我们构建了一个货币模型，其中的中间商在零售市场上充当供应商与消费者之间的中介，同时也作为供应商的资金提供者，为供应商筹集资金，以提供应急的流动性支持。我们展示了，中介在零售科技上的优势影响了她作为资金提供者的角色，她不仅根据供应商的盈利能力选择供应商，还根据供应商对整体流动性池的贡献来做出选择。出乎意料的是，来自货币市场的高成本流动性（即非零的名义利率）促使中介建立了一个流动性池，使得她的供应商之间能够实现福利改善的流动性交叉补贴。

We develop a monetary model in which a middleman, who intermediates between suppliers and consumers in retail markets, simultaneously operates as a financier to her suppliers, pooling funds to provide liquidity support for urgent needs. We demonstrate that, the middleman's advantage in retail technologies affects her role as a financier where she selects suppliers not only based on their profitability but also on their contributions to the overall liquidity pool. Somewhat surprisingly, costly liquidity from the money market (i.e. non-zero nominal interest rates) induces the middleman to create a liquidity pool that enables welfare-improving liquidity cross-subsidization among her suppliers.

Hosted by: Prof. Lijian Sun  

Contact: Tianxi Huang

2024年11月27日（星期三）18:30

Time: 18:30, November 27th 2024 (Wednesday)

Place: Room 209, Think Tank Building