在开放方面，中国承诺实行高水平的贸易和投资自由化便利化政策，全面实行准入前国民待遇加负面清单管理制度，大幅度放宽市场准入，扩大服务业对外开放，保护外商投资合法权益。凡是在中国境内注册的企业，都要一视同仁、平等对待。赋予自由贸易试验区更大改革自主权，并在中国的一些适当地方探索建设自由贸易港。

毋庸置疑，在没有改变的“初级阶段”之下，中国要能够保持持续的发展和增长的动力，还必须面对过去40年来（明年将是中国经济改革和开放的四十周年）已经发生变化的内部和外部条件并能妥善处理时刻可能爆发的各种潜在风险或把风险调整到可控的水平之内，尽管中国过去40年成功地做到了这些。

挑战之一是中国面临居高不下的收入不平等。中国收入分配的基尼系数从1983年的0.283一度上升至2008年的峰值0.491（根据中国家庭金融调查数据（CHFS）测算，中国2010年和2012年基尼系数分别为0.61和0.60，明显高于官方公布的0.481和0.474）。虽然2008年之后中国的基尼系数7年连续下降至0.462，但这一数据仍然高于国际警戒线，更高于主要发达国家0.24-0.36的区间值，不仅如此，由于低收入者养老金收入增速放缓和以生产粮食为主业的农民收入下降，中国的基尼系数2016年又回升至0.465。

如果考虑实物性收入和补贴，中国可能也是世界上城乡收入差距最大的国家之一。同时，居民的收入差距的扩大也发生在城镇内部。2014年收入最高的5%的家庭人均年收入高达53300元，而收入最低的5%的家庭人均年收入仅为1600元，两者相差33倍。

20年来，与居民收入差距相比，中国还面临越来越严重的居民财产的差距。1988年和1995年全国居民财产分配基尼系数分别为0.34和0.4，小于那时的收入分配差距。而到2010年，中国居民财产分配基尼系数达到了0.739的峰值。截至2014年，底端25%的家庭拥有的财产总量不足1%，而顶端1%的家庭拥有全国近三分之一的财产。

可见中国走向未来30年的道路并不平坦。如果依照过去的表现来推算，中国具有极大的可能在2035年进入高收入的国家行列，这意味着中国在未来15-20年要确保平均每年5%或更高的劳动生产率的增长。而上升过快的收入不均和财富的分化对于十九大绘制的和谐而美丽的蓝图而言是非常不利的潜在风险和妨碍因素。世界上绝大多数国家未能解决好增长与收入分配出扩大之间的冲突。中国需要更加智慧地处理经济增长和收入分配不均这两个目标的冲突。

最后，也许有必要从人口学的视角展望一下30年后的中国。30年后，即便中国能顺利实现中共十九大绘制的蓝图，进入到高收入和先进国家的行列，但似乎没有什么可以阻止中国在人口转变上的快速步伐。中国那时将极有可能变成一个严重老龄化的社会。

根据联合国发布的2015年修订版的世界人口展望报告预测，到2050年36.5%的中国人在60岁以上，人口老龄化程度高于多数发达国家。2015年，有一半中国人的年龄小于37岁。但到2050年，尽管那时的总人口跟今天持平，约为13.8亿左右，但0-14岁的儿童人口比例将低至13.5%，仅比日本高一个百分点；人口年龄中位数将高达49.6岁，接近日本53.3岁的水平，而瑞典、英国、美国欧美国家依然才40岁出头。

Achieving the lofty development goals China's leaders have set will not be easy. But with a clear development blueprint and a powerful leader whose political clout all but guarantees continued reform, the country seems to be in a strong position to sustain its unprecedented economic success in the coming decades.

Every five years, the Communist Party of China convenes a National Congress, where two key decisions are made: who will lead China for the next five years, and what path to development those leaders will follow. The CPC's recently completed 19th National Congress did all that and more.

Beyond choosing the next Politburo Standing Committee, the 19th Party Congress reelected President Xi Jinping as the CCP's leader and added his eponymous ideology – “Xi Jinping Thought” – to the Party's charter. The Congress also produced a blueprint for the country's future development until 2050, one that reflects the changes that economic reform and opening have brought to China.

At the CPC's 13th National Congress, in October 1987, China's leaders declared that the “major contradictions” facing the country were those between “people's growing material and cultural needs and the backwardness of social production.” In other words, the key challenge was to produce enough food, clothing, and books for all Chinese.

Thirty years later, the major contradiction China faces is that between “rising demand for higher standards of living and the constraints imposed by insufficient and unbalanced economic development.” In his address to the 19th Party Congress, Xi declared that, because China can largely deliver basic necessities to its people, the goal now should be to improve their quality of life.

With that in mind, the 19th Congress charted a new roadmap, based on the “two centennial goals” inherited from the 18th Congress. The first centennial goal is to build a “moderately prosperous society” (xiao-kang) by 2021, the 100th anniversary of the CPC's founding. The key here is to ensure broad prosperity, with poverty all but eliminated.

The second centennial goal is to transform China into a “fully developed and advanced nation” by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic. The vision, confirmed at the Congress, is for China to be a prosperous, civilized, harmonious, and modern socialist society, boasting strong governance. Such a China would be a leading global power, ranking high among the advanced economies.

The 19th Party Congress went some way toward marking the path between these two goals, asserting that once the first centennial goal is realized, China's next task will be to modernize Chinese society by 2035. Such a modern China would be a world leader in innovation, with a clean environment, a large middle class, and a much narrower gap between rural and urban growth, public services, and living standards.

Achieving these goals will require, first and foremost, that China's leadership understands where in the development process China is. In this sense, it is promising that China's leaders admitted at the latest Congress that China is and will remain in the primary phase of socialism. China must, therefore, put development first, with the expectation that economic growth will solve the country's problems.

Given this, China's top leaders promised that they would continue implementing structural reforms and advancing economic liberalization. This builds on a resolution, adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in 2013, to give the market the “decisive role” in allocating resources.

As the 19th Party Congress acknowledged, honoring these commitments will require China to protect private property rights and entrepreneurship. The importance of this is highlighted by the fact that the private sector contributes more than 60% of China's GDP, 50% of its taxes, 70% of its technological and product innovations, and 80% of its jobs, despite accounting for less than 40% of inputs.

As for liberalization, China is committed to implementing policies to open up further its markets to trade and foreign investment, while protecting the legitimate rights and interests of foreign investors. As part of this effort, the government is authorizing further free-trade zones, and exploring the possibility of free-trade ports in selected locations.

It is believed that China is on track to achieve its goal of becoming a high-income economy by 2035. But it will have to sustain labor productivity growth of at least 5% annually for the next 15-20 years – an outcome that will depend on rising urbanization and deepening technological progress.

The key to success will be a Chinese leadership that adapts effectively to changing internal and external conditions and manages the risks that have accumulated in recent decades. For example, it must tackle growing income inequality, driven largely by the massive disparity between urban and rural incomes, though the income gap among urban residents is also widening. In 2014, per capita income was CN¥53,300 ($8,024) for the top 5% households and just CN¥1,600 for the poorest 5%.

According to China Household Financial Survey data, China's Gini coefficient – the most common measure of inequality – climbed from 0.283 in 1983 to 0.491 in 2008, reaching highs of 0.61 in 2010 and 0.60 in 2012 (much higher than the official figures of 0.481 and 0.474, respectively). Though the Gini coefficient dropped to 0.465 by 2016, that still exceeds the 0.24-0.36 range for major developed economies.

China also faces increasing wealth disparity. In 1988 and 1995, China's Gini coefficient of household wealth was just 0.34 and 0.4, respectively. But the coefficient has grown, peaking at 0.739 in 2010. By 2014, the poorest 25% of households owned less than 2% of the country’s total wealth, while the top 1% owned one third.

If China fails to contain inequality, its long-term growth could suffer. But with a clear development blueprint and a powerful leader whose political clout all but guarantees continued reform, China might be in a strong position to address the challenges it faces and sustain its unprecedented economic success.

Yet, even if China achieves its goals for 2050, the challenge will not be over, as China's leaders will then have to contend with an aging population. By 2050, 36.5% of China's population will be over the age of 60, according to the 2017 revision of the United Nations’ World Population Prospects. The median age may be as high as 49.6, quite close to Japan's 53.3 and higher than in the Sweden, the United Kingdom, European Union as a whole, and the United States. This makes it all the more crucial for China's leaders to make the right decisions and put their country on a stable footing by 2050.