数对中国本身缺乏了解的外国民众而言，中国宗教和民间信仰的大量场所、仪式、活动和出版物就成为他们认识中国时最直观、最感性及最直接的渠道。随着中国传统文化与宗教信仰在全世界吸引力与影响力的提升，这些外国信众的人数也在逐渐增加，具有一定的潜在影响力。

在全球化的时代，中国的国内宗教实践已具有明显的海外效应，海外的华人信众与外国信众亦具有影响中国国家形象和利益的潜能。这种内外交融的情势决定了我们必须超越民族国家、内政外交的界限，在更广阔的视域中来理解宗教对中国的独特意义。“信仰中国”的论述，正是要消除这种内外有别的思维定势和现实限制。

实际上，“信仰中国”不仅是一种当下的现实论述，更有其深厚的历史基础。从长时段的视角来看，但凡中国处于国力强盛、民族自信的历史时期，都出现了中外宗教交流大发展的盛况。一方面，它意味着中国积极接纳、包容各种本土与外来的宗教信仰，使之在中国和合共生；另一方面，它表现为中国真诚地向域外（海外）学习或传播优秀的宗教文化。频繁而良性的中外宗教互动，不仅塑造了中国自身，也同时塑造了中国的周边环境。

进一步而言，在中国对外部世界具有巨大影响力和吸引力的各个历史

时期，宗教都在其中发挥了极其重要的作用。可以说，传统东亚世界不仅是一个以中国为中心的“文化圈”、“朝贡圈”、“贸易圈”，亦是一个以中国为中心的“信仰圈”。无论是儒、释、道三教，还是妈祖等民间信仰，皆直接参与了传统东亚世界的形成与运作，都是联系中国与东亚各国及其民众的重要精神纽带与官方外交层面对宗教资源的倚重相对应，滨下武志甚至认为，源于中国的妈祖曾是东亚海域民间秩序的守护者和统治者。同时，历史上每当中国试图在东西、海陆两个方向的对外关系中采取积极有为的政策时，宗教亦常常扮演着开拓者与中介者的角色。“东海”方向自不待言，沟通中国与“西域”的“丝绸之路”，就不仅是一条“贸易之路、文化之路、和平之路”，亦是一条名副其实的信仰之路。

可以说，对于“信仰中国”的长时段追溯，所展现的是历史上中国开放而自信的大国心态，以及气势恢宏的泱泱大国气象。这种心态与气象，正是“信仰中国”得以存在和持续的重要基础。

随着中国改革开放的深入进行与国际参与的全面拓展，中国对自身核心国家利益的界定已渐趋清晰。在此过程中，宗教信仰对于中国国家利益的影响也越发明显和深入。“信仰中国”的提出，将至少从国家安全、经济发展、国际形象、国家统一等方面对中国国家主权和利益的维护和实现产生潜在的积极意义。

“信仰中国”的提出对中国基督教有何意义？

“信仰中国”叙事从国家利益安全、国家形象和国家对外战略等视角，来阐述宗教对当下中国的积极意义。目前国内宗教学界已基本抛弃长期流行的主要针对基督宗教的宗教鸦片论以及把宗教打入“另类”和视为“鬼神信仰”等极其错误的做法，在理论上较全面地阐述了把宗教作为当前中国的重要社会资源的意义。“信仰中国”延续了这一努力，把宗教作为中国对外关系中的重要资源以及中国目前实施的全方面走出去战略的一部分来加以论证，从而进一步诠释了宗教在中国内外政策中的正面作用。与中国传统宗教和民间信仰相比，基督宗教在中国宗教开放和中外宗教交流方面更具指针性意义。中国社会和政府对于宗教更加正面的看法和政策，是“后传教时代”中外宗教互动以及我们所阐述的“信仰中国”的基础。中国领导人曾指出，推动中美关系发展，不仅要自上而下，也要自下而上，因为“中美关系根基在地方、在民间、在基层”。宗教尤其是基督宗教作为中美关系最具地方性、民间性和基础性的因素之一，其对推动中美关系进一步向前发展的潜能和必要性都是不言而喻的。

在全球价值链框架下推进互利共赢的中国经济外交

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2013 年 11 月，中共十八届三中全会决定全面深化改革，提出了“适应经济全球化新形势，推动对内对外开放相互促进、引进来和走出去更好结合，促进国际国内要素有序自由流动、资源高效配置、市场深度融合，加快培育参与和引领国际经济合作竞争新优势，以开放促改革，构建开放型经济新体制”。为此，中国政府相继颁发了《推动共建丝绸之路经济带和 21 世纪海上丝绸之路的愿景与行动》、《关于推进国际产能和装备制造合作的指导意见》、《关于构建开放型经济新体制的若干意见》、《关于加快实施自由贸易区战略的若干意见》和《关于加强国际合作提高我国产业全球价值链地位的指导意见》等一系列政策措施。随之，在多边、区域和双边之间，中国积极推进贸易投资领域经济外交，以实现全球价值链框架下互利共赢。

一、目的与手段共存：中国经济外交的基本模式

众所周知，经济外交一般具有两种基本模式，一是指国家为实现其经济目标而进行的外交行为和活动；二是指国家为实现其包括在政治上、军事上或其他外交目标，以经济为手段而进行的外交行为活动。然纵观包括“一带一路”、自由贸易区战略在内的重大经济外交实践，却已经很难区分其属于何种经济外交基本模式。

“一带一路”倡议强调，要顺应世界多极化、经济全球化、文化多样化、社会信息化的潮流，秉持开放的区域合作精神，致力于维护全球自由贸易体系和开放型世界经济，促进经济要素有序自由流动、资源高效配置和市场深度融合，推动沿线各国实现经济政策协调，开展更大范围、更高水平、更深层次的区域合作，共同打造开放、包容、均衡、普惠的区域经济合作架构。

“国际产能合作”指导意见要求，适应经济全球化新形势，着眼全球经济发展新格局，把握国际经济合作新方向，推动实施“一带一路”等重大战略，深化与有关国家的互利合作，促进当地经济和社会发展。

“构建开放型经济新体制”意见提出，要基于自主开放与对等开放，加强“走出去”战略谋划，实施更加主动的自由贸易区战略，拓展开放型经济发展新空间，重点实施“一带一路”战略促进基础设施互联互通，……，形成全方位开放新格局。

“加快实施自由贸易区战略”意见明确，坚持与推进共建“一带一路”和国家对外战略紧密衔接，逐步构筑起立足周边、辐射“一带一路”、面向全球的高标准自由贸易区网络，深度参与国际规则制定，拓展开放型经

济新空间，形成全方位开放新格局，全方位参与自由贸易区等各种区域贸易安排合作，重点加快与周边、“一带一路”沿线以及产能合作重点国家、地区和区域经济集团商建自由贸易区，兼顾各方利益和关切，考虑发展中经济体和最不发达经济体的实际情况，寻求利益契合点和合作公约数，努力构建互利共赢的自由贸易区网络，推动与世界各国、各地区共同发展。

“加强国际合作提高我国产业全球价值链地位”意见指出，要利用多双边平台推进基于全球价值链合作的规则制定，结合全球价值链进展，研究提出符合广大发展中经济体利益的全球价值链务实、包容的新规则。

上述重大经济外交实践，既有以外交为手段推进包括区域经济一体化、经济全球化等经济利益目标的实现，又有以经济为手段推进包括维护全球自由贸易体系、改善全球经济治理等外交目标的实现，因此，可以说目标与手段共生，已经成为贸易领域中国经济外交的基本模式。

二、多边、区域和双边同行：中国经济外交的基本路径

按外交主体和对象数量分类，经济外交又可以分为双边、多边两个基本范围，其中多边又可以分为全球多边和区域、部门诸边。但纵览“一带一路”、自由贸易区战略在内的重大经济外交实践路径，可以清晰地发现是多边与双边共进，尤其是集中于区域诸边。

“一带一路”倡议不仅强调双边经济合作机制，而且高度关注区域诸边协同机制；“国际产能合作”指导意见不仅要求深化双边合作机制，而且要求将合作范围扩展到了区域诸边“构建开放型经济新体制”意见不仅涉及双边，而且涵盖区域诸边；“加快实施自由贸易区战略”意见明确自由贸易区的形式不仅包括双边协定，而且还要包括区域、诸边取向；“加强国际合作提高我国产业全球价值链地位”意见非常清晰指向多双边共进的路径。

从上述对重大经济外交实践的分析，在贸易投资领域，中国经济外交的基本路径，可以概括为多边与双边共进。

三、跨洲生产网络内协同：中国经济外交的基本平台

2016年7月，在中国上海举行的二十国集团贸易部长会议声明强调，全球价值链，包括区域价值链，是世界经济的一个重要特征，包容协调的全球价值链是世界贸易投资的重要推动力。要支持企业，包括中小企业充分参与并利用全球价值链相关政策，不论企业规模及所处国家经济发展阶段，尤其支持发展中国家企业，特别是低收入国家企业更深入参与全球价值链并从中更多获益的政策。同时，继续加强能力建设，促进包容协调全球价值链的倡议，继续规划并实施一系列行动，在发展中国家，尤其是低收入国家和中小企业的包容性参与全球价值链的最相关领域，开展研究并采取行动，包括合适的基础设施、技术支持、贷款获取、供应链互联互通、农业、创新、电子商务、技能培训和负责任的企业行为。

实证研究已经发现，全球价值链的生存基础是跨洲生产网络。迄今为止，最具全球价值链特征的跨洲生产网络，仅北美 - 西欧跨洲生产网络和北美 - 东亚跨洲生产网络。由于美欧之间传统的经济联系、基本无缝的文化距离加之基本同质但又有差异的产业特征，两大区域生产网络中的跨国公司通过相互直接投资，推动了水平分工型的北美 - 西欧跨洲生产网络的形成，或者说是典型的发达工业化经济体之间“北 - 北”国际分工模式。北美 - 东亚跨洲生产网络则是基于企业和市场联系最密切的典型垂直分工型跨洲生产网络，生产过程被分割成若干阶段，网络中各经济体企业根据其比较优势专门从事不同的生产阶段任务。东亚地区新兴工业化经济体和新兴经济体，通过生产网络接受来自发达工业化国家的直接投资、服务外包和采购，使其能够参与到最符合其本身自然禀赋和技术水平的生产阶段，也因此享受了贸易和经济的高速增长。尽管从微笑曲线来看，这一跨洲生产网络中发展中国家主要是依托其大规模的廉价劳动力参与分工，资源密集型国家则主要是通过提供能源和原材料参与分工。从微笑曲线来看，在增加值最高端是掌握原始创新、核心中间品和市场主要份额的美国跨国公司，在两腮部高处则分布着具有集成创新能力、提供高附加值中间品和市场部分份额的日本跨国公司，在两腮部低处则是具有一定集成创新能力和较强承接启下分包能力、提供中高附加值中间品的新兴工业化经济体的企业，而在下颚部基本上是以劳动力优势见长的发展中国家，新兴经济体则镶嵌在新兴工业化经济体和发展中国家之间，是一种典型的跨国公司主导的垂直专业化“北 - 南”国际分工模式。

四、全球价值链框架下互利共赢：中国经济外交的基本目标

在可预见的未来，随着特朗普“美国优先”经济新政的推行，北美 - 西欧、北美 - 东亚两大跨洲网络将发生相应变化，尤其是垂直分工型的北美 - 东亚跨洲生产网络，随着网络中中国大陆劳动力成本和学习能力的双提升，产业间国际转移路径将有可能呈低增加值产业或产品向劳动力成本更具优势的网络内发展中国家，即向网络微笑曲线的下颚部集聚，高增加值产业或产品有向创新能力有可能向美国返流的趋向，即向网络微笑曲线的两个顶部集聚；网络中的新兴工业化经济体和新兴经济体将占有中增加值产业或产品所居的网络微笑曲线两腮部形成水平分工型的竞争合作关系。发达工业化国家继续寻求并固化其在全球价值链中“核心”地位，或者说其在全球生产网络微笑曲线中两侧增加值最高端位置；而发展中国家或经济体则有继续处于或被固化于“边缘”地位，即生产网络微笑曲线中下颚部增加值最低端位置的趋向。而居于两者之间的新兴工业化经济体，尤其是新兴经济体则面临向网络微笑曲线的两个顶部攀升和维护在下颚部获得既有利益保障非熟练劳动力就业的压力。

基于对未来世界经济的可能变化趋势，国务院 7 个主管部门适时公布了《关于加强国际合作提高我国产业全球价值链地位的指导意见》，这意

味着在贸易投资领域，中国经济外交的立足点应建立于全球价值链之上，围绕“一带一路”倡议、国际产能和装备制造合作、构建开放型经济新体制和加快实施自由贸易区战略等重大对外经济发展战略决策，有机融合经济目标和外交目标，在多双边框架下，推进经济外交。同时，经济外交必须关注包括合作对象的信用风险、政治风险在内的各类政治、经济，甚至文明冲突的风险。更重要的是，贸易投资领域的经济外交，必须针对北美—东亚生产网络产业间国际转移新动向，应以市场为主导、以企业为主体、以原始创新和集成创新为主要升级动力，通过持续提升和扩大中国在全球价值链中增加值产业和产品的位置和范围，与合作对象国实现在全球价值链框架下的互利共赢，为建立的新型全球经济治理体系奠定基础。

中国追求世界经济新秩序

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上海一经济学家对中国经济未来的看法日益分歧。乐观者强调中国的学习能力和快速积累人力资本的能力。悲观者关注中国人口红利的快速减少、高企的债务-GDP之比、出口市场的萎缩以及工业产能过剩。但这两派都忽略了一个更加基本的中国经济前景决定因素：世界秩序。

问题很简单：中国可以在当前全球秩序（包括其贸易规则）的约束下维持高速 GDP 增长吗？还是当前由美国主导的秩序必须做出彻底改变以适应中国经济的持续崛起？但答案仍不明朗。

中国寻找答案的一个办法是促使人民币加入决定国际货币基金组织（IMF）储备资产——特别提款权（SDR）价值的货币篮子中。目前，这一货币篮子由欧元、日元、英镑和美元组成。

IMF 总裁拉加德 4 月份在上海发表讲话时，SDR 问题便已成为听众的主要关注点。拉加德的立场——人民币加入 SDR 货币篮子只是时间问题——吸引了无数媒体关注（但遗憾的是媒体对她的话解读过度了）。

上个月，前美联储主席伯南克（Ben Bernanke）在上海也遇到了这个问题。他故意把话说得模棱两可：人民币纳入 SDR 是一个积极步骤，他说，但在此之前中国必须在改革金融业和转变增长模式上拿出更大进步。

预计 IMF 将在今年 10 月 SDR 货币篮子成分的五年评估中投票表决人民币问题。但即便结果与 2010 年不同，大部分人赞成人民币加入货币篮子，美国也有可能行使否决权。这一结果不会令人奇怪，因为在 2010 年美国就曾扼杀（尽管是国会而非奥巴马政府反对）已经形成一致的增加中国在 IMF 投票权的改革。

SDR 用途有限，这意味着加入人民币只不过是象征性的举动；但这是一个强有力的象征，意味着认可人民币的全球用途。这一结果不但将推进人民币的国际化，也将让人们了解中国在现行全球经济秩序中还拥有多少空间。

从目前的情况看，空间已然不足。经济学家阿尔文德·萨布拉曼尼安（Arvind Subramanian）在其 2011 年的著作中预测人民币将在这个十年之末或下个十年之初成为全球储备货币。这一结论建立在他的一项观察的基础上：经济和货币主导地位的时滞要比传统观点更短。如今，中国已是世界第一大经济体（用购买力平价衡量）和第一大贸易国，中国政府一直在积极促进人民币国际化，比如通过放松外汇管制。但人民币的国际使用情况仍远远低于萨布拉曼尼安的模型的预测。

因此，中国仍将受美国货币政策制约。如果美联储提高利率，中国也必须跟进以防资本外流，即使提高利率会对国内增长产生消极影响。由于

美元在国际交易中处于主导地位，中国公司的海外投资仍将面临汇率波动的相关风险。

事实上，在过去十年中，国际贸易规则在中国和包括美国在内的其他许多国家之间制造了巨大的摩擦。如今，不少自由贸易协定正在谈判中——即跨太平洋合作伙伴关系和跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系——它们将提高中国企业的进入壁垒，从而阻碍中国出口的继续扩张。

显然，试图获得与其经济实力相适应的角色的中国，在现行国际体系中面临着巨大的挑战。这也许解释了为何中国政府要实施“一带一路”计划并成立亚洲基础设施投资银行（亚投行），以此不断尝试根据自身条件改写世界秩序——特别是货币和贸易体系。

“一带一路”计划的目标是重建将亚洲商品和思想传播到欧洲的古代陆上和海上丝绸之路。在这一工程中，中国将进行巨大的投资，影响 50 多个国家，其对发展中世界的吸引力不容小觑。

亚投行也极具吸引力——并且不仅仅是对发展中国家。事实上，57 个国家——包括法国、德国和英国等主要大国——已经加入亚投行并成为创始成员国，这或许反映出越来越多的人认识到美国主导的秩序回报正在下降。

从中国的角度讲，国内经济增长在现行全球体系中似乎难以为继——这是日本和其他东亚经济体在经济崛起过程中不曾遇到过的挑战。事实上，唯一一个遇到过这一挑战的国家正是美国——它在二战前取代英国成为世界最大的经济和金融力量；幸运的是，这一先例是一个适应和和平过渡的先例。

平心而论，中国仍需要经历重要的国内改革，特别是金融业改革，以消除资源配置方面的扭曲和阻止经济减速。但中国领导人拒绝追求提振出口的货币贬值——哪怕需要面临增长减速的情况——这表明他们愿意做出必要的牺牲保证人民币的国际角色，同时保证长期经济增长和繁荣。

不管人民币在 10 月是否被加入 SDR 货币篮子，世界体系的逐渐转型以适应中国的趋势是不可避免的。

2017 年中国宏观经济增长面对的挑战

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2016 年，中国的宏观经济也许可以被称为“保守的”增长与增长模式转变时期。展望 2017 年，中国经济要破除“创造性毁灭”和“债务通缩”的双重魔咒，需要在供给侧、需求侧和政策选择三个方面互相协调同时发力，一方面，在强调积极财政政策的同时，必须要配合积极货币政策；另一方面，宏观经济管理者都要以经济中的真实需求为政策制定的依据，从而保障中国宏观经济增长趋势，充分体现出发展中国家的潜在高增长能力。

一、对宏观经济问题的判断

2016 年中国的宏观经济进入增长模式转变时期。首先，经济增长率趋向稳定，但是 6.7% 的经济增长率相对与过去几十年中二位数增长率是“保守的”，经济下行的压力依然存在。其次，经济增长模式从原来的工业化驱动，逐渐转为以产业的升级、高端服务业（特别是互联网）的创新、以及城市化的推进为主要动力的增长模式。之所以经济下行压力依然显著，恰恰是因为增长模式的转变，造成了企业家对中国未来经济发展方向的不确定，减少了当前的投资意愿。同时，投资意愿的下降导致了投资品需求的不足，不少企业的产品销售困难，利润不能实现，现金流紧张，所以不得不增加负债，以高杠杆率维持企业的运营。但是，在通货紧缩的条件下，负债的成本高昂，所以企业进一步地增加杠杆率以偿还债务，陷入费雪教授提出的“债务通缩”的恶性循环之中。

二、清楚认识到供给侧结构转变的困难

在工业化达到一定程度后，推动中国经济重回高速增长的动力来自产业升级、高端服务业创新、以及城市化推进，也就是供给侧的结构转变。但是，我们需要意识到，经济结构转变往往会面临两大困难：较长的周期和不确定性。如果不依靠资源的大量投入，那么潜在总产出的每一步推进都是一个漫长的过程。回想一下，即使在经济高速发展的情况下，在国际产业转移的有利条件下，中国工业化基本达到国际的平均水平也花费了整整 30 年，而且与工业发达国家（比如德国）相比还有一定的距离。结构转变是需要耐心的，不仅仅是耐心等待时机，还需要耐心学习和积累。而这种耐心在经济面临下行压力的时候是很难维持的。结构转变是顺周期的，也就是在经济繁荣的时候机会多；而在经济下行的时候，企业家疲于应对维持生产水平，转变的机会减少。所以在这样的背景下，经济复苏不可能仅仅是等待经济结构转变。这将使得中国失去在国际上取得技术创新领先地位的时机。而一旦失去领先地位，那么只能跟从领先者，这对当前中国

经济的超越是不利的。

更关键的是，结构转变面对巨大的不确定性。由于各个国家经济、社会的特殊性，结构转变的方向必须基于国家自身的比较优势，所以是不同的。而缺少参照学习的机会，可能导致发展方向的判断失误。理性的企业家明白，产业一时的繁荣可能只是因为部分人的盲目乐观。一旦盲目乐观的情绪随着真实经济信息的逐步揭示而消退，那么虚假繁荣时的投入就会变成对资源的浪费。回想千禧年时候，互联网产业何等的繁荣，似乎改变我们生活的一切，但是唯独没有增加全要素生产率，最终被证明只是形成了“dot-com”泡沫。这也是美国经济由盛转衰的开始。所以，一个国家在经历结构转变时一定要充分地意识到经济中的不确定性。无论是市场，还是政府，谁都不能保证结构转型的方向一定是正确的，所以一定要随时保持纠错的能力和工具。

三、选择宽松的宏观经济政策推动总供给

保证中国经济走出下行轨道需要的是宽松的宏观经济政策，这是对供给侧改革的有效补充。

一方面，央行的货币政策的目标应该明确通胀目标（比如 2% 的通货膨胀率），稳增长和保持金融稳定的坚定意愿。随着中国的金融市场的逐步完善，中央银行拥有越来越多的货币政策工具来实现其政策目标。同时，统计指标的完善使得中央银行的政策操作更为精准。中央银行能够设立银行存贷款基准利率，规定存款准备金率。而且中央银行具备从短期流动性调节工具、常备借贷便利，到中期借贷便利、抵押补充贷款等等调节货币供应量的工具。

另一方面，要保证积极的财政政策，同时配合积极货币政策。过去的几年中，仅仅使用积极财政政策可能导致地方政府和企业（特别是国有企业）为了获得财政配置的优惠资源，不顾及生产能力的成本限制，通过负债的过度扩展。由于经济下行，地方政府和企业债务高成本、产出低收益的情况下，不得不借新债，还旧债。形成当前全社会融资规模持续上升，但是实体经济却增长缓慢的困境。所以，在强调积极财政政策的同时，必须要配合积极货币政策。

四、需求侧拉动保障供给侧改革

无论是维持企业对结构改革的耐心，还是保证对结构改革纠错的能力，宏观经济管理者都一定要以经济中的真实需求为政策制定的依据。由于消费需求往往是稳定的、难以改变，而政府支出的需求受到财政收入的约束，所以保障需求对经济的拉动主要依靠有效率的投资。保障总需求的关键在于，决定最终产出水平的投资要以成本和收益为依据。

当前，中国经济的一个重要约束是投资配置效率不高。我们观察到全社会融资规模增长持续高于 GDP 增长。这意味着，为了增加单位产出水

平，需求的资金量在持续提高。这也意味着，企业投资的成本相对于收益在提高。经济学界已经对这一问题达成的共识是，有效率的民营经济部门的融资成本过高，得不到充分的投资配置。事实上，中国有大量的资源集中在国有企业部门和政府部门中。显然，政府已经意识到这个问题，并且在十八届三中全会上再次强调了国企的混合所有制改革。“国企混改”一方面是为了提高国企的效率，减少“僵尸企业”；另一方面也使得民营企业能更有效地资金配置，提高投资的回报。“国企混改”可以提高原有产业效率，从而能够为产业的升级、高端服务业的创新、以及城市化的推进等供给侧结构调整提供生产保障。近期，政府又进一步强调了政府公共建设与社会资本的结合，即 PPP 模式。同样，这也有利于发挥民营企业高效率的投资配置。

综上所述，保障中国宏观经济增长趋势，需要供给侧、需求侧和政策选择的协调作用。我们相信基于经济学家对宏观经济长期的研究形成的一套科学理论，中国宏观经济的管理能够根据国情做出符合中国当前形式的趋势判断，制定适当政策，保证中国经济未来的增长趋势。

海关制度创新应更上一层楼

千春晖 上海财经大学中国产业发展研究院

2016年9月29日,我国第一个自贸试验区——中国(上海)自由贸易试验区三周岁了。在这个值得铭记的日子,对上海自贸试验区的海关制度创新进行总结与回顾,具有重要的现实意义。

四个创新成效

以便利化为核心的通关制度基本形成,通关便利化水平提高。根据国务院的改革要求,自贸试验区一线进境货物入区通关时间与成本有明显压缩,进、出口平均通关时间较区外显著减少。二线监管方面,大幅减少企业申报次数,加快企业物流速度,有效降低通关成本。海关共推出31项创新制度,包括通关便利化类11项、保税监管类4项、企业管理类8项、税收征管类3项、功能拓展类5项,其中大部分已复制推广。

以功能拓展为重点的保税监管制度持续升级,促进外贸转型升级作用明显。海关支持建成商贸专业服务平台、国别进口商品中心、大宗商品现货市场,平行进口汽车展示交易中心与国际艺术品交易中心也上线运营,国家对外文化贸易基地入驻企业较自贸试验区成立时有大幅度增长。同时,货物状态分类监管“物流配送”模式在一些试点企业常态化运作,帮助企业向内外贸一体化运作的贸易运营结算中心升级。

以信息化为依托的简政放权改革深入推进,“放管服”成效逐步体现。海关共取消、下放、让渡、放开数十项前道审批事权或限制,并公布海关执法权力和责任“两张清单”,明确15类52项权力、5项事中事后监管制度、11条公共服务事项和41项窗口事宜。

以“单一窗口”为突破的管理模式实现破局,协同治理能力提升。上海国际贸易单一窗口按照“一个平台、一次提交、结果反馈、数据共享”的理念,在口岸监管环节和国际贸易管理各环节,实现贸易和运输企业通过单一窗口向监管部门一次性提交申报,监管部门通过单一窗口向企业反馈办理结果和共享监管结果信息。

对标 TFA、TPP 国际标准

对《贸易便利化协定》(TFA)条款规定先行先试,是上海自贸试验区的一大使命。据世界海关组织研究,TFA中30%的条款海关是唯一实施部门,40%的条款海关是主要实施部门,28%的条款涉及所有边境部门(包含海关)。经过逐条分析,上海自贸试验区海关创新制度整体上符合TFA基本原则和规定,部分内容实现了突破。

跨太平洋伙伴关系协定(TPP),可能对未来国际贸易安排、中美等自贸谈判产生巨大影响。海关程序与贸易便利化,是TPP的重要内容。在有些

方面,上海自贸试验区已达到或超过 TPP 标准:

一是在风险管理、复议与申诉、保密方面,TPP 仅作了原则规定,而上海自贸试验区已在实践层面实现了这些要求。二是我国已达到 TPP 在海关合作、预裁定、建议或信息请求答复、自动化、快递货物、处罚、货物放行、信息公开等方面的大部分要求。例如,在裁定时限上,TPP 规定预裁定时限是提供齐备信息起 150 天内,而上海自贸试验区商品归类行政裁定时限是自受理申请之日起 60 日内。

勇于担负国内示范职责

上海自贸试验区海关制度创新的使命尚未完成,需要继续努力、更上一层楼。在上海自贸试验区,新增的陆家嘴金融片区、金桥开发片区、张江高科技片区都不是海关特殊监管区域。针对这个问题,海关总署已在区域通关合作机制的基础上,全面启动通关一体化改革,并先在上海试点,通过优化三级事权、整合机构职能、再造通关流程,打破部门、关区、业务条线之间的藩篱。

今年 8 月底,浙江、重庆、河南等 7 个省市获批成立第三批自贸试验区。至此,我国形成了“1+3+7”的自贸试验区战略布局。但从自贸试验区承载的使命看,它们的差异性非常明显。如浙江和陕西自贸试验区,一个定位于宁波和舟山港,打造大宗商品自由贸易港,着眼于海运;一个服务于“一带一路”和西部大开发战略,发展航空产业贸易、文化旅游,着眼于铁路和航空运输。这就意味着海关制度创新必须因地制宜,客观上也增加了可复制、可推广的难度。

在这一过程中,为了避免付出不必要的代价,特别是不能出现为了创新而创新、为了复制推广而复制推广的情况,上海自贸试验区必须勇于担负起制度创新国内标杆的示范地位,及时总结经验教训,真正提供可复制、可推广的海关制度创新产品。

讲好有世界意义的中国故事

李友梅 上海大学基层治理创新研究中心

向世界讲述中国故事，是要让世界全面地认识中国，也在于为全球经济社会发展提供思想资源

2013年，习近平主席第一次公开提出人类命运共同体，4年来，这一理念渐成世界的共识。不久前，构建人类命运共同体理念首次载入联合国安理会决议。中国方案之所以能够产生巨大回响，不仅在于东方智慧给出了可取代丛林法则的另一种发展道路，也在于习近平主席等中国领导人不遗余力地讲述中国故事。

中国理念、中国智慧、中国主张，体现了中国对人类未来的思考、对国际秩序的设计，有助于推动全球治理体系变革。然而，外界对中国的认识还存在误解。很多时候，中国被刻画成“咄咄逼人”的形象。要想更好地了解中国了解中国的现代化之路与人类命运共同体建设之间的关系，有必要讲好中国故事。讲述中国故事，究其根本，一方面是让世界全面地认识中国、认识中国所选择的现代化道路，另一方面也在于为全球经济社会发展提供思想资源。正因此，我们需要讲好具有世界性意义的中国故事。

某种程度上，中国故事是一个世界性的公共品。中国故事内涵的世界性意义，是在世界范围内引导正义至上和各美其美的价值，而这正是构建人类命运共同体所需要的。中国“大道之行也，天下为公”的理念，是一种对正义考虑优先于对利益考虑的价值观，与西方一些国家价值观的“利益第一”有着本质区别。“和羹之美，在于合异”，中国尊重文明差异、重视文明交流互鉴，主张文明差异不应成为世界冲突的根源，与西方“文明冲突论”有着明显区别。

讲好中国故事，还需要创新话语体系，在中国与世界的不同语境中搭建起沟通的桥梁，传递出中国故事的感召力与说服力。对社会科学学者来说，“中国”的庞大体系和深邃内涵还有太多有待发掘的领域，我们还没有发展出能面向中国现实、回答中国问题、总结中国经验的学术体系。这让我们在进入世界时，要么囿于中国的传统而自说自话，要么以中国材料和数据削足适履地印证西方理论和观点。因此，讲好中国故事不能到西方的理论框架中去讲，而要在跨越多元文化的藩篱中促进大家对故事内涵的“意会”与理解。哲学社会科学话语体系建设的重要任务之一，就是要为中国故事的跨语境衔接做好理论准备工作。

让中国故事从中国走向世界，也需要培养更多能讲善讲中国故事的人才。讲好中国故事的世界意义，需要具备在全球性的不同语境中开展深入对话的能力，这就要求讲故事的人不仅对中国故事有深刻理解，也要善于在中西古今的坐标系中选择好题材，打通历史与现代、中国与西方的隔膜。我们不能仅仅依靠一个学科或几个智库的作用，而要动员优秀的哲学社会

科学工作者都参与进来，做好中国故事的渠道载体设计、内容主题拓展与语态形态更新。

作为一个“历史悠久和充满魅力的东方大国”，让我们的文明和文化站在与经济力量同等的位置，不仅是系统提升中国国际地位的必由之路，也是中国走向世界不可或缺的一环。讲好具有世界性意义的中国故事，中国一定可以为全球治理作出更大贡献。

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实现全面二孩政策目标需要整体性的配套

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十八届五中全会提出要实施全面二孩政策，这是中国生育政策调整过程中的重大决定，是一项利人民利后代的改革措施。如果从1980年中共中央发表关于控制中国人口增长的公开信开始计算，以独生子女为主要特征的生育政策已经实施了30多年，这项政策的初始目标已经实现，而政策实施形成的风险和负效应不断积聚，继续维持政策不变的社会经济成本不断增加，原来的生育政策必须适时地进行完善和调整。全面二孩政策的实施意味着实行了30多年的一孩政策的终结，实现中国国民不分城乡地域统一的生育权利，对中国未来人口和社会经济与环境资源的长期均衡发展将发挥重要作用。

1 正确认识全面二孩政策对人口发展态势的影响

实施全面二孩政策放松对育龄人群生育数量的政策限制，从人口增长的角度看主要目的是改善未来的人口年龄结构，延缓人口老龄化的速度，增加未来的劳动力供给，有利于人口和社会经济的均衡。二孩政策的实施并不是为了解决当前的所谓劳动力减少或短缺问题，也不是为了延续“人口红利”。短期内，因二孩生育导致出生数的增加意味着有更多的年轻女性因生育而暂时退出劳动就业，会使得实际就业人数在短期内加速减少。全面二孩政策对劳动力供给的积极作用至少要到15年以后才开始显现，劳动年龄人口在未来20年间持续下降的趋势可能也不会改变。同时出生人口的增加会提高少儿抚养比，进一步加速人口红利机会窗口的关闭。新增的出生人口会使得老年人口比重的增加速度减慢，但无法抵消日益增多的老年人口群体，对未来老年人口绝对数量的快速增长影响甚小，不可能从根本上扭转人口老龄化的长期趋势。

从人口发展的角度看，全面二孩政策的近期目标人群主要是1970年代出生的非独生子女群体，以及已经在城市落户的非独生子女流动人口群体和原先实行1.5孩政策的农村人口。从目前的各种预测来看，二孩政策的实施可能会使中国在未来增加3000多万的年轻人口，这对一个有近14亿人口的大国而言，增量并不是很大，但潜在的积极效应是可观的。当然，尽管全面二孩政策对未来人口的长期发展趋势的影响有限，但对中国社会的长期影响却可能是深远的，特别是通过影响未来的非独生子女一代人的成长而对未来的家庭和社会发展发生作用。不能仅仅以工具理性的视角来看待全面二孩政策的效果。

全面放开二孩政策本身只是影响人口出生的外因，内因是要看育龄家庭的生育意愿和实际的生育行为。人口生育政策近年来已经在发生变化，2013年单独二孩政策的推出是对独生子女政策的重要调整。但过去两

年中，在“双独”和“单独”政策实施的过程中，有大量符合政策条件的家庭却选择了不生育二孩，也就是说年轻的育龄人群对生育政策调整的响应度并不是很高。在中国，人们的生育行为主要受到政府生育政策和社会经济发展这两大方面的影响。如果说在上世纪的 70 到 90 年代，中国育龄人群的生育行为还主要是受政府生育政策的制约，那么在最近的 20 年间，以 80 后和 90 后为主体的生育适龄人群，无论是个人背景还是社会经济大环境都发生了很大的变化，其生育观念已经与上一代人有显著的差异。诸多生育意愿调查都表明晚婚和小家庭已经成为主流的婚姻家庭模式，政府生育政策对育龄人群生育意愿的约束作用不断减弱。育龄人群更多地从个体的利益权衡来作出生育决定，是否多生一个孩子也决定于家庭对社会经济长期趋势的预期和信心，具体而言，包括劳动就业、子女教育、社会保障、环境资源、住房、医疗、养老等方面面的现状和未来发展方向。

2 通过配套社会政策推进全面二孩政策的实施

对单独二孩政策的评估研究表明大量家庭符合政策条件却选择不生育二孩，究其主要原因在于三大压力，即经济压力、照料子女的压力、女性自身事业上发展的压力，这一结论对于全面二孩政策仍然是适用的。因此，要实现二孩政策的预期目标，特别是要想让生活在大城市的人口生育二孩，仅仅是生育政策的调整还远远不够，必须出台一系列的配套政策来推动，让老百姓想生、敢生，并且能够生好养好。短期来看，政府必须推出相应的政策措施，针对育龄人群的后顾之忧加大公共服务等的投入，才能鼓励更多的育龄家庭按政策生育。近年来我国育龄人群生育养育子女的经济成本不断增长，这不仅是社会经济发展的必然结果，同时也与正在开展的教育、卫生、住房等改革密切相关。优质教育资源的供给不足和父母对子女接受高质量教育的期望不断提升，房价高企和年轻人口对住房需求的增加，与照料有关的劳动力成本的持续上涨和家庭对家务劳动社会化的要求稳步增长，都使得年轻的育龄家庭承受日益沉重的经济压力。同时不必要的攀比和新媒体的传播效应也加大了育龄人群的心理压力。

政府作为最重要的公共服务提供者和资源配置者，有责任也有能力通过对公共资源的优化配置和增加投入，从宏观上缓解上述影响生育意愿的各种压力。政府可实施以家庭为单位征收所得税的税制改革，生育二孩的家庭有更高的减税额度，为愿意生育二孩的家庭减负。将义务教育延伸到学前阶段，并加大对整个义务教育的投入，在一定程度上可以缓解生育二孩的经济压力。政府有必要在托儿所、公办幼儿园的建设上加大投入，并采取必要的政策措施鼓励工作单位和民间资本参与婴幼儿童的照料服务和教育服务的提供。同时积极推动男性更多地参与到子女的生育养育过程中，让男女性共同承担家庭照料的责任。国外很多国家都已经有了“男性产假”的相关法规，中国可借鉴并采用灵活的制度安排，让男性能够同女性一样，享有照料子女的假期。也可以以家庭为单位，夫妻双方共享产假（具体时

间长度还需论证)，在保证女性足够的产假的前提下，根据家庭的具体情况使产假可在夫妻中灵活调剂，在产假的总额度内自由分配休假时间。男性更积极地参与到照料子女中有利于家庭关系的和睦，也能降低女性因为照料孩子而带来的职业发展损失，促使性别更平等。

以就业而言，市场经济的发展在为女性事业发展创造更多机会的同时，也使女性面临更为严峻的就业形势，营造男女平等公正的就业环境还任务艰巨。政府要在妇女权益保障法的基础上，通过各种预防措施防止妇女因生育而造成职业晋升受阻或在工作其他方面受到损害。虽然我国已基本消除了对女性就业的公开歧视，但隐形歧视仍然普遍存在，而全面二孩政策的实施有可能加剧这种隐形歧视。一些用人单位有可能为了自身的经济利益不招聘女性，特别是不招聘未婚和未育的女性，或者对准备生育二孩的女员工采取不公平的对待。政府要实施更加强有力的政策措施和监督，已有的相关规定应严格执行，也要前瞻性地研究新的政策手段。同时，企业因女性员工的生育可能会影响营收和利润，政府应介入并建立相关机制分担这部分成本，如进一步完善生育保险制度、扩大覆盖范围和延长享受时间、推进更加灵活的就业模式等。在鼓励企事业单位建设托儿所和幼儿园以缓解女性员工的工作家庭冲突时，一方面是企业要承担更多的社会责任，另一方面政府可对企业自办的托儿所和幼儿园给予适当的补贴。

类似这样的针对育龄人群的配套措施还不够，应形成一揽子整合的政策措施。此外，全面二孩政策实施以后对以往为实施独生子女政策所实行的各种法规政策条例都需要及时地清理、修订、完善或取消，从严格控制生育过渡到鼓励育龄人群按政策生育，形成对二孩家庭公平的政策环境。诸如原来实行的独生子女补贴、政府评估的一票否决权、社会抚养费的征收等都需要作相应的调整。以往实施独生子女政策所产生的遗留问题，包括对失独家庭的支持等也需要在新形势下进一步完善。其他政策法规也应作相应调整，比如我们的住房管理部门以往主要都是按照三口之家的住房需求来界定房屋性质的，而全面二孩会直接影响家庭对居住面积和房间需求的变化，因此，需要修改完善与房屋市场管理相关的政策法规。

3 重构家庭政策和家庭伦理体系

全面二孩政策的实施使家庭再一次成为社会关注的焦点。在过去的几十年间，中国的家庭规模不断缩小，家庭在传承文化、抚小养老、社会稳定等方面的能力也不断下降。与此同时，中国社会转型的进程又使中国的家庭被重新赋予了重要的保障和福利职责，面临巨大的责任和风险，扩大的家庭成员之间的传统互助模式再次成为中国家庭应对风险和适应变迁的重要屏障，中国家庭结构在不断简单化的过程中也日益呈现网络化的特征。全面二孩政策的顺利实施需要家庭作为支撑，同时也会成为中国家庭模式变化的新作用力。中国和谐社会的建设和各项社会经济改革的深化都需要家庭发挥更加积极的作用，我们在强调重视家庭是中华民族优秀传统文化的同时，却没有形成相对完整的家庭政策体系。家庭模式在转变，需要通过相

关的社会政策来帮助家庭恢复传统功能或具备承担新功能的能力，社会政策只有建立在家庭功能和需求的基础上才能为社会成员提供有效的帮助，特别是对家庭承担养育子女和老人的责任提供有效支持。与此同时，需要在传承传统家庭观的同时，研究发展并提倡在新的社会经济条件下的新型家庭观（包括孝道），这在一亿多独生子女正在成为中国社会的中坚力量时更加显得重要和紧迫。

在长期的历史发展进程中，中国社会形成了完整的家庭伦理道德体系，以此为基础规范中国人在家庭中的行为准则和长幼秩序，包括纵向的代际关系和横向的夫妇、兄弟等伦理关系，并形成“家国同构”的文化传统。传统的家庭伦理首先被五四运动所冲击，并在其后的近百年中进一步受到削弱，尤其是市场经济的建立和人口发展态势的快速转变更是在家庭本身和社会经济环境方面从根本上颠覆了传统的家庭伦理和家庭功能。在中国社会进入全面深化改革的重要机遇期，家庭再度成为发展政策和社会和谐的关注焦点。习近平近年来多次强调家庭建设和家庭教育的重要性，指出不论时代发生多大变化，不论生活格局发生多大变化，都要重视家庭建设，将家庭视为国家发展、民族进步、社会和谐的重要基点。

因此，以全面二孩政策的实施为契机，重构与中国社会经济相符合的、以传统文化为基础的新型家庭伦理，并以此作为家庭政策的理论基础，同时营造良好的有利于新型家庭伦理的传播和推广的文化氛围。在关注“民生”的总体政策导向中实施家庭政策，提高家庭政策的行政效率，最终形成一个政府、市场、社区和社会组织都有责任、动力和行动来帮助家庭承担应有责任的制度框架。家庭政策不仅要提升家庭延续传统功能的能力，还要使中国家庭在生态文明、社会建设和文化传承等长期发展战略中成为主体。

4 因地制宜，关注城乡地区间的差异

城乡之间、地区之间影响生育的因素存在很大差异，配套的政策措施也应当是因地制宜的。中国以往的计划生育实践有巨大的城乡和地区差异，差异不仅体现在各地不同的生育政策和项目实践，也反映在各地差异性的育龄人群生育意愿和总体生育率水平上。全面二孩政策的实施在政策上缩小了这种差异，但还保留了原先对一部分人口，主要是少数民族群体更为宽松的生育限制。中国巨大的社会经济 发展差异对育龄人群生育意愿差异的影响也不会迅速消失，因而各地在执行二孩政策过程中需要的配套政策措施也会有差异性。

还需要特别关注的一个问题是实施全面二孩政策对不同地区的影响存在差异。全面二孩政策对上海等东南沿海发达地区的影响可能不大，而对于中西部地区的影响可能会大一些。但在其他涉及公共服务的领域，尤其在教育领域中西部地区未来将面临很大压力。目前中国的基础教育经费基本是纳入地方财政，与地方政府的财政能力直接相关。近年来中国政府在

落实整体教育经费达到国内生产总值 (GDP) 的 4% 这一标准方面取得了很大的进展, 东南沿海发达地区较高的发展水平使地方政府投入较多的教育资源, 但即使严格按照 GDP 的 4% 标准投入教育经费也并不算充足。出生数的增加在若干年后就会转化 成对教育资源的需求, 对这种因生育政策调整造成可能的新的地区差异, 中央政府要通过转移支付或统 筹的办法, 尽可能给予中西部地区更多的教育及其他资源支持, 缩小东西部之间本来就已存在的教育资源和教育水平差距, 从制度上防止出生人群素质逆淘汰的发生。公共服务均等化在地区层面的差异应当 在新型城镇化战略的推进和户籍制度的改革过程中得到有效的改善。

5 通过整体性治理实现全面二孩政策的目标

总之, 全面二孩政策的推出是整个生育政策调整过程中的一个重要阶段, 对国家长期均衡发展有利, 也给予育龄家庭更多生育决定的自由。但我们也必须认识到生育政策的调整不是万应灵药, 生育政策的调整会延缓人口老龄化的速度, 但不可能扭转老龄化的长期趋势。因此, 养老金、退休年龄、医保、户籍等 制度性的改革不会因为生育政策的调整而放慢步伐。实现全面二孩政策的目标还需要整体性的、完善的配套政策, 牵涉到地区之间、城乡之间、贫富之间、男女之间乃至不同年龄群体之间的平等和利益调整。国家在实施全面二孩政策的同时必须加以充分考 虑, 使各个利益群体在政策调整过程中利益不受损害或达到共赢的状态。由于城乡和各地 区影响生育的 因素存在很大差异, 配套的政策措施也应当是因地制宜的。需要相关政府部门通过政策优化、资源组合 的方式, 实现各种由政府部门实施的配套政策, 提供更好的生育养育的相关公共服务, 切实解决育龄夫妻 的后顾之忧, 将两孩生育政策落到实处。以“家庭为中心”的家庭政策体系应当是中国未来社会建设和 民生领域深化改革的最重要领域之一, 并与普遍二孩政策相配套, 在生育政策调整的过程中及时推出并实施。需要对各种各样可能采用的政策措施进行充分的论证, 让好的政策能够很好地得到落实。

“互联网 +”时代, 网络和媒体日益成为日常生活的必需品, 人们的生育观念不断受到周围环境的影响。社会舆论的引导、公共服务的改善、经济活动周期性的变化、全球化和城镇化的深化都有可能对人们的生育观念产生影响, 导致生育意愿进一步下跌或回升。政策调整不是万能的, 但从政策上打破制约生育意愿的瓶颈, 进一步激发生育意愿才有望进一步释放生育潜力, 实现全面二孩政策的人口目标。通过整体性治理机制, 优化政策设计和效能, 合理配置政策资源, 充分调动各行为主体的参与, 广泛利用各种政策工具和传播媒介, 使人口政策调整成为实现全面小康社会的重要战略措施。

二次元文化对主流文化传播方式的启示

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二次元文化的内容庞杂且种类繁多，动画（Animation）、漫画（Comics）、游戏（Game），轻小说（Light Novel）、角色扮演（Cosplay）等均属于该文化类型。由于符合青年审美标准且内容丰富，二次元文化在网络青年文化群体中呈现溢出效应，为网络流行语言、网络表情包、网络原创音乐等其他网络青年流行文化提供源源不断的文化符号，可以说是网络青年文化再生产的富矿。富矿同样也需要资源，其中对主流文化的挪借改写、再编也是二次元文化其维系自身存在的重要方式。面对青年越来越强调个性化的文化消费趋势，主流文化在青年群体中的传播与传承需要主动与青年流行文化进行沟通互动，借鉴其表现形式上的亲和力，传播手段上的科技化，内容上的多样化，才能面对挑战，更好地实施有效引导。

一、二次元文化让青年极富参与感，发挥想象力，并进行再创作

二次元文化之所以能够吸引众多年轻人，其主要原因在于：

1. 二次元文化网络平台的设计能够让青年更具参与感。“用户参与”

对于 90 后是表达喜爱的常见方式，他们乐于参与创作，并在参与中获得满足感。其中，同步性是二次元文化中的弹幕视频区别于传统视频评论的首要因素，受众的反馈伴随着整个传播过程同步发生，评论可以针对任何的细枝末节做出反应，更偏向碎片化；同时它还具有即时互动性，能够完全呈现人际交往中瞬时的、不假思索的互动，更具感情色彩；而无限循环更新的模式更是保持观众新鲜感的重要因素，不断叠加的弹幕会丰富充实原有的内容，使得弹幕视频在多次的传播中发生内容的变化和转移，它所传播的再也不是大量复制的信息，而是经过受众创作的去中心化的内容。

2. 提供二次创作平台让青年能够自由发挥创造性和想象力，同时，其作品大多来自青年自创，更能满足青年的审美需求。新生代对美感与想象有更高的追求。动漫的丰富题材从某种程度而言，输出了多元的价值理念。动漫中不同的画风，不同世界的描绘也激发了年轻人的想象和创造，他们对于现实世界的审美有了更高的要求。除了参与感、想象力，二次创作更是符合新生代口味的重要因素。

二、二次元文化可与主流文化结合的成功范例

1. 二次元作品成功融合主流意识形态

《那年那兔那些事儿》被视为二次元文化可与主流意识形态文化对接最成功的作品之一。作为首部由社区原创开始的民间自创动漫，讲述了中国近现代历史特别是中华人民共和国建国之前及建国以来的一些军事和外交的重大事件。相关视频累计点击量已经超过 5 亿次。该部作品在青年群

体中引起了强烈的情感共鸣，说明年轻人并非对党史军史失去了兴趣，关键在于历史的展现形式，弘扬主旋律需要采用的是符合青年审美的语言，首先让青年产生共鸣，再内化为他们自身的价值观。

另一个典型的例子就是一段改编正史剧《大秦帝国之裂变》的鬼畜视频《大秦嘴炮帝国》，视频已有百万点击量，所谓鬼畜是指一种混音制作、具洗脑效果的歌曲，该视频改编自剧中商鞅与秦孝公的一段经典对话，之所以走红，亮点在于它将古文转化为说唱歌词，而内容是唱的是正正经经的变法强国，决心、制度、忠信，不再只是空谈理论或者少有人听的实验作品，让广大群众喜闻乐见。仔细研究视频中歌词的改编，它的精神大体上仍是与原剧一致的，不是简单低俗的恶搞。对于现在的青年人来说，简单的恶搞已经不够看了，表面恶搞，底下却是认真，而且讲得对、唱得好，这才会真正令人欣赏。一位台湾学者在点评这一现象是称：“以恶搞的形式将爱国的主旋律变出入心的节奏，大陆新一代的网络创作能量不可小觑”。

2. 优秀传统文化与二次元文化的完美碰撞

以古筝演奏视频《千本樱》为例，该视频号称是二次元文化社交网站哔哩哔哩网（bilibili.com，简称为B站）的“镇站之宝”，点击量已经突破1200万，弹幕评论更是多达67余万，视频制作者选择了火遍全球的日本动漫名曲《千本樱》作为改编曲目，融入中国古典文化元素，经过创造性的编曲，运用古筝弹奏的方式重现此曲。视频作者凭借娴熟的古筝演奏技巧，利用令人眼花缭乱的古筝指法，伴随着轻快明朗的曲风，展现了极富张力的弹奏风格，让观众们在弹幕评论里惊呼“这个古筝成精啦！”，该自创视频一经发酵，立马掀起一阵古典乐器演奏热，一系列的古筝、笛子、琵琶演奏视频陆续走红。

《千本樱》的走红表明古典文化不能始终高高在上，令人高山仰止，要想走出曲高和寡的尴尬境地，就要善于将古典文化与流行文化元素相结合，使古典文化更接地气，才能使青年人更乐于接受古典文化；再者，古典文化应该走出传统风格禁锢，大胆尝试新的表现风格，适应年轻人的心理和审美需求。传统的古典民乐演奏往往是万年不变地跟随伴奏弹奏，表现风格固然是端庄的、得体的，能展现出中国古典文化的风韵魅力，但却无法引起年轻观众的共鸣。诸如《千本樱》表演中或夸张、或恶搞的“不太正经”的表现风格，在年轻群体中对中国古典文化的传播效果却是颠覆性的。”这种“有趣”、“脑洞大开”的表现风格，恰恰迎合了当下年轻人的心理和审美需求。

三、启示：青年网络文化的有效引导

面对二次元文化的日益鼎盛，主流文化如何通过媒体、市场等进行有效引导，二者之间如何更好接轨，这是青年教育需要思考的问题。

1. 政府管理方式应实现间接性转化。只有尊重新媒体时代文化产业发展规律，才能更好地引导和发挥创作者与消费者的热情，为融合发展提供

良性生态。当下产业和商业对青年的网络文化消费市场的竞争日趋激烈，互联网企业成为二次元文化发展的重要外部推手。2015年，很多互联网文化娱乐企业注意到二次元内容的巨大变现潜力，因而开始积极与内容版权方展开合作并进行内容推广，成为推动二次元内容商业化进程的外部动力。这一趋势既为主流文化对青少年网络流行文化的引导提供了更多的可能性和实现途径，也使其必须摒弃单一的、强制的引导，而要面对更具复杂性、竞争性和协商性的情境。类似B站这样走商业化路线的媒体是较为容易管理的，因为一旦有了商业化需求后，平台运营者以及视频上传者都会有自觉的自我省察，自觉去避免那些不能够带给他实际收益的行为。因为如果触碰到意识形态红线，就会对其利益造成直接损害，显然这是商业化媒体平台和用户不愿见到的。他们现实的收益来自于国家整体的安全繁荣和稳定发展，对于这部分人来说，收益与国家利益形成捆绑关系后，他们便不会愿意去打乱秩序。因此只要鼓励良性健康的商业化，让其与现实的收益捆绑在一起。对于政府管理而言，可以从删视频这种粗暴、冲撞的方式变为掐断资金链、影响资本收益。这种相对间接的管理方式具有针对性、更有弹性。

具体而言，类似B站的视频分享网站可以建立行业协会，或者行业自律公约。政府对他们保持适当的容忍度，总体采取鼓励促进发展的态度，不宜过多介入其商业行为和商业模式。但对于那些具有外国政府背景的资金、投资以及公司内部治理结构有外国背景的个人、势力插手的机构，需要严格管控。对于不同的部分要区别管理，但管控的方式方法要保持适当的弹性，可以通过定期会谈、通过第三方研究机构去做一些间接的约束等。

2. 大学生思想政治工作应拓宽创新发展空间。面向大学生群体的思想政治工作应该要密切和以弹幕视频分享网站为代表的年轻人喜闻乐见的新媒体应用紧密结合。一是可以将类似于《那兔》那些具有一定影响力的优秀作品作为高校公共政治课的辅助读物；二是应该鼓励大学生自主发挥生产类似的产品，可以通过类似的创作大赛，或者在有相关动漫专业的高校，有意识地培养一批能够以动漫方式宣扬主旋律的新一代自媒体人；同时从网上去挖掘、培养一批骨干团队，为政府自发代言。例如在B站的运行模式下，未来UP主会越变越多，他们也会各自获得粉丝群，并且更有效率地去运营这些粉丝群。这种互联网创作模式的带宽是中心媒体的成千上万倍。这些UP主会越来越走向专业职业化的队伍，也是需要重点培养的对象。

3. 机构之间共同协作，促进健康有效发展。相关管理部门、高校从事思政工作的机构、研究人员以及类似B站的从业人员，可以形成共同研究探讨的机制，诸如产业生态发展论坛等形式，专门定期就这一问题展开研判，合作。在这一过程中，产业方提供可以研究的数据、对象，学界可以向产业方提一些要求，让运营方去搜集一些数据、资料，形成研究报告。这一报告将同时具有三方面的价值：研究价值、产业发展咨询以及监管部门关心的政治生态管理问题。

上海交通大学海洋智库助力我国深海大洋事业

薛桂芳 上海交通大学海洋战略与权益研究基地

一、国际海底的重要战略地位

国际海底是地球上尚未被人类充分认识和利用的最大潜在战略资源基地。目前已被认知的矿物资源包括多金属结核、富钴结壳和多金属硫化物等。据测算，海底多金属结核估算资源量达 750 亿吨，富钴结壳潜在资源量达 210 亿吨，多金属硫化物的富集程度也远超过陆地矿床。随着陆地资源的日趋枯竭和对海洋资源认识和利用能力的不断提高，国际海底必将成为未来多种自然资源的开发利用基地，孕育形成深海采矿业、深海生物产业、深海技术装备制造业等战略性新兴产业。

根据《联合国海洋法公约》（以下简称《公约》），国际海底区域（《公约》简称“区域”）是指国家管辖范围以外的海床、洋底和底土，约占地球表面积的 49%。国际海底及其资源是人类共同继承财产，由国际海底管理局代表全人类进行管理。国际海底的战略地位根植于其广阔的空间和丰富的资源。在全球经济一体化形势下，国际海底及公海是各国融入世界的大通道，是各国国际经济贸易和经济发展必须利用的通道和空间；国际海底是国际政治、经济和军事斗争的重要舞台，是所有沿海国家安全防卫必须考虑的区域，也是大国军事利益的必然场所。

二、我国进军国际海底取得积极进展

1990 年 4 月，国务院批准同意“以中国大洋矿产资源研究开发协会（以下简称中国大洋协会）名义申请矿区登记，并将大洋多金属结核资源研究开发作为国家长远发展项目，给予专项投资”；2000 年，大洋专项实现了由单一的多金属结核资源向国际海底多种资源的扩展；2010 年，国际海底新资源矿区申请得到国务院批准，明确了立足太平洋、面向印度洋、挺进大西洋的战略框架，确立了“立足资源、超越资源”的战略构想，我国深海大洋工作步入崭新的发展阶段。

二十多年来，按照“持续开展深海勘查，大力发展深海技术，适时建立深海产业”的工作方针，我国大洋工作成效显著：在政治上，维护了我国在国际海底的权益，拓展了走向全球大洋的战略活动空间；在经济上，开辟了我国战略金属资源的新来源，培育了着眼未来深海新兴产业的国际竞争力；在科学技术上，提高了对深海底部的科学认知水平，促进和带动了我国深海技术装备的发展。

三、深海事业发展的国内立法需求

近年来国际海底制度有很多新发展。国际海底管理局于 2001 年通过了《多金属结核探矿和勘探的规章》；2010 年 5 月通过了《多金属硫化物

的探矿和勘探规章》；2012年7月通过了《富钴结壳的探矿和勘探规章》。各国对国际海底资源的争夺在有序、合法的国际环境下愈演愈烈。2011年2月1日，国际海洋法法庭在其公布的咨询意见指出：如果担保国已经采取了国内立法、规章和行政措施等“一切必要和适当的措施”，以确保被担保的承包者有效履行其合同义务，则可免除担保国的法律和赔偿责任。如果担保国未能履行其通过国内立法、规章和义务的条约义务，担保国应对承包者不法行为所造成的损害，承担法律和赔偿责任。

国际海底制度赋予各国的权益只是一种制度上的可能，而不是一项既得的现实利益。把国际公约规定的沿海国家的利益转化为国内法上的现实权益，有赖于国家就国际海底资源的权属、勘探、开发、管理等问题的国内立法，有赖于国家对国际海底战略价值的充分认识和国家的综合国力。西方主要工业发达国家早已完成了关于深海采矿的国内立法。

在这种形势下，我国于2016年出台了《中华人民共和国深海海底区域资源勘探开发法》（以下简称深海法），深海法有助于推动和促进我国的国际海底勘探和开发活动，维护我国在国际海底区域的正当和合法权益，为我国在大洋矿产资源的勘探开发活动提供国内法上的保障。徒法不足以自行，仅有法律远不能达到其所设想的目的。深海法内容概括、提纲挈领，是规范我国深海活动的基本法，它需要一整套配套法规体系来实现规范深海活动、提升深海能力两大目标。

四、上海交大海洋智库助力我国深海大洋事业

上海高校智库——上海交通大学“国家海洋战略与权益研究基地”自成立以来，依托上海交通大学海洋工程、深海技术、船舶设计等方面雄厚实力，建设积极对接国家战略需求，为支持和发展中国深海大洋事业的问题研究及成果产出提供了重要的理论支撑和学术保障。

2015年，中国大洋协会委托本智库进行了《深海海底区域资源勘探与开发“十三五”规划》编制。规划依据《国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要》、《中华人民共和国深海海底区域资源勘探开发法》等相关法律、规划和文件编制，为发展我国的深海事业、建设海洋强国，维护和拓展我国在国际海底区域的合法权益，促进我国对国际海底区域的研究、勘探和开发活动，推动深海矿业、基因资源、深海装备产业的培育与发展提供了蓝图。

2016年，全国人大环境与资源委员会和中国大洋协会委托本智库对2016年通过的深海法进行解读。通过对《深海法》进行解读，对《深海法》不详尽的内容进行必要的解释和完善，对探矿活动、适用主体、深海海底区域资源勘探和开发的环境保护问题等制度进行补充，有助于完善《深海法》的框架性规定、执行程序等，减少其在实践中造成适用法律的困惑与误解，提高其实施效果。

2016年，中国大洋协会委托本智库进行深海法配套法规体系进行设计研究。以深海法为基石的配套法规体系既结合我国深海实践、深海安全战

略目标、深海法律基础，又考虑深海科技发展、深海商业开发时机的预判、国际制度和规则的发展，既维持法律规则的稳定性，也保持深海相关技术标准、规程的开放性，统筹兼顾，为我国拓展深海大洋事业保驾护航。

2016年，中国大洋协会委托本智库进行国际海底制度定期审查机制研究。对国际海底制度的新近发展进行跟踪和详实分析，有利于我国全面审视、检验以人类共同继承遗产原则为基础的国际海底法律制度；加深我国对国际海底规则体系的理解；在国际海底权益维护中落实海洋强国战略，提高国际话语权；为我国未来制定国际海底战略提供智力支持。

2016年，本智库作为环境评价法律事务组参与国家科技部《深海多金属结核采矿环境调查与环境影响评价》项目，具体负责国际规则制定，收集相关信息，讨论提出对策建议。该项目由国家深海基地管理中心负责组织实施，项目总经费1.335亿元，将逐步提升我国深海环境调查和评价能力，也可提升我国深海资源勘探能力，保障我国海洋权益；同时可以为海洋管理机构和国际海底管理局等有关部门在制定有关环境管理法规时提供重要的科学依据，提高我国在相关领域的话语权。

2017年7月3日-14日，本智库将举办“海洋法理论与实践”暑期国际研修班。研修班将邀请国内外著名深海界专家学者重点讲授深海科技、实践、法律等内容。研修班获得了国际海底管理局的捐赠基金支持，代为发展中国家培养深海方面的服务人才。研修班以建设成为国际化、开放式的国内一流海洋法主题暑期研修班为目标，旨在为诸多青年学者、优秀学生提供良好的海洋法律与政策发展研究平台。

Five Issues Worth Noticing on the "One Belt, One Road" Initiative

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1. The Origin of the "One Belt, One Road" Initiative Rooted in the Response to the US Obama Administration's "Pivot to Asia" Strategy

The hot debated "One Belt, One Road" Initiative, raised in 2013, was at first a response to Obama's "Pivot to Asia" strategy. A brief historical review would be needed to view this problem. Before the 9.11, China played the role of a major potential enemy of the United States' hegemony. However coincidentally, 9.11 exposed the real enemy, who attacked the United States and made a war on its own territory. As a result, from 2001 to 2003, the US focused on the warfare in the Middle East. Nevertheless, from 2004 to 2006, a bunch of think tanks in the US believed that the country's enemy is still China, instead of the Middle East countries. Since China had unexpected development after joining the WTO, especially in GDP, finance, employment. Thus, after George W. Bush stepped down in 2008, the Obama administration embarked on the general strategic planning to settle with the Middle East as soon as possible, and to prepare to get back to Asia-Pacific.

In the strategic transit of the US "Pivot to Asia", China's biggest concern is the energy issue. Energy issue is one of crucial pulse for China's industrialization. China also started to consider this issue since the year of 2000 in the over-all planning. "One road" is launched after "one belt", but if the "one road" was stuck, what could be done next? What to do on the energy issue? And if the Malacca Strait were blocked, there would then be two sea-lanes? With this as the starting point, China put forward the "One Belt, One Road" initiative, with immediate and positive response from the international society, partly due to China's human resources. For example, Liqun Jin from Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has played an active role. Speaking of AIIB, there used to be 30 at most, but now it turned to be more than 70, with whose popularity far beyond our expectation.

2. The Core of the "One Belt, One Road" Initiative is a Modification on the US and Europe Dominated and Defined International Relations. The Academics Community Should Have Various Interpretations on the Meaning It Has Been Given.

In the recent one or two years, the extra value added to "One Belt, One Road" is getting increasingly profound, in aspects including the academic research, politics, and business. The earliest move of adding on is related to domestic industrial structure adjustment and energy security. Considering the fact that both the strength in building bridges, roads and tunnels and the whole capability in mechanical facilities had already ranked the first in the world, China has the confidence to face the whole world. It has also been a fact that the developing countries need infrastructure construction, so do some developed countries. So China faced the world with its productivity with good quality, which motivated its steel and car industries to export. Then, when it comes to the extra cultural meaning on the initiative, it could be added on massively. What China aimed to change is a US and Europe dominated international relations system in the past 500 years, especially in the past few decades the Westphalian System formulated. But it is not a change based on destroy, but based on correction, with principles such as "Mutual discussion, construction and sharing", "Equality, Respect, Cooperation, Mutual Benefit" and "unite but not ally, confrontation and balance". China could bring a new global definition on international relations, so as for the whole human society.

This new definition aimed at getting rid of the discourse of the West since the World War II, with human rights, democracy as the criteria. It aimed at establishing a discourse system of "Mutual discussion, construction and sharing". Therefore, the "One Belt, One Road" strategy would take the differences based on region diversity into account, resulting in China holding talks with the host separately. Thus, China mentioned more on individual country connection to avoid one-way output in the last year and a half. It is a great question for the academic community to initiate further study on, that among the meanings added on "One Belt, One Road" which ones are reliable, which ones are conceptual, and which ones are original, which ones were gradually attached one.

3. It is Necessary to Carefully Analyze the Pros and Cons to Host Countries" Industrialization During the Promotion of "One Belt, One Road" Initiative.

For "One Belt, One Road" Initiative, China has to consider its impact that might bring to the host countries" industrialization. This could be a very complicated issue, since when there is no industrialization, there is no urbanization. China's 30 years of development could be a golden chance by accident, as in 1978, Deng Xiaoping, Madame Thatcher in the UK, and Ronald Wilson Reagan in the US all took on actions on globalization,

which docked with China's reform and opening up inadvertently. After the World War II, the lower-end production capacity western developed countries was also as the point to be transferred oversea, while China took on the job. Development Zones had been constructed in China, which transferred hundreds of millions of labor storage in the rural areas to factories. After that, wage had become the core income. This fast, massive and complex transition ensured considerable stability and growth, which was unexpected. Later, in spite of the high domestic pressure, China joined WTO, which promoted the economic development greatly. From 2002 to 2008, the accumulated employment problems in China were resolved immediately, and the labor force was in short supply between 2003 and 2005.

Now, China's entire industry, are supposed to be in the transition from the lower-end to the higher-end, and the same time, to solve the employment problem of migrant workers, the present lower-end part should be maintained in a long period of time, which touched the cheese of the US and European countries. The western countries are development since they have taken up the upper position in the value chain. While if China could take over its place, it would be a great threat for them, considering China's huge population, strong national identity and complete industrial system. Theoretically, if China could produce anything, it had blocked the possibility of India repeating the way of industrialization like China. If the lower-end industry flows to India as a substitution, though the settlement of India's more than 200 million surplus labor could be done, the existence of commodity market stayed a question. Meanwhile, China has occupied the major international market. In this case, what does China need from India? There is indeed a sense of zero-sum game, while win-win situation and mutual benefit might be hard to achieve. One indisputable fact is that China's biggest importing needs are energy and mineral resources.

So, how many actual benefits the "One Belt, One Road" initiative could bring to the industrialization and urbanization of the countries along the route is an issue worth analyzing. Besides, the ecological system of these countries along the route could be fragile, which, would surely result in serious problems if enterprises with high pollution risks go there, with the ecological system in the Central Asian countries more fragile than China. So when talking about the industry development of "One Belt, One Road", it is necessary to analyze its influence to the host countries thoroughly.

4. Attentions Should be Paid to the Religious and Cultural Issues of the Countries Along the "One Belt, One Road". It is Essential to Have a Rational Understanding on the Difficulty of Communication.

Many countries along the "One Belt, One Road" route are Islamic countries, these countries are withstanding a series issues of marketization, industrialization, urbanization, as well as the oppression from the West, which led to their greater difficulties in transition than China. One important factor which is a barrier to these countries is that the doctrines in Hadith of Islam have restricted a lot on daily life, which could be easily violated by behavioral changes. However, no restricted religious rules in China had granted freedom to Chinese people in the convenience of modernization, and religion is not a big issue in China's development. When facing these countries, it might be hard for China to communicate with them though not impossible to communicate. When China needs to communicate with these Islamic countries, it needs to be cautious in knowing about Koran and Hadith of Islam and using them as a thread of communication. For doing this, China should make effort in cultivating talents to make significant contribution to the communication while with recognition on its difficulty.

It should be noted that Confucianism and Taoism have never been exported to other countries in China's history; instead the outsiders came to China to learn Chinese culture. This implied China at that time had extreme self-confidence, and showed no interest to enlarge the influence of its culture. While the western cultural promotion is majorly religious related, which could also be called social organization promotion, which had been going on for centuries. Nowadays the US and the European countries established NGOs related to human rights and charity organizations, which also served the needs of the entire society and economy. Religious emotion and motivation are bounded with this type of promotion while which is the thing that China lacks. Chinese people need governments' facility and financing supporting to promote its culture and social organizations, since missionary spirit is missing in Chinese culture. However, this is also China's advantage in not selling its culture with force like the West, with religion in modern times and values in human rights, democracy in contemporary time.

5. It Is Necessary to Pay Enough Attention to "Sino-Indian Relation" in "One Belt, One Road" Initiative.

The attitude of the Indian government and the mainstream society towards China is diversified, and tends to be conservative and negative, which is also a stable status. Because the relationship between China and India is very subtle, the reason lies in the following four aspects:

First, China has border dispute with India. The 2200km borderline of China only left one period without delineation, which is the territory connected to India.

Second, China's victory in the Sino-Indian war in Tibet in 1962 buried the seed of India's ill feeling.

Third, India-Pakistan relations made India worried. Kashmir issue is the core of the dispute between the two countries. China built roads in Pakistan and Kashmir, and also the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which touched nerve of India. India hoped that China could meet their demands in Kashmir, which would also be impossible. Meanwhile, the sovereignty and cultural issue in Kashmir is complicated, with the lower social group had Islam as the religion while the upper class believes in Hinduism. The contradiction is not reconcilable.

Fourth, India was somewhat indulging in Western media calling it the largest democratic country. While a question should be posed on why it could not surpass China as an authoritarian country (in the western discourse). This was the hardest question for India to answer. In the past two or three decades, the gap of overall competence between the two countries had been drastically widened. At the same time, the US initiated the "pearl chain" strategy towards China to place multiple issues to China. All of these has worsened the Sino-Indian relation, which must be taken into serious consideration when promoting the 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative.

Translated by Du Xiaoxin, Tian Yan

NATO Expansion, Trump's New Deal and New Pattern of Russian–European Security

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The NATO problem is a great gap in-between Russia and Europe. This gap is not only resulted from the Cold War, but also has its deep and complex historical origin. After more than a decade when the Cold War ended, the relationship between Russia and the West had once reconciled. But in the beginning of the new century, the relationship between the two sides grew intensive step by step. The expansion of NATO played a vital role in this process.

From the perspective of nowadays, the expansion of NATO is not only an international organisation's enlargement in a single region, but a boundary expansion of NATO as a military security organisation in European region which focus on state and politics. In addition, through the deployment of missile defense system as defensive strategic weapon system, the movement of NATO had brought along conventional armed forces' direct appearance in the frontier of confrontation between the East and the West after Ukraine's political crisis.

The expansion of NATO had not only received boycott from Russia, but also had faced differentiated opinions within the Western camp. When the result of USA presidential election was revealed in 2016, Trump made a lot of statement commenting on "NATO's outdatedness" and on improvement of relation with Russia, which was totally different from the US's previous strategies. This had made people feel surprised. But not long after this, in the Munich Summit on February 2017, and also when important political figures of Trump cabinet had visited Europe, these members of Trump government including himself had expressed the attitude on maintaining alliance with Europe. What would this unprecedented dramatic change bring to NATO's, Russian and European security relations? Would Russian-European security relation tend to become reconciled, to move into a new cold war or to create an even worse scenario?

1. The Conflict on NATO Expansion under the Background of Crisis

After the collapse of Soviet Union, NATO as a military organisation confronting Warsaw Treaty Organisation during Cold War had to choose which way to go, which became a problem.

There was a debate and discussion on the transformation of NATO from a military security organisation to a political organisation after 1990s, while no agreement had been made. There was also dispute on NATO's role in former Yugoslavia states' intervention Balkan Region. Now it is known that the internal dispute in USA on NATO expansion during 1996 to 1997 even happened in the core decision making level. It was not until 911 terrorist attack in 2001 that the USA became awake on this issue. Especially motivated by the new conservatism power, George W. Bush realised that it is necessary to revive the security function of NATO in the name of fighting terrorism.

In the following decade and more, NATO firstly participated in the war against Afghanistan with all efforts, which driven by the US. Though the warfare was on and off, it was the first large scale collective military action of NATO in the new century. More importantly, the change happened since G. W. Bush attempted to include Georgia and Ukraine as members of NATO during 2007 and 2008. This move was not realised since its European counter partners such as Germany stood in the way. However, it led to great impact on interaction between NATO and Russia.

In 2009, when President Obama took the office, he took democratic revolution in Mid-East as important responsibility. However, when continuous turmoils caused by revolution in Mid-East happened, the USA stepped back. Under the embarrassing circumstances of not being able to cope with self-recovering in the financial crisis, the US reluctantly push its alliance countries like France to the front stage. In 2001, the resolution of the Security Council of the UN about "No-fly Zone" in Libya was further explained, leading to air strike by NATO that resulted in the military intervention in Libya and the ruthless execution on Gaddafi in chaos. Until 2013, exactly when Obama prepared to withdraw the NATO military force as a leader's role, the Ukraine political crisis occurred. On the one hand, this crisis caught NATO red handed with little preparation. On the other hand, the Ukraine political crisis made NATO obtain great chance in firmly enhancing its security function. Consequently, NATO's overall arrangement on Eurasia had changed significantly, from only focusing on marginal areas during the Cold War like Balkan, Afghanistan and Libya to formally back to the "New Europe" zone which is the front line of Europe facing Russia with direct confrontation again.

Honestly speaking, after the Cold War ended, the NATO expansion was not causing huge dispute at first. The launching of NATO expansion was not initiated by the US, but caused by Middle and East European countries' security concerns on themselves since they located in between the East and the West. Under the atmosphere of that period, even Russia

who used to be the rival during the Cold War once expressed interest in joining NATO. Nevertheless, all these could not cast away the fact on NATO's attempt in expansion as a real military security organisation with politicisation as its form on the surface. This is realised with organised steps by taking advantage of each crisis happened in sensitive geopolitical crucial areas like Middle East European, South East European and Baltic States from the second half of 1990s to the beginning of the 21st century.

2. Missile Defense system and European Security

The missile defense system is the Ace card for the USA to fight for strategic advantage in the Cold War and sustain its super power dominance in world military aftermath. Since the new century, on the one hand, the US insisted the promotion on missile defense system as it enlarged its missile defense system of one country to a wider coverage on the entire Europe and NATO. On the other hand, Russia had an attitude change from cooperation to boycott towards the missile defense system and had shown the uncompromisable position. These moves leading to different directions revealed that the antimissile issue is still the focus of great power in the world since the new century.

The development of USA missile defense system had experienced several stages. From the perspective of taking this issue as a core, the security strategic relation among the US, NATO and Russia could be seen with different tendencies in different stages.

The first stage was from the proposal of Strategic Defence Plan in 1983 to the US withdrawing from Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) in the end of 2001. Though the struggle about the antimissile in this period of time is not as complicated and fierce as later, it generally reflected the extreme opposite position on this issue between the US and Russia: even in the comparatively fine status of their relation, they would still take all to fight for it.

The second stage was from the US's withdrawal from ABM to the Russia-Georgia War started in August 2008. This was a crucial period that the US missile defense system moved from getting rid of limitations to the real implementation, which led to drastic worsening on relation with Russia.

The third stage was from ending of the Russia-Georgia War to the breakout of Ukraine political crisis in 2013. Right before this stage, the restart on US-Russia relation did bring relaxation and intimacy in struggle of the sides. However, it was still the fundamental differences on the important strategic issue of the missile defense system that altered the restart to the crisis situation.

The fourth stage was from the breakout of Ukraine political crisis in the end of 2013 to the real deployment of the missile defense system in 2016.

The crisis in Ukraine led to the drastic backward movement in relation between Russia and the US with Europe. Not only the restart of US-Russia had been all gone away, but also the security dispute between Russia and Europe had been rapidly upgraded because of the Crimea Incident. With this as the background, The deployment of missile defense system in Europe became one of the top concerns in East-West relation.

On the antimissile issue, the imbalance of strategic power of the US and Russia had appeared. That was the reason why Putin had emphasised again and again that antimissile issues was the origin of US-Russia relation going worse since the new century. In general, if the antimissile issue could not be settled properly, the framework of Europe security could hardly be formed.

3. The New Confrontation of Conventional Armed Forces After Ukraine Political Crisis

After the Ukraine political crisis broke out, in one way, the return of Crimea and intervention of Russian military volunteers in eastern region of Ukraine had shown that Russia was determined to fight against Western influence's expansion in Ukraine despite of all problems it faced both domestic and abroad. In the other way, facing a non-member country like Ukraine, NATO had not prepared to implement military response. If by that time Russia had further intervention on issues of Ukraine or other regions, NATO did not even have an emergency plan for that. In a word, Ukraine crisis actually stimulated the political will of the US and other NATO member countries on "reexamine the fundamental promise NATO made on European security and the US's leadership".

3.1 The Re-deployment on NATO Armies

The content of deployment plan confirmed in NATO Summit in Warsaw including sending four multinational troops to Poland and three Baltic countries, with 1000 soldiers in each troop and rotation implemented (According to explanation of Stoltenberg, this was to prevent contradiction with regulations in "Russia and NATO basic documents".); enlarging the rapid reaction force of NATO to three times as its original size, reaching 40,000 people; setting up a vanguard brigade (planned to be stationed in Romania) as a part of the rapid reaction troops; establishing 8 small headquarters in Eastern regions of NATO; confirming the responsibility of NATO core countries on the multinational troops in East European countries (the NATO troops in Poland under the leadership

of US, the troops in Baltic countries respectively under leadership of Canada, Germany and the UK); big countries in NATO carrying out preset equipment, supplementing alert and information system; planning to deploy more weapons in these countries in a defensive way; inviting leaders from two neutral countries, NATO partners Sweden and Finland, to the summit which was worth noticing. In recent years, NATO had been increasingly active in lobbying these two countries to join NATO.

This is the biggest and most powerful adjustment of NATO after the Cold War.

3.2 The Different Positions of European Member Countries

Before the Warsaw Summit, the then German Foreign Minister Steinmeier had just made a warning that it was better not to "use eye catching threat of force and claim of war" to intensify the relation. But on the Warsaw Summit, there were still a series military enhancement plans of NATO that was the most massive since the Cold War ended. Sigmar Gabriel, the president of .

Germany Social Democratic Party, placed his doubt, "We have to ask ourselves whether the world is going to be better if the two sides started military exercises on their borders, increased military forces and threat each other." President Holland of France made it clear that NATO did not have a right to point fingers on how the relationship should be between Europe and Russia. While he also said that Russia to France was neither threat nor enemy. President Zeman of Czech Republic openly questioned the NATO army deployment in the four countries. Representatives from Belgium and Luxembourg also expressed their stands that NATO should consider its position against Russia and consider start conversation with Russia, "the aim of Warsaw Summit is not to work against anybody."

3.3 The Response from Russia

Alexander Grushko, the permanent representative in NATO from Russia, stated that the moves NATO made in Eastern regions were "confrontational" and "Russia would be forced to react upon NATO's moves". Before Warsaw Summit, Gruchko had refuted Stoltenberg's point of view proposed through media. Firstly, he made it clear that what NATO did in the Eastern regions would only worsen the situation, and in fact, it is a new way of boundary setting with military measures (e.g. rotation of soldiers and massive military exercises) to stand in the way of the implementation of the Greater Europe Project, and to enhance European countries' dependency on the US."

On the expert forum before the Warsaw Summit, Vice Secretary General of NATO, Vershbow, said, "Now we are disappointed to admit that we

have entered the phase of longterm strategic competition with Russia. Since the both sides had fundamental opinions on Europe. He commented that it means NATO "had already started the transformation which was different from that when the Cold War ended." NATO is going to be back at its origin which is consolidating its eastern border.

3.4 The Dispute on "Size of Military Presence" and "Hybrid War"

After the Ukraine Crisis, there were two types of disputes between Russia and the West, on crucial issues like to what extent the US and NATO member countries could have military reaction.

The first type is that the definition of "Military Presence" in the basic documents signed in 1997 by Russia and NATO remained contentious. According to articles in Nato-Russia Founding Act signed by the two sides on May 27th 1997, NATO confirmed: Under the current and foreseeable future security condition, NATO would make effort through coordination, integration and potential enhancement to implement its own defense and complete related tasks, instead of through increasing deploying massive conventional combat forces.

The second type was how to deal with the alleged Hybrid War started by Russia in Eastern areas of Ukraine. After the Ukraine crisis, there appeared a new word discussed by experts from various background in the field of European security. That is Hybrid war. Interestingly, both the two opposite sides used concepts similar as hybrid war to accuse ambiguous military actions taken on purpose by the other sides. Expert in Russia believed that it was the US who started a hybrid war in Ukraine by the end of 2013 with the purpose of replacing the government with puppet regime.

4. New Deal of Trump and the Future of NATO

In general, there had been two types of estimation and analysis on the development of NATO in recent years. The first position held by some is that the strategies used by the US to Russia had failed and the persistence of NATO should be considered. With this position as the premise, one type of opinion proposed that the current strategies the West held towards Russia had been in general dilemma. Another type of opinion taking this position proposed that the US should withdraw from NATO. The third types of opinion was that now matter what happened, there was no way out for Russia, i.e. even the US and Russia made peace with each other, this would not help Putin. This one actually was affirming that the US should give up its tough attitude towards Russia, which echoed Trump's proposal during its campaign.

It could be seen obviously from the above two types of opinions that it was not only the Trump cabinet, but also political elites from other parties that wished to adjust the relationship with Russia in the dilemma.

However, there was another more notable position which was extensive among the internal dispute of the US and Europe, which was proposing a tougher allied strategies to deal with Russia.

With this position, two types of opinion could be subdivided. One emphasized on the toughness, one on containment. The former had considerable supporting population in Westerners. They thought Europe and the US should stick together with tough coping methods to face “threat from Russia”. The conclusion from opinion is that the tough attitude was more likely to bring NATO triumph.

The second type of opinion from the position holds the view that strategies followed a style like George Frost Kennan’s policy of containment as the strategic measures should have a return. The feature of containment strategies should be, firstly, continuous patience in staying Kennanist containment as long as half a century; secondly, unremovable belief on advantages of the West and difficulties Russia faced; thirdly, unity maintenance of the West. All these were the key to successes.

As Concluding Remarks: The Historical Comparison on Dispute among NATO, European Security and Russia.

In relatively short period of time, scholars worldwide focused on the impact of relaxation of relation and “restart” between the US and Russia to the European security since the Cold War, especially after the Cold War. Honestly speaking, though intensive antagonism between the East and the West had been long existing in Europe, relaxation had occurred more or less during those days. Under the current situation, the confrontation seems to be back again. But looking back in history, people could see persistent efforts made in pursuing peace between the East and the West, which always left important insights for the development on the status quo.

The first insight is about geopolitics’ role in current situation. Putin mentioned when attending Valdai International Discussion Club in 2016, geopolitics is more important than ideology. This argument made by Putin had not been widely discussed by international media till now. However, which is more important, ideology or geopolitics, is really worth thinking about. Though non-ideological language had been the mainstream in international development after the Cold War, on the one hand, ideology would not really be abandoned by the “winner”; on the other hand, the interest gaming on geopolitics had never disappeared along

with the existence of ideology, instead, it had thrived. Thus, Putin had hit the bullseye.

The second insight is that for the tendency of the European security with the NATO Expansion as the background, though a lot of international legacy and experience could be concluded after decades past the second World War, the time is still short to touch upon structural change on deeper level. This could mean, more time would be needed to observe so as to have conclusion and reflection.

Russia in general weaker position had been tested over and over in 26 years' hardship after the Cold War and the disintegration of Soviet Union, showing its fighting spirit in perseverance and strength. Nevertheless, with challenges from both domestic and abroad, it is still hard to say that it has an optimistic future. The pluralistic coexistence instead of unitary dominance is a historical situation which is unprecedented. It would take long time and twisted process to achieve. Power and courage might not be enough to help but more sanity and innovation would be needed. In this way, a clear vision of security structure on Russia, NATO and Europe could be weaved out.

What is worth emphasizing is, historically, the West's expansion in Euraisian regions, no matter the Crusade or war expansion of Napoleon after the French Revolution or NATO Expansion, always started with unitary instruction under ideological (religious) and political military expansion, but ended with more or less a tendency in pluralistic development. This repeating historical logic should teach people great lessons.

Comparatively, the biggest difference between previous Western expansion and NATO Expansion after the Cold War is that, with the context that the West still held the overall advantages and the expansion was with deep strategic threatening elements, after all no massive or overall armed clash and war had happened. So despite the fact that the NATO Expansion looked like a landslide and indeed moving to a critical point on overall military conflict breakout, the progress in history had made clear on the issue of war and peace. This means under the status quo, the peace keeping opportunity was still there for people concerned in all parties to make all possible efforts for it.

Translated by Du Xiaoxin

Xi-Trump Meeting: To Cement the "Skyscraper" of Sino-U.S. Relationship

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The meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his U.S. counterpart Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago resort came to an end on April 7. As President Xi proposed during the summit, the building of Sino-U.S. relationship needs to be constructed step by step. The meeting of the two leaders not only facilitates the smooth transition of Sino-U.S. ties from Obama's administration to Trump's administration, but also enhances the foundation for the "skyscraper" of China-U.S. relations.

We could understand the achievements of this summit from four aspects.

First of all, the political leaders and their working teams of both countries have built good relationship. During the meeting, Trump has expressed his satisfaction about this summit and he believes benign friendship has been developed between President Xi and him. Considering Trump's character, this statement must not be platitude. Compared with his predecessor, Donald Trump is of quite a "down to earth" style and that's also why he has been awarded as "big mouth". Therefore, it could be inferred that the two political leaders have truly built friendship. And it shouldn't be ignored that the working teams of both sides have also developed good relationship. Since the meeting lasts only one day, the two leaders are not able to fully exchange opinions over specific issues. But we should notice that before this summit, Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang, together with U.S. Treasury Secretary Mnuchin, commerce secretary Ross, State Councilor Yang Jiechi with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Tillerson, defense minister Matisse, has started a dialogue, in which they have had in-depth exchange over relevant issues and agreed on the agenda for work next. By bringing all his core team members to Mar-a-Lago resort, especially some of who are successors of vital positions that haven't assumed office, Donald Trump shows his "outcome-oriented" attitude, which is quite pragmatic.

What's more, Donald Trump, as well as his core team who have survived the internal "struggle", is of pragmatic style. It could be seen from what Trump said in the summit, that is, the two sides should maintain communication and coordination on important issues and work together to accomplish some big event. Thus, this provides greater space for Sino-U.S. relations in the future.

Secondly, this summit has set a positive tone for future development of

Sino-U.S. relations. The summit of political leaders of two countries always set the tune for country relations. So how this time the top-level design is like? It's the words "mutual respect and mutual benefit" that set a positive direction. More concretely, the former part, "mutual respect", is about how to deal with discrepancy and the latter part refers to cooperation between two countries in every area, especially in economy and trade. For instance, on Korean nuclear issue, the two presidents respectively stated their stands and in the meanwhile they agreed on cooperation within the framework of UN, stressed implementing the resolutions of UN Security Council and solving this problem in a peaceful way. It shows "mutual respect". And if President Trump would make positive reaction towards President Xi's invitation to participate in cooperation under "The Belt and Road" initiative, it would be the best interpretation of "mutual benefit" and "working together to accomplish some big events".

Thirdly, this summit has reassured and developed the institutional guarantee to deal with bilateral relationship. Since the establishment of China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2006, it has become an efficient and effective communication mechanism. The summit this time has deepened it by initiating four-pronged dialogue mechanism, including diplomatic and security dialogue, comprehensive economic dialogue, law enforcement and cyber security dialogue, and social and cultural issues dialogue. In this way, the bilateral cooperation between both countries is further specified and it's in accordance with the "outcome-oriented" expectation of Trump administration.

Last but not least, it helps to manage and control potential crisis by positive interaction. As President Xi put it during the meeting, military-to-military relations are the essential composition of China-U.S. relations and mutual trust on military security is the basis of mutual strategic trust. The new platform for joint staff dialogue platform, initiated by the United States and received positive respond from China, will mend the bilateral military-to-military relations which have stagnated due to the South China Sea crisis during the late President Obama term and further improve mutual notification of major military operation mechanism and a code of safe conduct for naval and air military encounters.

Though this summit marks a good start for Sino-U.S. relations in the new era, it has never been a plain sailing since the normalization of the relations between both countries, 45 years ago. The less than 24-hours Xi-Trump meeting has left a lot unsolved, such as, in which form for the two countries to cooperate on Korean Peninsula Nuclear issue, how the one hundred-day plan in economy and trade area will solve trade imbalance problem, how the four senior dialogue mechanism produce satisfying

results for both sides, the direction for further cooperation in energy and so on.

The complication of the United States domestic politics and uncertainty of Trump's policies are still the biggest obstacles in the development of bilateral relations. However, as President Xi said, "there are thousands of reasons to improve Sino-U.S. relations." After the Xi-Trump meeting, we believe there are thousands of approaches to cement, heighten, and embellish the skyscraper of China-U.S. relationship.

Understanding Protestant Christianity in Contemporary China: The Concept of a Believing China

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My perspective on and understanding of Protestantism in China differs from those of the Chinese government, the Chinese Protestant Church, and most other Chinese scholars. My views are based primarily on analysis in the following three areas: (1) Sino-West religious interaction in the postmissionary era; (2) Protestantism in contemporary Chinese society; and (3) a new narrative on China: “Believing China.”

Post-Missionary Sino-West (Sino-US) Religious Interaction

The Christian missionary movement in China has been one of the most important chapters in the chronicles of China’s relations with foreign countries. Missionary societies in Western countries, especially those from the U.S., have exerted a major influence in Chinese society by founding numerous educational, medical, and philanthropic institutions in China. They have also provided the cultural and social foundations for Sino–US relations. In this regard, American missionaries have served as a spiritual ligament between China and the United States.

In the late 1940s and 1950s, the forced, comprehensive withdrawal of Western churches and missionaries seemed to cast a long shadow over Sino–US relations. Over the past 60 years, the Christian missionary movement and religion continue to be a constant influence and emotional factor in China’s relations with the Western world.

During the first half of the 20th century, mainland China was a country that received the largest number of Christian missionaries. In the last half of the 20th century, however, the same country has transformed from being a blessed region into a forbidden territory for Westerners, especially American missionaries.

As far as the current Sino–US relations are concerned, the spiritual ligament or cultural agent is no longer confined to just missionaries. Even though foreign missionaries have come back to China, evangelism is not the main objective of their interaction and exchange with the Chinese population. Religious interaction and exchange particularly between China and the US, has now entered what is called a post-missionary era. What primarily distinguishes this era from the previous one is that the content of the interaction has become more diversified and pluralized than

in any time past.

Sino-US religious interaction in the so-called post-missionary era is characterized by a number of features, which I will discuss in the following paragraphs.

First, in the post-missionary era, missionaries are no longer serving as the main spiritual link between China and the US because Chinese government regulations forbid foreign missions in China. However, American churches have not relinquished mission work in the country. Today, sending missionaries to China is no longer the main objective or chief means of evangelism for American missionary societies. Due to the practical restrictions on the ground, American mission groups employ indirect rather than direct methods in their missionary approach and work. As a result, the earlier role of the missionary movement as the main spiritual tie between China and the US has now been supplanted by diversified religious interactions and exchanges.

Second, Sino-US religious interaction in this post-missionary era is not confined to the level of civil interaction or people-to-people exchange that it was in the missionary period. It now also involves governmental activities, such as cooperation in the campaign against religious terrorism, intergovernmental dialogue on religious freedom, faith-based public diplomacy, and legislative issues of religious freedom, etc. As in the case of civil religious exchanges, Sino-US intergovernmental or semi-official interactions in the field of religion have the potential to both promote and set back bilateral relations between the two countries.

A third feature of Sino-US religious interaction in the so-called post-missionary era is that from the vantage point of China, the US is considered a superpower not only in political, economic, and military terms, but also in religious terms. China is rich in religious resources and traditions, but currently it cannot be regarded as a country with a strong religious influence upon the rest of the world. During this post-missionary period, some of the greatest tangible religious developments have been seen in the production and export of religious goods. For example, the well-known Amity Printing Press, which was originally sponsored by the United Bible Association and is a branch of the Amity Foundation in Nanjing, is able to print 20 million copies of the Bible each year. This makes China the single largest Bible producing and exporting country in the world. China is also the world's largest producer and exporter of religious commodities, such as Christmas gifts and religious artifacts. Despite this, however, Sino-US religious exchange is quite unbalanced in favour of the U.S. While the U.S. suffers a large trade deficit with China, China in turn has run quite a significant "spiritual deficit" with the United

States in this religious exchange.

Fourth, in the post-missionary era, there are few people in US religious communities who possess genuine knowledge about the church in China or about China and who can thereby effectively contribute to the Sino-US religious exchange. According to American historian Daniel Bays, the issue of the church in China has been debated by people and groups that really do not know much about China, thus limiting the depth and breadth of discussions. Also, such discourses tend to be polarized, based more on emotions than facts. These polarized views are well entrenched and resistant to change. This type of discussion on Protestantism in China can be rightly termed as highly emotional and has little positive impact on Sino-US relations, given Americans' limited understanding of Chinese religions and the Chinese government's policy toward religion. Overly politicized and ideologically driven interpretations of China's religious policy and religious situations by concerned groups in America, entrenched views based on certain theological traditions, contingent practices motivated by fundraising, and even political manipulation – all constitute significant obstacles for Sino-US religious exchange. In Christian missiology, Christians talk about lands not yet reached by the gospel of Jesus Christ and people groups who have not yet heard of the gospel. As far as Sino-US religious interaction is concerned, there is much territory to cover and many people who still do not have access to well-researched information about China's religious situation.

A fifth feature of Sino-US religious interaction in the post-missionary era is that in China, when it comes to different levels of academia, church, government, and society, little attention is paid to the role of religions in America or to the role of religious factors in Sino-US relations. Typically, public discourse and popular discussions on such issues tend to be oversimplified, fraught with misunderstandings, disagreements, or even contradictions.

At present, within China's academic circles, the journal of Religion and American Society, of which I am editor, is one of only very few publications on the subject. When it comes to topics of interest within American studies, there still exists a noticeable gap between religion and other fields. American religious studies in China focuses on historical research (mainly research on the history of the American missionary movement in China), literature reviews, and translation of related works from English into Chinese. Actually, as far as American Christianity is concerned, certain Chinese church leaders have much more knowledge about famous American churches – such as the Crystal Cathedral, Willow Creek Church, and the Saddleback Church – than do Chinese scholars of religious studies.

Promoting Chinese scholarship on American religious studies, particularly on religious factors affecting American foreign policy, will help reduce suspicion and misjudgment—in particular, the tendency to over politicize the interpretation of religious issues – and will profoundly influence the building of more stable and sustainable Sino–US relations.

A sixth feature of Sino–US religious interactions in the post-missionary era is that they have not been confined to the Protestant Church. In previous religious interactions, other religions have exerted far less impact on China. Since China’s opening up and reform, other religions, such as Buddhism, Daoism, Judaism, and Mormonism, have all participated to some extent in China-US religious interactions, reflecting not only the increasing openness within Chinese society, but also the greater diversity within the American religious landscape. In fact, the establishment of Mormonism, the Eastern Orthodox Church, the Baha’i Faith, and Judaism in various parts of China, along with the resurgence of various Chinese folk religions, have posed serious challenges to the current governance model of religion in China, which recognizes only five major religions: Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Daoism, and Islam. While it allows the Mormons, the Eastern Orthodox Church, the Baha’is, and the Jews to convene for religious activities at certain designated spots, the Chinese government has not yet given formal legal recognition to these religious organizations, providing ammunition for critics to label this practice as an ostrich policy.

A final feature of post-missionary Sino–US religious interaction lies in one of the most important consequences of US religious exporting to China: that is, that American religious ideas and practices, such as the separation of church and state and religious freedom, have become frames of reference not only for the intellectuals, but also at the level of government and the general public. Indeed, the United States has become a reference for Chinese society in many areas, including the field of religion, which will have important repercussions on China’s future religious policy and practice.

As the Chinese government implements its so-called outward cultural strategy, a number of government agencies have begun to modify their views on the Christian missionary movement in China.

Protestant Christianity’s Social Situation in Contemporary China

One of the greatest difficulties involved in understanding Protestant Christianity in contemporary China is the lack or ambiguity of statistics. Missionaries and missionary societies have been given great credit for

keeping historical documents and data. By contrast, data discrepancies about Protestant Christianity under Communist rule in China have been so great as to draw completely different conclusions.

Due to the increasing Sino-US religious interaction in the post-missionary era, there is more cooperation between China and the US in public opinion polls on religions in China. As a result, the so-called methodological or statistical differences regarding the number of Chinese Christians are narrowing. According to recent statistics, deemed credible by scholars from both China and the US, the total number of believers of various religions in China is over 300 million, surpassing the total US population. Among China's religious population, between 23 and 40 million are Christians, accounting for 1.7% to 2.9% of the total Chinese population. Chinese government statistics show that currently there are nearly 130,000 places of worship approved by the government. Among them, about 44,000 are Christian churches and meeting places, while official Three-Self Church sources quote the number of Christian worshipping places at 57,000.

If we take into account the number of worshipping places without government approval, especially those of the folk religions, then the total number might far surpass that of the US, which currently has over 300,000 places of worship. Therefore, if we look at the statistics alone, religions in China, especially Protestant Christianity, has experienced quite a rapid growth since the Communist take-over in 1949, particularly since the opening up and reform policy was initiated in 1979.

Pre-1949 social status of Protestant Christianity in China

Despite the absolute numbers discussed above, the current social status of various religions in China, particularly Protestant Christianity, still lags behind what was achieved during the pre-1949 era. I mentioned some years ago that the development of Protestant Christianity in China roughly followed a cycle, one that began from a peripheral position in Chinese society, then reached the central stage, and finally swept back to its former peripheral position.

More specifically, Protestant Christianity in China began as a de facto revolutionary force outside the political establishment, transformed into a reform-minded yet conservative force within the political system, and finally turned into a social force, half-withdrawn from the political system, assuming only a symbolic political role. Before the Communist take-over in 1949, Christianity as a whole enjoyed a rather high social status, which can be examined through the aspects of education, social engagement, and internationalism.

First, Protestant Christianity maintained a high level of education and theological training. It is well known that Protestant Christianity was the forerunner for modern higher education in China, as well as the model for Chinese institutions of higher learning. Church-run colleges, universities, and theological seminaries not only provided important infrastructure for Christianity to take roots in China, but also functioned as the think tanks and talent reservoirs for Christian churches in China. Church sponsored education was always a priority in the missionary strategies of the Christian movement in China.

Second, Protestant Christianity was highly involved in Chinese society. Protestant churches in the pre-1949 period not only worked top-down to reach the lower strata of Chinese society through preaching the gospel and the work of educational, medical, and philanthropic institutions, but they also worked from the bottom-up to interact with the elite and Party politics (both KMD and CPC). As a result, the Protestant churches played an important role in each and every historical event in modern Chinese history, finally becoming a part of China's establishment. The debate within Protestant Christianity over whether it should follow a high-end (the elite) route or low-end (the proletariat) route, in effect, helped deepen Christianity's social engagement, broaden its contact base, and enhance its influence in Chinese society.

Third, pre-1949 era Protestant Christianity in China achieved a high level of internationalization. The Christian missionary movement in China was part and parcel of the Christian international movement. As such, it was highly influenced and controlled by Western churches in terms of its theologies, rituals, economy and organizational arrangements. Beginning from the early years in the 20th century, the Chinese Protestant Church gradually entered the international arena, making important contributions to the ecumenical movement. Years ago, this author regarded the election of Mr Zhao Zichen (T.C. Chao) as one of the six chairmen of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1948 and the appointment of Dr Wei Zhuomin (Francis Cho-Min Wei, President of Huachung University) as the first Henry W. Luce Professor of World Christianity with Union Theological Seminary in New York City in 1945, as two symbolic events, signifying the theological and institutional progress achieved by the Christian Church in China and its leading position in East Asia at that time.

Marginalization of Protestant Christianity in today's China

During the past six decades of Communist rule, the social situation of Christian churches in China has undergone fundamental changes, which can be summarized as marginalization along three lines.

First, we have seen marginalization of the church's theological education and religious studies. Christian theological education and religious studies originated with churches and their affiliated colleges and theological seminaries. However, with the nationalization of Christian educational institutions in the early 1950s, and amid subsequent political turbulences such as the Cultural Revolution, the Protestant Church was forced out of the field of education. Formal theological education was almost cancelled, and it ceased altogether for a while until it began to slowly recover after the Cultural Revolution.

After 1949, the centre for theological and religious studies in China first shifted to churches and academic circles in Taiwan and Hong Kong. When it returned back to mainland China after the Cultural Revolution and the opening up and reform, theological and religious studies fell more into the hands of the mainland's academic world rather than the church. This has given the secular and undertrained world of academia a comprehensive and overwhelming advantage over the Protestant Church in the field of theological and religious studies.

The second area of marginalization refers to the Protestant Church's existence in social life. The Protestant Church used to be one of the main providers of public social goods in pre-1949 China. With its withdrawal from the field of education in the early 1950s, the church was also forced out of the other social spheres, such as medicine, philanthropy, the media, etc. While the government took control of all the church institutions, church and religious activities became increasingly and strictly confined to the private sphere. Since that time, the Protestant Church has been represented in the People's Congresses and political consultative bodies at various levels. Currently, Protestant Christian representatives reach tens of thousands with their symbolic status in the current political system.

In the past two decades, the church has been allowed to establish a number of small scale medical and philanthropic institutions, nursing homes, and kindergartens, as well as to carry out social projects on HIV/AIDS, fighting poverty, and disaster relief. Its social influence, however, is still very limited. The situation today cannot compare to what existed in the pre-1949 years and does not coincide in any sense with the huge Protestant following in contemporary China.

The third area of marginalization refers to the Protestant Church's position in the international Christian movement. During the early 1950s, severing the links with Western churches was regarded as a fundamental mission of the Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM). As a result, the Protestant Church in China was completely isolated from the rest of the Christian world. Since the initiation of the opening up and reform, the

Protestant Church in China has re-established relations with a number of ecumenical institutions. For example, in 1991, it was re-admitted into the WCC and has re-established relations with the World Evangelical Alliance. Its international standing, however, has suffered a sharp decline and basically lacks the capacity to engage in international academic dialogues. This again matches very poorly with China's status today as a rising power with world influence and a large Christian following.

New trends for the development of Protestant Christianity in China

Recent years have seen a number of new trends emerging within the Protestant Church in China that are worth close examination. These may well be regarded as trends toward mainstreaming and they may, to a certain degree, transform the Protestant Church's marginalized existence as discussed above. They are likely to help improve Christianity's social standing in Chinese society.

The first such trend can be referred to as a trend toward diversity, and it can be seen in a number of areas. First, it is manifested through the formation of various types of churches. Currently, China's Protestant churches can be classified into three main categories: (1) Three-Self churches, which are churches defined within the system of two government-sanctioned national church bodies, namely the National TSPM and the China Christian Council (CCC); (2) non-Three-Self churches, which are churches unregistered with the government; and (3) pseudo-Three-Self churches, which are churches belonging to the National TSPM and CCC in name only, but not obeying their directives in practice. The Home churches mostly refer to the latter two types. Other scholars divide the Protestant churches into five types: 1) Three-Self churches, 2) home churches, 3) independent churches, 4) profession-based churches; and 5) scholarly fellowships. Issues related to the redefinition of Home churches and churches outside the establishment, as well as their legitimacy, are now on the agendas of both the research institutions and government agencies.

This trend toward diversity is also reflected in the decentralization and even sectarian tendency within the TSPM system. Due to the so-called localized management policy of the government and other factors, there appears to be a tendency toward power sharing and localization within the Three-Self churches, with authority and power beginning to flow into churches at the grassroots, especially into local mega-churches. At the same time, a quiet movement toward factions is gaining momentum, challenging the so-called post-denominational era, long proclaimed by the Three-Self Churches.

Another trend towards diversity is seen in the social composition of

Protestant Christian followers, whose majority used to be the elderly, women, and illiterate or half-literate persons. Now, they are being partly replaced by white-collar workers, the social elite, and professional high-achievers. Urban churches, whose congregations includes entrepreneurs, migrant workers and college students, are growing rapidly.

Lastly, Protestant Christians are moving and spreading in multiple directions. With greater economic development and unprecedented large-scale population movements within China, religious believers are migrating in growing numbers. During the past 30 years or so, Protestant Christian migration in China has mainly followed two directions, one from the rural to the urban areas and the other from the Eastern coastal areas westward to the inland areas. These movements are making Protestant Christianity an increasingly urban and national phenomenon. All these trends help to improve Protestant Christianity's social influence and visibility. They also magnify, however, tensions within the Church, between the Church and society, and between the Church and the government.

The second trend can be called a trend towards intellectualization, and it can be explained in two aspects. On the one hand, benefitting from an improved education among its rank and file, the trend toward intellectualization of the Protestant Church manifests itself in such phenomena as cultural Christians and university student Christian fellowships. Selecting and sending church leaders and priests off for further study and work toward degrees in prestigious institutions of higher learning or theological seminaries both home and abroad has won government approval and become an institutionalized arrangement. On the other side of this intellectualization trend, religious schools and theological seminaries are barred from entering China's national education system. This means that the education and diplomas they offer are not recognized by society. This represents the greatest bottleneck restraining the development of Protestant theological education in China. The Protestant Church has a long road ahead in its effort to self-theologize – or what it claims to be “theological thinking reconstruction.”

The third trend can be called a trend toward an intensified emphasis on social concerns. Christian social services in China are gradually evolving from traditional disaster relief types of philanthropy or government-directed philanthropy and moving toward more professional, institutionalized, and larger scale services, significantly improving China's own public image.

In February 2012, six central government ministries and commissions, including the China State Administration for Religious Affairs under the

State Council and the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee, issued a regulation entitled Suggestions on Encouraging and Regulating Religious Community Engaged in Public Welfare and Charitable Works. This aims at providing more space and legal coverage for religious groups, including the Protestant Church, to enter the field of public philanthropy.

Circumscribed by present conditions on the ground, the mainstream Protestant Church's (Three-Self Church) engagement with civil society is mainly through less controversial and less sensitive means, such as providing social services and care, participating in cultural construction, and moral modeling. This falls short of substantive participation and influence in national political life or engaging in social criticism in a religious way. As Dr Zhuo Xinping, a prominent scholar on religion from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, points out, in terms of social function the Chinese Christian Church needs to learn to be a servant before assuming the role of a prophet.

Scholars in China generally hold that after rapid growth during the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese Protestant Church entered a period of stable and slow development. By the end of the 20th century, it was thought that it may even have reached the limit of growth for various reasons, particularly the competition from the traditional religions of China, like Buddhism, Daoism, and different folk religions.

In the coming years, the absolute number of Chinese Christians may continue to grow, but its ratio among the overall population is unlikely to increase substantially. Obviously, in a new historical context, the need for the Chinese Protestant Church to strengthen itself and improve the quality of its work in areas such as pastoral care, theological education, academic research, social service, the construction of civil society, and foreign exchanges is needed now more than ever.

“Believing China”: A New Narrative on China

Believing China is a concept that provides not only a new perspective for studying Protestant Christianity in China, but also a fresh framework for examining the whole phenomenon of religion in Chinese society. It can also be understood as a kind of vision about religious development in China. Since the concept of Believing China was put forth by this author in early 2012, it has caught the attention of academic circles and government agencies in China.

As stated above, contrary to the entrenched impression of atheist China

long held in the Western world, authoritative data from a variety of sources indicate that China is not only a country with rich traditional religious resources, but also a country with a vibrant, new religious energy. The growth of China's mainstream religions, the rise of new religions, and the resurgence of folk religions are all interwoven in this exuberance, constituting an important component of the global resurgence of religion.

Compared with its soon-to-be superpower status in the fields of politics, economics, and the military, China still belongs to the rank of developing countries in cultural and conceptual terms, hence suffering from a clear unbalance between the so-called hard power and soft power when trying to exert its real international influence.

The perception gap between religious resurgence at home and the impression of atheist China abroad pinpoints China's limitations to project its religious influence abroad, as well as its insufficient ability to construct and demonstrate a more convincing Believing China than the old impression of atheist China. In the context of China's strategic pursuit for peaceful development, poor communication and isolation with other nations and peoples over religious issues has become a real obstacle for China in efforts to establish itself as a source of great cultural influence.

At the same time, while China currently supplies a large quantity of religious commodities to the rest of the world, these commodities have not acquired culturally or theologically added value to them, which creates a glaring contrast with China's ancient and rich religious traditions. The consequence of this contrast is that while China provides many religious commodities for global religious resurgence, the international community has yet to realize that there is an emerging Believing China behind all these material supplies.

Since the end of the Cold War, religion has been increasingly regarded as a crucial element in the field of international relations. Despite all its efforts in the area of religion, the Chinese government still faces challenges over issues relating to religious freedom and international public opinions against China in this area. Under such conditions, China should face and follow the historical trend of global religious resurgence on the international scene, and proactively explore religious factors in its diplomacy, instead of being constantly and passively dragged into religious issues. How to transform religion from a liability into a source of soft power in China's international strategy, thus enabling China to play a proactive rather than passive role in the international religious arena, poses a strategic choice that demands immediate Chinese government attention.

The historical process accompanying China's peaceful rise would be the same process witnessing the unfolding of globalization of China's national interests. One can hardly imagine how a strategy for economic expansion can be sustained without the strong support from China's traditional culture. Likewise, we can hardly imagine a traditional Chinese culture devoid of religious background and foundational values.

Given the public participatory nature of modern politics, in order to successfully carry out China's economic strategy of expansion and comprehensive diplomacy, while simultaneously recognizing the need to focus on the political establishment and social elite in target countries and regions, China cannot ignore the power resident within the grassroots level around the world. As a spiritual force transcending class, race, gender and cultural distinctions, religion has always been an integral factor and major vehicle for cultural exchange between China and the rest of the world. Grasping the value of the religious component can undoubtedly provide strong support for China's public or people-to-people diplomacy. It will help overcome problems that hinder the Chinese government's diplomatic work; problems such as mercantilist foreign policies that excessively tilt toward business interests and unfair treatment of stakeholders (e.g., the government ignoring the needs and voices of the general public by focusing too much on the elite).

The above analysis indicates that the coordination and harmonization among domestic religious development, transnational religious exchange, and the overall diplomatic work of China is emerging as a strategic issue, pivotal to the peaceful development of China and the renaissance of the Chinese nation. By virtue of its importance and scope, this issue deserves serious consideration and needs to be tackled earnestly.

The formation of Believing China

Since the modern era, the traditional Chinese political order and value system have experienced an all-around crisis and collapsed with the onslaught of Western culture and ideologies. During the transition from a traditional empire to a modern nation-state, rapid inward territorial compression and large-scale immigration of the Chinese population to the rest of the world have become two opposing yet parallel trends. The consequences of such dual processes is that while the territory of modern China shrinks significantly, as compared to its imperial past, the geographical spread of overseas Chinese has surpassed that of any previous historical period.

In other words, the process of China's frontier contraction, in a geographic sense, parallels a process of its expansion in a global

demographic sense. As Chinese people have moved and established themselves in Southeast Asia, Europe, the Americas and other world regions, so have various traditional Chinese religions. Seen from this perspective, the internationalization of the Chinese people as propelled by their transnational migration has also created the internationalization of traditional Chinese religions.

As these dual processes advance, they've gradually formed at least three types of faith communities outside of China proper: (1) overseas Chinese followers of traditional Chinese religions and beliefs; (2) overseas Chinese followers of various religions in the world; and (3) non-Chinese followers of traditional Chinese religions and beliefs. These religious or faith communities can be said to comprise the overseas section of a Believing China.

Three believing blocks of Believing China

In the narrative constructed by Prof. Tu Wei-Ming, Cultural China consists of three symbolic universes: (1) mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore; (2) overseas Chinese communities around the world; and (3) epistemological communities concerned with Chinese culture all over the world, including scholars, media personnel, entrepreneurs, and government officials.

Similar to this approach to defining Cultural China as transcending the geographical boundaries of the modern nation-state, the concept of Believing China also denotes an inclusive, concentric yet hierarchical structure. In a sense, the narrative of Believing China is inconsistent with the concept of modern nation-state, yet represents a return to a traditional Chinese political culture.

Specifically, Believing China consists of three interconnected "believing blocks": (1) mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau; (2) overseas Chinese followers of traditional Chinese religious and spiritual systems, as well as other religions of the world; and (3) non-Chinese communities of traditional Chinese religions. The first believing block corresponds to the political map in contemporary China, while the second and the third blocks can be regarded as imaginary extensions of Believing China or the imagined overseas components of Believing China.

The first believing block constitutes the bulk of Believing China, as it possesses the vast majority of the population of Believing China. Contrary to the narrative of Cultural China, which implicitly treats Hong Kong and Taiwan as the centre, the new narrative regards mainland China not only as the centre of this first block, but as the centre of the whole of Believing China. The central position of mainland China is vindicated

not only by its massive religious population, its prosperous religious economy, and an all-around resurgence of religion, but also by the fact that mainland China is the birth place and centre of various Chinese traditional and folk religions. Be it localized Buddhism, or native Chinese religions and beliefs such as Daoism and the Matsu worship, almost all of the most important holy places are located within mainland China. These connections are important bonds for maintaining the allegiance of peoples in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan toward mainland China, and are the potential resources that China can utilize to exert its cultural influence abroad. At the same time, China's acceptance of various foreign religions allows followers of these religions to function as mediators between China and other countries. Against the backdrop of China's "go global" strategy and all-around diplomacy, the significance of the above connections is becoming apparent.

With regard to the two religious or faith communities of the second believing block, the overseas Chinese population has a natural as well as a special connection with China. The general status of religion in China, the Chinese government's policy toward religion, and the experience of religious interaction with China are among factors that influence their allegiance and their sense of belonging to China.

As a force transcending boundaries of geology, blood, class, gender, and religious beliefs, the religious establishment gives overseas Chinese communities a cohesive power. These believing minority groups possess far greater capabilities than non-believing groups with respect to social mobilization, organization, and participation, which to a certain degree makes it possible for them to influence their host country's public perceptions of China and government policy toward China, be it positive or negative. Various ancient traditional Chinese religions and folk beliefs play an important role in the everyday life for overseas Chinese communities, especially those in Southeast Asian countries.

Speaking to the growth of Protestant Christianity in China, the famous missiological scholar Andrew F. Walls reminds us that we should not forget that Chinese Christianity is not confined to China. The Christian portion of the huge overseas Chinese population across Asia and beyond is now substantial, another development of the twentieth century.

In fact, followers of "Western" religions among the overseas Chinese population more often than not have a more truthful grasp of religious conditions in China than the general public in the West. They're in a better position to understand and are more capable of transmitting the real situation in China to Western societies than the Chinese public and government are. This double advantage makes it possible for followers

of Western religions among overseas Chinese people to act as translators for building greater mutual understandings in the field of religion between China and the rest of the world.

The third believing block, composed of non-Chinese followers of traditional Chinese religions or beliefs, are an organic part of Believing China, though they do not have a direct link with China in terms of history, ethnicity, blood, or language. Since religious faith does not require a minimal level of modern knowledge as a precondition, the third believing block of Believing China undoubtedly is more closely connected with ordinary people and those at the grassroots level in foreign countries. They are quite distinct from the epistemological and elite orientations associated with the third symbolic universe of Cultural China, though it must be added that in the narrative of Believing China, the role of the elite is not to be underestimated.

For the vast majority of the people in other countries who have little understanding about China, the worshipping places, rituals, activities, and publications on traditional and folk religions in China provide the most direct and tangible means to learn about religious life in China. As the appeal and influence of Chinese culture and religions gradually increase, so does the number of non-Chinese followers of Chinese religious and spiritual practices and their potential influence.

In the era of globalization, China's domestic religious practice obviously has had overseas repercussions. While the overseas Chinese religious followers and non-Chinese believers of Chinese religions have had the potential to shape China's international image and national interests, such an interactive trend of events requires that we must transcend the traditional distinctions between domestic and foreign policy spheres of nation states. Instead, we must try to understand the unique significance of religion to China in a broader context.

As China deepens its opening up and reform and broadens its participation in the international arena, the answer to what constitutes China's core national interest is becoming increasingly clear. During this process, the impact of religion on China's national interest also emerges as an issue with profound significance. In this new historical context, the concept of Believing China, as expounded above, is expected to have a potentially positive impact on China in areas such as China's national security, economic development, national image, and unification of the country, thus helping to preserve and strengthen China's national sovereignty and interest.

The significance of Believing China to Protestant Christianity in China

What, then, is the significance of the concept of Believing China for Protestant Christianity on Mainland China?

The Believing China narrative employs such terms as national interest, national security, and national image – often used by policy-making agencies of the government – to explain the positive meaning of religion for contemporary China. On the whole, scholars of religion in China are abandoning long-held views on religion, particularly the Christian religion, as the opiate of the people. Instead, scholars are beginning to regard religion at a theoretical level as an important social resource or a form of social capital. At the same time, religious policies of the Chinese government are also experiencing a transition from a previous emphasis on ideological differences between state orthodoxy and religious worldviews, to an emphasis on religion's social function.

Ironically, religion is once again valued by the government at various levels as having the same kind of soothing or numbing effect as that of opium on people who have been suffering from social and personal problems. Building on these efforts, the new narrative about China describes religion as an important resource that can be tapped for improving China's relations with the outside world, thus representing a further step in establishing religion as an asset in China's domestic and foreign policies.

By emphasizing religion's role in China's international strategy, the concept of Believing China explains that religion is an important factor in China's comprehensive engagement with the outside world. This acknowledgement, in practice, nurtures requisite conditions for reciprocal exchange between China and the rest of the world, as well as China's greater openness to overseas Christian churches.

To a certain extent, the concept of Believing China is conducive to developing an appropriate perspective on the Christian missionary movement itself. Quite unnoticeable to the public, the era of overseas missions carried out by individual Christians and Christian churches from mainland China has already begun. Compared to the traditional and folk religions of China, Christianity is easier to gauge with regard to the extent that China practices religious openness and exchange with the outside world.

In summary, proactive engagement of Chinese religions and religious groups with those in the world and vice-versa are mutually conditional. Emerging positive attitudes and policies toward religion on the part of Chinese society and the government provide necessary social and political foundations for this type of religious interaction to happen in a post-

missionary era. Therefore, the concept of a Believing China not only represents a vision for future religious development in China, but to a great extent can also be regarded as a policy suggestion for the Chinese government.

Advancing China's Mutual Benefit Oriented Economic Diplomacy under Global Value Chains

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4 years ago, Chinese central government decided to reconstruct a newly system of economic opening outside the world and released some related action plans. Subsequently, China has been vigorously promoting bilateral, regional and multilateral diplomatic activities in trade and investment, as China hopes to achieve mutual benefits under the Global Value Chains.

I. The Basic Pattern of China's Economic Diplomacy: Correspondence between Objectives and Means

It is universally known that there are two basic patterns of economic diplomacy: diplomatic behaviors and activities for economic purposes, and diplomatic behaviors and activities for political, military or other purposes through economic means. However, when it comes to the major economic diplomatic practices in China.

The One Belt One Road Initiative highlighted that China should embrace the trends of multi-polarity, economic globalization, cultural diversity and social informatization. China will uphold the spirit of open regional cooperation by dedicating to defending the open, free trade and investment. The country strives to encourage the free flowage of production factors under certain regulation, which will help improve resource allocation efficiency and market integration. Thus, economic policy coordination among participant countries is expected to achieve for broader, deeper and more sophisticated regional cooperation. With joint efforts, the world will establish a more open, comprehensive, balanced framework for regional economic partnership that benefits all.

The Plan of Promoting International Cooperation in Capacity of Production required China to adapt to the new circumstances of economic globalization and pay attention to the new development layout of global economy. China ought to understand deeply the new directions for international economic cooperation, and promote the implementation of major strategies. In addition, mutual-beneficial partnership with other countries will be strengthened to facilitate the development of local economy and community.

The Plan of Reconstructing Newly System of Economic Opening Outside

the World, China states that the government will enhance the strategic planning of “going out” upon self-opening and mutual opening. More strategic initiatives will be attached to the implementation of free trade zone to explore the potential of the new open economy. The One Belt One Road Initiative will be given top priority to facilitate the interconnectivity of infrastructure and so on to form a new layout of fully open economy.

As for the Plan of Accelerating Implementation of Free Trade Agreements, it suggested that China will continue to forward the construction of the One Belt One Road Initiative along with other external strategies. China aims at gradually building a sophisticated international network of free trade areas which covers the peripheral countries and the countries along the line of the One Belt One Road Initiative.

In the Guidance on Enhancing International Cooperation and Increasing the Position of China’s Industries in the Global Value Chains, rulemaking for international cooperation based on the global value chains will proceed by using bilateral and multilateral platforms. Combining the evolvement of the global value chains, a new set of practical and comprehensive rules that are in line with the interests of developing economies will be established.

Among the major economic diplomatic practices mentioned above, some activities are conducted for economic purposes such as regional economic integration and economic globalization through diplomatic means, while others are carried out for diplomatic purposes such as defending the global free trade system and improving global economic governance through economic means—it is self-evident that in terms of China’s economic diplomatic behaviors in trade, the objectives and methodology should not be viewed as isolated.

II. The General Directions of China’s Economic Diplomacy: Bilateral, Multilateral and Regional Diplomacy in Parallel

Based on the nature and number of participants, economic diplomacy can be divided into two main types, bilateral and multilateral. For the latter, it can be further categorized into global multilateral activities, regional activities and pluri-sectoral activities. As can be seen from major economic diplomatic practices, such as the One Belt One Road Initiative and the Plan of Accelerating Implementation of Free Trade Agreement, China is promoting bilateral and multilateral communication at the same time, and the government is focusing on regional and plurilateral cooperation.

The One Belt One Road Initiative focused not only on bilateral cooperation, but also on regional and plurilateral collaboration. The Plan

of International Cooperation in Capacity of Production requires that bilateral partnership should be furthered, and partnership will be extended to involve regional participants to form plurilateral relations. The Plan of Reconstructing Newly System of Economic Opening Outside the World deals with among bilateral, regional and plurilateral activities. Likewise, the Plan of Accelerating Implementation of Free Trade Agreements points out that free trade agreements can, but not limited to, be built on agreements among bilaterally, regionally and plurilaterally are acceptable too. The last governmental announcement mentioned at the beginning, Guidance on Enhancing International Cooperation and Increasing the Position of China's Industries in the Global Value Chains, has articulated that bilateral and multilateral cooperation are to be developed hand in hand.

After analyzing China's recent major economic diplomatic practices, China regards the development of bilateral and multilateral relationships as general directions for economic diplomacy.

III. The Primary Platform of China's Economic Diplomacy: Coordination of Cross Continental Production Network

The Joint Statement of G20 Trade Ministers' Meeting in 2016 stressed that the global value chains reflects the current global economy. A harmonious network of global value chains will serve as a significant driving force for trade and investment around the world. China ought to increase support for enterprises, especially in providing policy support for small and medium businesses to fully engage in the global value chain ecosystem. Meanwhile, capacity building will be continuously strengthened to promote the construction of a comprehensive and resilient global value chains. In the meantime, capacity improvement will be carried on to promote the proposal of a comprehensive and harmonious global value chain. Action plans will be designed and implemented to carry out research work and application in the most relevant fields of participation in the global value chain for developing countries, low-income countries and SMEs. It requires proper infrastructure and technical support, accessible loan, interconnective supply chain, agriculture, innovation, e-commerce, skill training and socially responsible enterprise to reach such goals.

Some empirical studies have found that the typical cross-continental production network with the features of global value chains were North American-West European production network and North American-East Asian production network. The traditional economic connections between America and Europe, highly similar cultures and manufacturing patterns lead to the making of North American-West European production network

through direct investment among transnational companies. The network employs horizontal division of labor, which can also be considered as a typical North-to-North division of labor among developed economies. For the North American-East Asian production network, it is the perfect representative of the vertical division of labor model, which relies most on enterprises and market. In such kind of model, the production process will be divided into several stages and delegated to different economic bodies and enterprise whose strengths suit best inside the network. The newly industrialized economies as well as the emerging economies in East Asia received direct investments, outsourcing and purchasing from developed industrialized countries in the network and got the opportunity to participate in production stages suit their natural resources and capacities most, which in turn pushes the rapid increase in their trade and overall economy. However, if judging from the smiling curve, the main contribution of developing countries is their huge pool of cheap labor, while resource-intensive countries mainly supply energies and raw materials. In the light of the smiling curve, The American transnational companies which have original innovations, core intermediates and major market shares can achieve the highest added value. For Japanese transnational enterprise with integrated innovations, semi-products of high value added and partial market shares, they enjoy less additional value than the former companies, but still relatively high. Even lower are the businesses of the newly industrialized economies. They have limited integrated innovations and comparatively strong connectivity for outsourcing and providing semi-finished products of middle and high added value. However, developing countries with an edge of intensive labor are at the bottom. Emerging economic bodies are in the middle of newly industrialized economies and developing countries. The labor division model they adopt is a classic model, vertical, and professional, distributed from North to South, governed by transnational companies.

IV. The Main Objectives of China's Economic Diplomacy: Mutual Benefit Oriented Economic Diplomacy under Global Value Chains

It is foreseeable that both of North American-West European and North American-East Asian cross continental production networks will have great changes under the Trump policy of "American First". The latter is especially the case. With the increase of labor cost and learning abilities of mainland China, the newly industrialized economies and emerging economic bodies are estimated to be located at the two sides of the curve, manufacture products of medium added value and therefore form the relationship between competition and cooperation following the pattern horizontal division of labor. Highly industrialized countries will

continue to pursue and consolidate their “core” position in the global value chain, namely, the top end with the maximum added value in the smiling curve. As for developing countries or economic bodies, they are likely to be stuck or be pushed to the margin of the network, the lowest part of the curve with the minimum added value. Regarding the newly industrialized economies in between, they are facing pressure from two sides: attempting to climb to the higher ladder while securing their vested interests by preserving jobs for unskilled workers.

To prepare for the possible future changes of the world economy, the Guidance on Enhancing International Cooperation and Increasing the positions of China’s Industries in the Global Value Chains reflects that in the field of trade and investment, China’s economic diplomacy will be built upon the global value chains. China will strive to realize the correspondence between objectives and means to promote economic diplomacy through bilateral and multilateral platforms. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that economic diplomacy must consider all potential risks: credit risks of partners, political risks, financial risks, cultural conflicts, etc. More importantly, China’s economic diplomacy should be followed the new transnational shifts among the industries inside the North American-East Asian production network, should be considered the demands of market and business, should be focused industries upgrading driven by indigenous and integrated innovation, should be paid attention on continually increasing the position both of China and its partners’ industries and products in the global value chains.

Translated by Zhou Xueyi

China's Pursuit of a New World Economic Order

Zhang Jun, *Research Institute of Chinese Economy, Fudan University*

SHANGHAI – Economists are increasingly divided over China's economic future. Optimists emphasize its capacity for learning and rapid accumulation of human capital. Pessimists focus on the rapid decline of its demographic dividend, its high debt-to-GDP ratio, the contraction of its export markets and its industrial overcapacity. But both groups neglect a more fundamental determinant of China's economic prospects: the world order.

The question is simple: Can China sustain rapid GDP growth within the confines of the current global order, including its trade rules, or must the current U.S.-dominated order change drastically to accommodate China's continued economic rise? The answer, however, remains unclear.

One way that China is attempting to find out is by pushing to have the renminbi added to the basket of currencies that determine the value of the International Monetary Fund's reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right (SDR). As it stands, that basket comprises the euro, the yen, the pound and the dollar.

The SDR issue was the audience's main concern when IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde spoke in Shanghai in April. Her stance — that it is just a matter of time before the renminbi is added to the basket — garnered considerable media attention. (Regrettably, however, the media read too much into her statement.)

Former U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke faced the same question in Shanghai last month. He was purposely vague in his response: the renminbi's inclusion in the SDR would be a positive step, he said, but it could not be taken until China makes much more progress in reforming its financial sector and transforming its growth model.

The IMF is expected to vote on the renminbi's inclusion in the SDR this October, at its regular five-year review of the SDR basket's composition. But even if, unlike in 2010, a majority votes to add the renminbi to the basket, the United States may exercise its veto power.

Such an outcome would not be surprising, given that U.S. opposition (though in Congress, not within the Obama administration) blocked reforms, agreed in 2010, to increase China's voting power within the IMF.

Limited use of the SDR implies that adding the renminbi would be a

largely symbolic move; but it would be a powerful symbol to the extent that it served as a kind of endorsement of the currency for global use. Such an outcome would not only advance the renminbi's internationalization; it would also provide insight into just how much room there is for China within the existing global economic order.

So far, it seems that there is not enough. In a 2011 book, the economist Arvind Subramanian projected that the renminbi would become a global reserve currency by the end of this decade, or early next decade, based on his observation that the lag between economic and currency dominance is shorter than traditionally believed. Today, China is the world's largest economy (based on purchasing power parity) and the largest participant in world trade, and its government has been actively promoting renminbi internationalization, such as through the relaxation of foreign-exchange regulations. And yet the renminbi is used internationally much less than Subramanian's model predicted.

As a result, China remains subject to U.S. monetary policy. If the Federal Reserve raises interest rates, China must follow suit to keep capital from flowing out, despite the negative impact of higher interest rates on domestic growth. Given the dollar's dominance in international transactions, Chinese companies investing abroad also face risks associated with exchange-rate fluctuations.

In fact, over the last decade, international trade rules have created significant friction between China and many other countries, including the U.S.

Now, free-trade agreements are being negotiated — namely, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership — that will undermine the continued expansion of Chinese exports to the extent that they raise entry barriers for Chinese firms.

Clearly, China has faced major challenges within the existing global system as it tries to carve out a role befitting its economic might. That may explain why, with its “one belt, one road” initiative and its establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China's government is increasingly attempting to recast the world order — in particular, the monetary and trading systems — on its own terms.

The “one belt, one road” initiative aims to re-create the ancient overland and maritime Silk Roads that carried goods and ideas from Asia to Europe. Given that the project will entail significant Chinese investment affecting some 50 countries, its appeal in the developing world is not difficult to fathom.

The AIIB, too, has proved appealing — and not just to developing countries. In fact, 57 countries — including major powers like France,

Germany and the United Kingdom — have signed up as founding members, which may reflect a growing awareness of the U.S.-dominated order's diminishing returns.

From China's perspective, sustained domestic economic growth seems unlikely within the existing global system — a challenge that Japan and the other East Asian economies did not encounter during their economic rise. Indeed, the only country that has encountered it is the U.S., when it replaced the United Kingdom as the world's dominant economic and financial power before World War II; fortunately, that precedent is one of accommodation and a peaceful transition.

To be sure, China still needs to undertake important domestic reforms, especially of the financial sector, in order to eliminate distortions in resource allocation and stem the economy's slowdown. But the refusal by China's leaders to pursue export-boosting currency depreciation, even in the face of decelerating growth, suggests that they are willing to make the needed sacrifices to secure the renminbi's international role and, with it, long-term economic growth and prosperity.

Whether or not the renminbi is added to the SDR basket this October, a gradual transformation of the global system to accommodate China seems all but inevitable.

The Challenges that Macroeconomic Growth in China Faces in 2017

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In 2016, China's macro-economy can be referred to as "conservative" growth and the turning period of growth pattern. In 2017, China's economy has to break the curses of "creative destruction" and "debt deflation", which needs the supply side, the demand side and the policy choice to cooperate with each other and work simultaneously. For one thing, active fiscal policy should cooperate with active monetary policy. For another, regulators of macro-economy should base policies on the real demand of economy to ensure the growth trend of China's macro-economy, fully reflecting the potential ability of high growth of developing countries.

1, The judgment of problems in macro-economy

In 2016, China's macro-economy entered the turning period of growth pattern. First, the economic growth rate tended to be stable. However, compared with the double-digit economic growth rate over the last few decades, 6.7% is "conservative", leading to the pressure of an economic downturn. Second, the economic growth pattern has gradually changed from being driven by industrialization to mainly being promoted by industrial upgrading, innovations from high-end services (especially the Internet) and urbanization. The change of growth pattern is the very reason why the pressure of the economic downturn is still great, which has caused entrepreneurs to feel uncertain about China's future economic development orientation and be less willing to invest. Meanwhile, the decrease in investment willingness has led to a shortage of demand of investment products. Many companies find it hard to sale products and achieve profitability, along with tight cash flow. Therefore, they have to sink deeper into debt to maintain the operation of the company by high leverage ratio.

However, given the deflation, the cost of debt is expensive, which results in companies' further increasing leverage ratios to pay back debt, falling into the vicious circle of "debt deflation", which is put forward by Prof. Fisher.

2, A clear awareness of difficulties in structural change of the supply

side

When industrialization has achieved a certain level, the driving force that pushes the economy back to a high-speed growth comes from industrial upgrading, innovations from high-end services and urbanization, which means the structural change of the supply side. But we need to realize that such change usually faces two critical challenges: longer cycles and uncertainty. If there is no substantial investment of materials, every single advance of potential output will be a long process. In retrospect, China's industrialization took 30 years to reach the international average level even if it enjoyed the advantage of the transfer of international industries under the condition of rapid economic development, not to mention there is still a gap compare with industrially developed countries (like Germany). The structural change needs patience, not only abiding its time patiently but also studying and accumulating patiently. But such patience is hard to keep when facing the pressure of the economic downturn. The structural change is pro-cyclical, which means it has more chances when economy is booming and less chances when economy is experiencing downward turn for entrepreneurs are locked in a battle to maintain production level. Under such a background, economic recovery cannot only depend on waiting for an economic structural change, because this will make China lose the opportunity to take the global leadership of technological innovations. Once China loses the leadership, it has no choice but to follow other leaders, which is bad for China's contemporary economic growth.

More importantly, the structural change faces great uncertainty. Given the particularity of each country's economy and society, the orientation of the structural change should be based on the country's own comparative advantages. So if there is a lack of opportunities to learn reference models, misjudgment of the orientation of development may occur. Rational entrepreneurs understand that temporary economic prosperity of the industry may be the result of some people's unrealistic optimism. Once such optimism fades away with the gradual disclosure of real economic information, the investment during false prosperity becomes a waste of resource. During the millennium, the tremendous prosperity of internet industry seemed to have changed our entire life. The only thing that was not changed was the increase of total factor productivity, turning out to be "dot-com" bubble. This is also the beginning from flourish to decadence of America's economy. As a result, a country should fully realize the uncertainty of economy when it is experiencing structural change. Neither the market nor the government can ensure the orientation of the structural change is correct, so error correction capability and policy instruments must be kept in constant.

3, Choosing loose macro-economy policy to promote aggregate supply

To ensure China's economy get rid of the downward turn, loose macro-economy is necessary, which is an effective supplement to supply-side structural reform.

For one thing, central bank's monetary policy is supposed to make inflation target explicit (for example 2% inflation rate), stabilize growth and keep financial stability. With the gradual perfection of China's financial market, the central bank has more and more monetary policy tools to realize its policy goals. Meanwhile, the improvement of statistics index makes policy operations of the central bank more accurate. The central bank can set deposit and lending benchmark rate and the deposit reserve ratio. Besides, the central bank have tools of adjusting the money supply, varying from short-term liquidity operation and standing lending facility to medium-term lending facility and pledged supplementary lending.

For another, active fiscal policy should be ensured and cooperate with active monetary policy. In the past few years, only practicing active fiscal policy may cause local governments and enterprises to overextend through debt to obtain preferential resources allocated by finance, regardless of the cost restriction of production capacity. Because of economic downturn, local governments and enterprises have to roll over old debts with new borrowing under the circumstance of high costs of debt and low profits of output, leading to the dilemma that although at present, the financing scale of whole society keeps growing, the entity economy is suffering slow growth. Therefore, active fiscal policy should be ensured and cooperate with active monetary policy.

4, Pulling demand side to ensure supply side reform

Regulators of macro-economy should base policies on the real demand of economy when it comes to keeping entrepreneurs patient with the structural reform and the error correcting capability. Due to the stable and unchanging nature of consumer demand and the restriction to government expenditures by fiscal revenue, ensuring demand boost economy mainly depends on effective investment. The key to ensuring demand lies in that investment that determines final output level should be based on cost and profit.

At present, one important restraint in China's economy is the inefficiency in investment allocation. We notice that the increase financing scale in society is constantly higher than GDP growth, which means to increase the output level per product, the amount of funds keeps growing. This also means the cost of enterprise investment is rising compared with profit. The economists' common view over this issue is that the financing

cost of efficient private economy is too high, short of enough investment allocation. In fact, the government has been aware of the problem and emphasized the reform of mixed ownership economy in state-owned enterprises at the 3rd Plenary Session of 18th CPC Central Committee. The reform can improve original industrial efficiency, further providing safety of production of the structural reform in supply side such as industrial upgrading, innovations from high-end services and urbanization. Recently, the government has further emphasized the combination of public construction and social capital, that is PPT pattern. Similarly, it is beneficial to efficient investment allocation of private economy.

To conclude, to ensure the growth trend of China's macro-economy, the supply side, the demand side and the policy choice need to coordinate with each other. We believe based on the scientific theory put forward by economists who have been studying macro-economy for a long time, the management of China's macro-economy will fit the judgment of the contemporary trend of China according to national conditions, making appropriate policies to ensure the future growth trend of China's economy.

Translated by Ren Andao

The Innovation of Customs System Shall Go Beyond

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September 29th, 2016, saw the third anniversary of China's first Pilot Free Trade Zone – China (Shanghai) Free Trade Zone. In that background, it is of great importance in the reality to summarize and review the innovation of the Customs system.

Four Innovation Achievements

The facilitation level of the clearance system has been improved. According to the reform requirements of the State Council, in post customs, the clearance time and cost of the imports have been apparently reduced, and the average clearance time of importing and exporting has been greatly cut down compared to that outside the Free Trade Zone. Referring to the customs in charge of supervision, enterprises' frequency of declaration has been remarkably reduced, and their logistics has speeded up, and the clearance cost has been effectively reduced. The Customs have introduced 31 innovation systems in total, including 11 pieces on the facilitation of Customs clearance, 4 pieces on bonded supervision, 8 pieces on corporate administration, 3 pieces on taxation, and 5 pieces on function extension, most of which have been duplicated and popularized.

The system of bounded supervision focused on function extension has been continuously updated, obviously promoting the transformation and upgrade of the foreign trade. Supported by the Customs, the specialized service platform of business and trade, the center for import goods from different countries and the sport market of bulk commodity have been built up. At the same time, the exhibition center for parallel-import cars as well as the trading center for international artwork have been put into operation. The number of enterprises settled in the National Base for International Cultural Trade has been greatly increased since the establishment of the Free Trade Zone. Meanwhile, the logistics mode of supervising different sorts of goods by status has been normalized in some pilot enterprises, helping them upgrade to a trading and operating settlement center based on the integration of domestic and foreign trade.

The reform of streamlining administration and delegating more power to lower-level governments based on the informatization has been deepened, whose achievement has gradually been reflected. The Customs has

cancelled, transferred, released or put down dozens of limitations for approval and published the Customs' power and responsibilities in law enforcement, including 52 pieces on power in 15 categories, 5 pieces on supervision in and after the process, 11 pieces on public service affairs and 41 pieces on window service affairs.

The administrative system with the key point of "one window" has made progress, improving the capability of cooperative governance. With the concept of "one platform, one submission, result feedback, data sharing", "one window" in Shanghai international trade means that in the customs supervision section and main sections of international trade administration, trade and transportation enterprises submit the applications to the supervision department for once through the "one window", and the supervision department also gives feedbacks and shares the information of results through the "one window".

Benchmarking the International Standard TFA and TPP

One of the mission of Shanghai Free Trade Zone is to implement the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in advance. According to the research of World Customs Organization, the customs is the only enforcement department for 30% clauses in TFA and the main enforcement department for 40% clauses. Besides, 28% clauses are applied by all the border departments, including the Customs. Based on the analysis of each clause, the innovation system of the Customs of Shanghai Free Trade Zone meets the basic principles and rules of TFA on the whole, and has made breakthroughs in some parts.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) will greatly affect the international trade arrangements and the free trade negotiation between China and the United States in the future. The facilitation of the Customs procedures and trade is the major content of TPP. In some parts, Shanghai Free Trade Zone has reached or exceeded the standards of TPP:

First, referring to risk management, reconsideration and appealing, and confidentiality, TPP merely applies general provisions, while Shanghai Free Trade Zone has achieved those requirements in practice. Second, China has met most requires in TPP, including customs cooperation, pre-ruling, feedback to suggestions or information request, automation, express delivery, penalty, release of goods, information publicity, etc. For example, for the time limit of ruling, in TPP's provision, the time limit of pre-ruling is within 150 days since all the materials are provided. While in Shanghai Free Trade Zone, the time limit of administrative ruling for commodity classification is within 60 days from the acceptance of application.

Shouldering the Responsibility of Demonstration in China

The innovation of Shanghai Free Trade Zone's Customs system still has a lot of room for improvement. In Shanghai Free Trade Zone, the newly-established Lujiazui financial area, Jinqiao development area and Zhangjiang high-tech area are not special areas supervised by the Customs. To solve this problem, the General Administration of Customs has started the integration reform of the Customs clearance based on the regional cooperation system, which has been tried in Shanghai, by optimizing three-level (central, provincial and local government) governments' responsibility, integrating institutions functions and reformulating the customs clearance procedures, the obstacles between different departments, customs and business lines will be eliminated.

In the end of August, the third batch of pilot free trade zones are approved to set up in seven provinces and municipalities, including Zhejiang, Chongqing, Henan, etc. Till now, the "1+3+7" strategic arrangement of pilot free trade zone has formed. However, different free trade zones have distinct functions. For instance, Zhejiang Free Trade Zone pays attention to shipping, relying on Ningbo and Zhoushan Seaport to build a free trade port for bulk commodity. While Shaanxi Free Trade Zone focuses on railway and air transportation, exploring aviation industrial trade and cultural tourism to serve the "One Belt One Road" strategy and the grand western development program, which means the innovation of the Customs system should comply with local conditions, which enhances the difficulty of its duplication and generalization.

In this process, to avoid unnecessary cost, especially innovating for innovation and promoting for promotion, Shanghai Free Trade Zone should bravely shoulder the demonstration status of institutional innovation, sum up experience and lessons from the past, and provide qualified innovation products of the Customs system that are duplicable and scalable..

Translated by Li Weixuan

To Tell a Good Story of China with Worldwide Meaning

Li Youmei, *Research Centre for Local Governance, Shanghai University*

To tell the world a story of China, is to establish a more comprehensive image of China in the world. Meanwhile, it will help provide the global economic and social development with more intellectual resources.

In 2013, President Xi Jinping put forward the vision of creating a community of shared future for mankind for the first time. During the past 4 years, this vision has already become a consensus of the whole world. Not long ago, the vision of creating a community of shared future for mankind was recorded in the UN Security Council resolution for the first time. The reason why the Chinese proposal getting a strong response is that eastern wisdom gives a new way of development to replace the law of jungle. At the same time, it can be attributed to Chinese leaders' sparing no effort to tell the story of China.

Chinese philosophy, Chinese wisdom and Chinese proposals all reflect our thought of human being's future and our design of an international order, which will contribute to the reform of global governance system. However, there remains some misunderstanding by the outside world towards China. Many a time, China will be shaped as an "aggressive" entity. Thus, to let the world has a better understanding of the relationship between China's routine of modernization and creating a community of shared future for mankind, it is highly important to tell a good story of China. Basically, to tell a good story of China, is to let the world thoroughly understand China as well as China's routine of modernization, meanwhile to provide the global economic and social development with more intellectual resources. Because of that, it is necessary to tell a good story of China with worldwide meaning.

To some extent, China's story is a public good in the world. The worldwide meaning of its connotation is to advocate the value of the superiority of justice and to support the advantage of a nation's own culture in the world, which is an unavoidable part of creating a community of shared future for mankind. As Chinese philosophy goes, "a public spirit will rule all under the sky when the great Way prevails." It indicates a value system that pays more attention to justice than to interests, which shows an essential difference against some western countries' value system as regarding interests as the most significant thing. Besides, "the secret of a tasty soup is that it contains different ingredients." China respects cultural difference, values the communication between different

cultures, and insists that the difference among the cultures shall not become the cause of international conflicts, which is opposed to western countries' theory of "clash of civilizations".

To tell a good story of China also requires to innovate a new discourse system. In this way, a communicative bridge between China and the rest of the world under different contexts will be established, delivering the story's inspiration and persuasion. As for social scientists, the enormous system and profound meaning of "China" is far from being fully explored. An academic system to concern the reality of China, to deal with the problems of China and to summarize the experience of China has not been fully developed. It leads to two defects when we are entering the global stage. One is that we will be restricted to China's own tradition and cannot go beyond that. The other is that we will mechanically apply the theories and opinions of western countries and ignore China's own conditions. Therefore, a good story of China is not supposed to be told in the western theoretical framework, but to be promoted among a multi-culture system as to effectively convey its complete content. One of the key mission of the construction of the philosophical and social science's discourse system is to theoretically prepare for the trans-discourse connection of China's story.

To let the story of China enter the global stage, more talents who are good at telling those stories are urgently expected. The worldwide meaning of China's story requires the ability to develop further dialogue in different global context. Thus, the story-teller should not only have a deep understanding of China's story, but also be skilled at choosing a suitable topic to make up the gap between the past and modern history as well as that between China and western countries. It is not enough to merely rely on a certain discipline or some think-tanks, but that more excellent philosophical and social scientists are encouraged to join in to better design the channel and carrier, expand the content and topic and update the discourse and form of the story of China.

Being a big country with a long history and unlimited charm in the eastern world, to let our civilization and culture go hand-in-hand with our economic strength is an inevitable course to promote China's international status and an integral part for China to enter the global stage. Through telling a good story of China with worldwide meaning, China will surely make more contributions to the global governance.

People's Daily (March 30th 2017 Page 5)

Translated by Li Weixuan

Achieving the Goals of the Universal Two-Child Policy Requires Overall Complementary Policies

Peng Xizhe, *Fudan University Center for Population and Development Policy Studies*

The universal two-child policy was proposed in the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, a milestone in the process of China's family planning policy adjustment. It is a reform measure for the benefit of the Chinese people and later generations. The implementation of the policy marked the end of the one-child policy, which had been carried out for more than 30 years, and the realization of the reproductive rights of the Chinese people in both urban and rural areas. It will be conducive to the long-term and balanced development of China's population, socio-economy and environmental resources.

1 The influence of the universal two-child policy on China's demographic development

The universal two-child policy relaxes the policy restriction on the number of children a couple is allowed to have. From the perspective of population growth, the policy's purpose is to improve the future age structure of China's population, slow down population aging and increase the future labor supply for a balance between demographic and socio-economic development.

In the short term, as a result of the policy, more young women may temporarily leave the workforce for pregnancy, reducing the level of employment to a greater degree. That being the case, the positive effect of the policy on the labor supply will not be felt until at least 15 years from now on. It is thus most likely that the working-age population may continue to decline in the next 20 years.

Meanwhile, the child dependency ratio will be on the rise due to the increasing new births, thus moving forward the end date of demographic dividend. Admittedly, the new births will slow the increase in the proportion of the elderly population, but the increasing number of the elderly is an indisputable truth. In other words, the policy's effect of checking the rapid growth of the elderly population is limited, and it is therefore almost impossible to reverse the long-term aging trend fundamentally.

So the influence of the universal two-child policy on the long-term

development trend of China's future population is limited. That said, the policy may exert a far-reaching influence on China's social development, especially through the growth of the non-only-child generation. We are not supposed to forecast the effect of the policy merely through instrumental understanding.

The two-child policy only affects the birth rate externally. The internal cause is families' attitudes toward and action of childbearing.

In the latest 20 years, the post-80s and post-90s generations make up the major population of childbearing age. Since both personal backgrounds and the socio-economic environment have undergone great changes, their views on childbearing are significantly different from those of previous generations. Many surveys show that late marriage and core families have become the mainstream marriage and family models. Moreover, the family planning policies are no longer strong enough to influence people as to their willingness to bear children. Instead, the childbearing population is more likely to decide whether to have children from personal interests. Whether having a second child also depends on a family's expectations of the long-term socio-economic trends, including employment, education, social security, environmental resources, housing, medical care, pension and so forth.

2 Promoting the implementation of the universal two-child policy through complementary social policies

Many surveys evaluating the selective two-child policy show that a large number of qualified families choose not to have a second child. The major reasons lie in three types of pressure: economy, child caring and women's career development. This conclusion still holds water for the universal two-child policy. Therefore, in order to achieve the expected goals of the universal two-child policy, to be more specific, to encourage urbanites to have a second child, merely adjusting the family planning policy is far from enough. It is imperative to introduce a series of complementary policies to motivate and enable citizens to have another child.

In the short term, the government must introduce corresponding policies and invest more in public services targeted at the population of childbearing age before more families are encouraged to have a second child. As a public service provider and resource allocator, the government has the responsibility and ability to relieve the abovementioned pressure at a macro level. For example, the income tax system may be reformed: the tax may be imposed on family units rather than individuals. The family with two children may enjoy higher tax cuts. Besides, the government may extend the compulsory education to the pre-school period and invest

more in compulsory education. All of these measures will certainly relieve the economic burden of two-children families. Meanwhile, men may be encouraged to participate more actively in the process of child-rearing, so that men and women share the responsibility of family caring. Many foreign countries have adopted the paternity leave policy. China may follow suit by allowing men to take leave for child caring like women. Moreover, men's more active participation in child-caring is in the interest of building harmonious family relationships, alleviating the impact of child caring on women's career and promoting gender equality.

The development of market economy created more employment opportunities for women. But at the same time, women are faced with a severer situation: gender inequality in the world of work. It remains an arduous task to create a fair and equitable employment environment. Apart from the Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests, the government are supposed to take all necessary measures to prevent women from unfair treatment such as being deprived of the chance of promotion because of pregnancy.

As for companies' worries that women employees may affect their revenues and profits due to childbearing, the government may intervene and share the cost by establishing related mechanisms. Enterprises and institutions may be encouraged to shoulder more social responsibilities by establishing nurseries and kindergartens to resolve female employees' conflict between work and family. Meanwhile, the government may grant appropriate subsidies to these nurseries and kindergartens.

Besides, since the universal two-child policy has been implemented, it is necessary to revise, improve or abolish the previous regulations or policies related to the one-child policy so that a fair policy environment can be formed for two-child families. China can thus undergo a smooth transition from strict control on childbearing to encouraging the qualified population to bear children by the the policy. Moreover, the residual issues arising from the implementation of the one-child policy must be tackled properly. For example, the support for couples who have lost their only child shall be enhanced despite the new policy. Other policies and regulations should be adjusted too, for example, those of the housing market management.

3 Reconstructing family policies and family values

The topic of family has come under the spotlight since the implementation of the universal two-child policy. China's family structure, in the process of continuous simplification, is also showing some characteristics of network. The smooth implementation of the policy requires family to act as its pillar. Meanwhile, the policy is a driving force in the change of

family patterns in China.

The change in family models requires social policies to restore traditional family functions or develop new functions. By the same token, policies must serve family functions and needs before they can offer effective help to social members. For instances, policies should ease the burden for families in supporting children and the elderly. At the same time when traditional family values are preserved, neo family values may be researched and promoted to suit the modern socio-economic conditions. This is a burning and important issue especially at present when the only-child generation of more than 100 million are taking center stage of Chinese society.

In recent years, President Xi Jinping has reiterated the importance of family construction and family education. He pointed out that no matter how time or life changes, we should value family construction all the time, as family is fundamental to state development, national progress, and social harmony.

Therefore, we should see the implementation of the universal two-child policy as an opportunity to reconstruct neo family values in line with Chinese society and economy and based on traditional culture. By taking these values as the theoretical basis for family policy, we aim to create a cultural atmosphere for promoting new family ethics. The family policy must be implemented with a focus on people's livelihood and aimed for maximized administrative efficiency. Hence an institutional framework would be constructed where the government, market, communities and organizations are all responsible, motivated and enabled to help family play its due role.

4 Paying attention to the differences between urban and rural areas

The factors influencing child bearing vary from urban to rural areas. Therefore, complementary policies should be adapted to regional contexts. People's willingness to bear children largely depends on socio-economic development, which in China's case, features huge gaps between regions. This situation will be with us for a long time. As a result, the supporting policies will be different from region to region for the implementation of the two-child policy.

Another issue worth special attention is that the universal two-child policy exerts different influences on different regions. Its influence may be limited on the cities in the eastern coastal zone such as Shanghai. But the central and western regions may be significantly influenced. These regions are estimated to bear heavy burdens of public services, especially in education, as the increase in the number of births will be

translated into the demand for educational resources in a few years. To deal with this new regional disparity due to birth policy adjustment, the central government should resort to transfers or other coordinated measures to grant the central and western regions more educational and other resources. By doing so, the government may manage to narrow the existing gap between the East and West in educational resources and level and institutionally prevent the adverse elimination of population. By taking the opportunity of promoting the new urbanization strategy and the reform of the household registration system, the government may do more to render public services in different regions equal.

5 Achieving the goals of the universal two-child policy through overall governance

In conclusion, the introduction of the universal two-child policy is an important stage in the whole process of family planning policy adjustment. Nevertheless, we must recognize that policy adjustment is not a panacea. The new policy does play a role in delaying the speed of population aging, but it cannot reverse the long-term trend. Therefore, despite the new policy, China cannot afford delaying the reform on pension, retirement age, health insurance, household registration and so on.

Achieving the goals of the universal two-child policy also requires holistic and sound complementary policies that aim to achieve equality and adjust interests between regions, urban and rural areas, the rich and the poor, men and women, and different age groups. Full consideration shall be taken by the government in implementing the policy with a view to protecting the interests of various groups and achieving a win-win situation.

Policy adjustment is no cure-all, but it is a must to break the bottleneck restricting childbearing willingness before the goals of the universal two-child policy are realized. The population policy will act as a crucial building block in constructing a moderately prosperous society if the government implements it through overall governance, optimized policy design aimed for greater effectiveness, rational allocation of policy resources and by mobilizing all stakeholders to participate by means of various policy tools and media.

Translated by Tian Yan

ACG Culture: How Mainstream Culture Can Learn from the Way It Spreads

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ACG culture is multifarious in content and rich in variety, encompassing – as the name indicates – Anime, Comic, Games, and also Light Novels and Cosplay. The inclusive culture, speaking to young people's aesthetics, has spillover effect in their internet community, continuously providing culture symbols for internet youth culture, such as buzzwords, emoji, and original music. ACG culture hence can be deemed a rich mine for the reproduction of internet youth culture. Manifold as it is, the subculture still requires resources; as a result, how it borrows from and interprets the mainstream culture is crucial to its survival. To appeal to the youth, who increasingly crave individuality in culture consumption, to accept and inherit it, the mainstream culture should take initiative in communicating and interacting with youth popular culture and draw lessons from its approachability in presentation, technology in dissemination, and variety in content; only so can the dominant culture confront its current challenges and better lead the subculture.

I.ACG culture gets the youth involved with their imagination and recreation.

The subculture effectively engages the younger generation for the following reasons.

1.The design of the internet platform for ACG culture makes young people feel that they are part of something. “User participation” is the post-90s’ way to show their approval, for they are willing to be part of the creative process and derive satisfaction from it. Synchronicity is the first and foremost feature distinguishing bullet-screen videos from conventional internet videos with separate comment sections, for the viewers can respond at the same time of the video streaming with bullet screens as comments, which, though fragmented, can focus on even the tiniest detail of the video. Such videos, moreover, allowing for instant interactivity, simulate real-life communication, which is instantaneous and instinctive, and thus are considered more human. The constant update of the bullet screens themselves also contributes to keeping the viewers entertained. The accretion of the missives would add to the original content, shifting its focus after multiple times of transmission. The information conveyed thus is no longer thoughtlessly repetitive but becomes decentralized

material created by the users.

2. The recreation platform ACG culture provides cultivates young people's creativity and imagination; at the same time, the original content from the youth can better meet their aesthetic needs. The younger generation is more demanding regarding the aestheticism and imagination of creative content. The sheer variety of the topics that anime deals with, in some degree, provides heterogeneous outlooks on life. Additionally, different painting styles and dissimilar depiction of the world in anime help young people to access their originality, resulting in their higher demand in real-world aesthetics. Apart from the sense of involvement and the appeal to their imagination, the requirement of recreation is yet another reason why ACG culture fascinates the young.

II. Successful cases substantiate how ACG culture can merge with mainstream culture.

1. ACG works efficaciously promoting mainstream ideology

Rabbits: The Tumultuous Years, one among the ACG works most successfully integrating with the dominant culture, is a groundbreaking grassroots original anime series, portraying china's modern history, especially the major military and diplomatic events immediately before and ever since the founding of the PRC. The series has so far received over 50,000,000 clicks online. The great emotional appeal the work has for the young people shows that they can take a keen interest in the history of the Party and the army as long as the way the history is presented is intriguingly creative enough. To promote the mainstream ideology, we should utilize the kind of language appreciated by the youth to resonate with them; only then would it be possible for the ideology to be internalized as part of their values.

Another typical example is the guichu video Qin: A Remix, already attracting millions of views, based on the history television series Qin: The Division of an Empire. Guichu, a Chinese internet buzzword, means a catchy music remix. The video, revised from a classic conversation in the series between Shang Yang and Duke Xiao of Qin, goes viral, because the composers make rap lyrics out of the normally obscure ancient Chinese language, and underneath the hip exterior are serious contents about an empowering political reform. Such traditional Chinese values as tenacity, law-abidingness, and loyalty are no longer just empty propaganda or stiffly incorporated in experimental works. Examined closely, the lyrics are by no means just a brainless spoof but correspond to the spirit of the original show. Today's youth have outgrown meaningless spoofs; rather, the underlying seriousness and thought are what can truly

inspire accolades. A Taiwanese scholar, commenting on this phenomenon, puts it well, “Under the ostensibly joking parody is affecting appeal for patriotism – the latest internet creative power in Mainland China cannot be underestimated.”

2.The inspiring clash between traditional Chinese culture and ACG culture

Guzheng video Senbon Zakura would be a perfect example demonstrating the inspiring clash between traditional Chinese culture and ACG culture. The video, a representative piece that the ACG site Bilibili proudly boasts, has over 12,000,000 clicks and more than 670,000 bullet screens. The video maker, playing the well-known anime soundtrack Senbon Zakura on the Guzheng, reinterprets it with classical Chinese elements and innovative arrangements. The music-video maker, with her impeccable rendering of the upbeat music and mature fingering skills, gives a performance of consummate style, eliciting viewers’ praises “Absolutely amazing!”. The trending original video popularizes videos featuring the rendering of traditional Chinese instruments ranging from Guzheng, Chinese flute, to Pipa.

The popularity of the video shows that traditional Chinese culture ought not to all the time appear too highbrow so that it would seem unapproachable. It, rather, should incorporate popular elements to become more accessible to the youth. Furthermore, traditional culture should try to break free from the constraint of conventional approaches and take on new expressions to better attend to the psychological and aesthetic needs of the younger generation. Classical Chinese music rendering generally sticks to the original arrangement. Though this approach manifests utmost decorum and the charisma of traditional Chinese culture, it nevertheless does not connect with the young. The dramatic, unconventional touch to the interpretation of Senbon Zakura achieves an unexpected success in the young in terms of the spread of the traditional culture. It is exactly the intriguing, innovative delivery that satisfies today’s youth’s psychological and aesthetic needs.

III.The takeaway lesson: youth internet culture should be effectively guided.

With the increasing popularity of the ACG culture, how the mainstream culture can integrate with the subculture and effectively guide it through media and the market is a question for youth education.

1.Governmental management should achieve indirect transformation. Only by respecting the development pattern of culture industries in the new media age can the passion of creative workers and consumers be

better stimulated and guided and can a better environment be provided for integrative development. Currently industries and businesses compete furiously for the consumer market of the youth internet culture, and internet enterprises has become an important external driving force for the development of ACG culture. In 2015, many internet entertainment enterprises that had noticed the huge profit potential of ACG content began to actively work with the proprietors and promote their original content, fueling the commercialization of ACG content. Such a trend not only provides more possibilities and approaches for the dominant culture to guide the youth's internet pop culture, but also makes one realize that homogeneous, mandatory guidance is not the way to go, and that complexity, competitiveness, and compromises should be expected when dealing with actual situations. Commercialized media, the aforementioned Bilibili for instance, are relatively manageable, for once the commercial need is involved, the site administrators and video uploaders would voluntarily censor themselves and consciously avoid the kind of behaviors that wouldn't bring them profit. Apparently both the commercialized media platforms and the users wouldn't want to go against the orthodox ideology, for there is no profit in it for them. Now that their actual profit depends on the safety, prosperity, and stability of the country and is in line with national interest, they will not break the order. For that reason, benign commercialization should be encouraged to accord with the sites' interest so that the government can regulate the industry, not by such crude approaches as deleting the videos, but by relatively roundabout measures such as cutting off the capital chain and interfering with the profits, which would prove to be more purposeful and flexible.

To be more specific, video sharing sites, including the foregoing Bilibili, can together found an industry association or sign a self-discipline convention. The government should consider to show due tolerance, generally encouraging their development and avoiding interfering too much with their business practices and business models. As for those capital and investments with foreign government background and the institutions whose management include foreign personnel and forces, they should be strictly regulated. Differential managerial approaches, which ought to be flexible and can encompass regular meetings and indirect restriction exerted by third-party research institutions, should be applied to different sections.

2. The ideological and political education of college students should be more innovative. Such education should embrace the new media platforms popular among the youth, such as bullet-screen video sharing sites. To start with, influential works, such as *Rabbits: The Tumultuous Years*, can be included into the teaching materials of college political courses. Moreover, college students should be encouraged to create such works

themselves. We should hold competitions or cultivate, in universities with anime majors, a new generation of citizen journalists who can, through their works, promote the dominant ideology. We, too, should scout on the internet for potential core teams and cultivate them to voluntarily speak for the government. For instance, under the current operating mode of Bilibili, more video uploaders will emerge who will each gradually gain his or her own fan base and learn to manage it more effectively. And since the internet creative industry is now unimaginably more influential than the conventional media, these video uploaders, who are getting increasingly more professional, are to be especially trained.

3. Organizations should work together to promote successful, effective development. Relevant government administrative agencies, university institutions specializing in ideological and political education, researchers, and practitioners such as those of Bilibili can together develop a cooperative mechanism – creating an industry development forum for instance – to carry out regular researches and discussions. During the process, the industry can provide data and research objects and also ask the operators to gather new information if necessary so that the researchers can generalize reports that would prove valuable in three aspects – facilitating researching, inspiring industry development, and enlightening the management of political environment that the administration's supervision department concerns itself with.

Translated by Xu Qiong

The Research Base on National Marine Rights and Strategy, Shanghai Jiao Tong University: A Driving Force in China's Ocean Development

Xue Guifang,

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I. The international seabed area is of strategic importance.

As the largest home to potential strategic resources on earth, the international seabed area is yet to be fully explored and exploited by humanity. The currently known minerals rich in the seabed include polymetallic nodules (PNs), cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts (CRFCs), polymetallic sulphides (PSDs), etc. It is estimated that the seabed contains 75 billion tons of PNs, 21 billion tons of CRFCs and far more PSDs than those on land-based deposits. As the natural resources on land are being exhausted while humanity is in a better position to know about and utilize ocean resources, there is no doubt that the international seabed area will serve as a major base for R&D of various natural resources. Hence strategic industries are expected to emerge, such as the industries of deep sea mining, biotechnology and engineering.

In accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the international seabed area (the Area), occupying 49 percent of the Earth's surface, means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The Area, along with its resources, is the common heritage of mankind with the International Seabed Authority (ISA) acting on mankind's behalf. The Area is of strategic importance because of its vastness and rich resources. Countries cannot be integrated to the world without access to the Area and the high seas, which thus become pivotal to countries' international trade and economic development, not least in the current world featuring economic globalization. Besides, the Area provides an arena of international politics and military. A natural domain where the major powers want to gain military advantage, the Area is always a priority in all coastal countries' national security and defense plan.

II. China has made progress in the area of exploration and exploitation.

In April 1990, the State Council agreed to establish the China Ocean Mineral Resources R&D Association (COMRA) and to apply for authorization to explore the Area in the name of COMRA. Moreover, the exploration of deep seabed PNs was seen as a state long-term project, receiving state targeted investment. In 2000, the project expanded its

subject to various resources of the Area. In 2010, the State Council agreed to hand in another application for seabed exploration. These moves demonstrate China's strategy of exploring resources not only in the Pacific Ocean, but also in the Indian and the Atlantic Oceans. China does focus on resources, yet her attention is also beyond resources. These achievements mark a milestone in China's ocean development.

China has been vigorously promoting deep sea exploration and developing deep sea technologies in a bid to establish deep sea industries at a proper time. Therefore, the recent two decades have seen substantial progress in China's ocean development: China has safeguarded her due rights of the Area, earning crucial opportunities to make her presence in the Area; economy-wise, China has explored new sources of important metallic resources, enabling the establishment of world-class deep sea emerging industries; in terms of science and technology, China has gained more knowledge about deep sea, boosting China's deep sea engineering development.

III. China's ocean development needs domestic legislation.

The recent years have seen many regulations on the Area established. The ISA passed the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area in 2001, the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area in May 2010, and the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese Crusts in the Area in July 2012. Countries compete for the resources of the Area increasingly fiercely, albeit orderly and legally. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea pointed out in its advisory opinion released on February 1, 2011, that the sponsoring State shall not be liable for damage caused by any failure, if the State Party has taken "all necessary and appropriate measures" including domestic laws, regulations and administrative measures to secure effective compliance.

These regulations, however, merely endow the state parties with ideal rights, instead of tangible benefits. To translate the rights of coastal countries provided in the international regulations into practical benefits, it is essential to establish domestic laws and regulations on the ownership, prospecting, exploration and management of the Area's resources. Equally important are how fully a country is aware of the strategic value of the Area and a country's overall strength. The major western industrialized countries, for example, legislated on deep sea mining long ago.

Against such a backdrop, China established the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Exploration and Development of Resources in Deep Seabed Area (Deep Seabed Law) in 2016. The Deep Seabed

Law, by putting China's exploration and development of resources in deep seabed area under the umbrella of domestic laws, can safeguard China's due right in the Area and promote China's ocean development. Nevertheless, laws alone cannot carry themselves into practice. A whole system of corresponding laws and regulations are required to supplement the abstract and pithy Deep Seabed Law, the "basic law" in China on deep sea, with a view to regulating and enhancing China's deep sea exploration.

IV. The Research Base on National Marine Rights and Strategy, Shanghai Jiao Tong University drives China's ocean development.

Since its inception, the Research Base on National Marine Rights and Strategy (the Base) of Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU), one of the university think-tanks in Shanghai, has established itself into an enabler of China's state strategies. By leveraging SJTU's strengths in marine engineering, deep sea technologies and ship design, it has been providing theoretical foundations for China's ocean development.

In 2015, commissioned by COMRA, the Base formulated the 13th Five-year Plan of Deep Seabed Resources Exploration and Development (the Plan). Based on the relevant laws, plans and documents including the Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China and the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Exploration and Development of Resources in Deep Seabed Area, the Plan served as a blueprint for China's ocean development. It helped protect and expand China's legitimate rights and interests in the Area, boost China's exploration and development of the Area and foster industries such as deep sea mining, gene resources and deep sea engineering.

In 2016, the National People's Congress Environment Protection and Resources Conservation Committee and COMRA commissioned the Base to interpret the Deep Seabed Law adopted in 2016. The Base interpreted and improved the parts which had not been provided explicitly in the Deep Seabed Law. Furthermore, the Base filled legal lacunae in seabed mining, applicable bodies and environment protection. All these substantiated the framework offered by the Deep Seabed Law and clarified its application, thus minimizing confusions and misunderstandings for more effective enforcement.

In the same year, commissioned by COMRA, the Base researched into and designed corresponding laws and regulations of the Deep Seabed Law. These laws and regulations, centered on the Deep Seabed Law, took into consideration not only China's practice, security aims and legal foundations of the Area, but also the future development of deep sea

technologies, the prediction on the proper timing to develop deep sea business and the trend of international systems. They were aimed to strike a balance between the stability and openness of laws and regulations, particularly on the standards of deep sea technologies.

Besides, COMRA asked the Base to research into the periodic review of the international regime of the Area in 2016. By tracking and analyzing the latest development of international regime regarding the Area, China is better served to check whether the international rules regarding the common heritage of mankind have been observed. Moreover, a deeper understanding of the rules can facilitate China's ocean development and grant China a greater say in the global stage. China can thus be well founded intellectually to formulate the strategy of the Area in the future.

In 2016, the Base participated in the project of "Environmental Investigation and Assessment of Deep Sea PNs Mining" initiated by the Ministry of Science and Technology. The major tasks of the Base included formulating international rules, collecting information and putting forward proposals. This project, undertaken by the National Deep Sea Center, received funds of RMB 133.5 million. Once completed, the project will improve China's competence in deep sea environmental investigation and assessment, and in deep sea resources exploration. Meanwhile, China will enjoy more say in the Area by offering significant scientific evidence to maritime governance bodies such as the ISA in the course of formulating environmental management rules.

The Base will host the summer international course under the theme of "The Law of the Sea: Theory and Practice" on July 3 to 14, 2017. Well-known experts and scholars both at home and abroad will be invited to deliver lectures on deep sea science and technologies, practice and laws. Funded by the ISA, the course will aim to train professionals of deep sea for developing countries. The Base intends to build the course into an international, open and first-class one in China where young scholars and students can be facilitated to research into laws and policies regarding the law of the sea.

Translated by Jin Yi

《中国观》2017 年长期征稿启事

为更好地落实新型智库建设，推动科学研究与决策咨询的相互转化，提供更多高质量、高水平的咨询报告与专家建议，复旦发展研究院和上海市高校智库研究和管理中心拟就《中国观》向国内外学者长期征稿。《中国观》以中国当下各领域的热点议题为关注重点，每月月刊以“国际视角 前沿观点 中国智库 建言发展”为主题，选编国外顶尖智库最新中国研究成果，并且收录复旦发展研究院访问学者、国内智库专家对当前中国热点问题的政策分析。

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